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ABSTRACT 
 
In the design of complex systems serving a broad group of stakeholders, it can be 
difficult to prioritize objectives for the architecture. I postulate that it is possible to make 
architectural decisions based on consideration of stakeholder value delivery, in order to 
help prioritize objectives. I introduce the concept of value network models to map out the 
indirect benefit delivered to stakeholders. A numerical methodology for prioritizing paths 
through this network model is presented, with a view to discovering the most important 
organizational outputs.  
 
I show how value network models can be linked to architecture models to provide 
decision support to the architect. I present a case study to examine the connectivity and 
sensitivity of a test architecture to value delivery. I conclude that a limited subset of 
NASA’s outputs will discriminate between architectures. In this manner, I show how 
value considerations can be used to structure the design space before critical technical 
decisions are made to narrow it.  
 
A number of organizational implications for value delivery are generated from 
this analysis. In particular, I show that benefit flows should be aligned to organizational 
processes and responsibilities, and that failure to map stakeholder input to architecture 
evaluation can weaken benefit.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A critical aspect of future space exploration is sustainability.  Technical success 
alone cannot ensure that space exploration will have the continuing societal support 
necessary over the course of decades to develop enduring and expanding exploration 
capabilities. I define sustainability using a four-fold approach: valued benefits to all 
stakeholders, affordability, risk management that communicates residual operational risks 
to stakeholders, policy robustness to improve the chances of success in a changing 
political environment1,2,3. In this thesis, I focus on modeling the first pillar of 
sustainability, how value is delivered to a wide range of stakeholders. The exploration 
enterprise includes the core set of explorers, scientists, and engineers that realize and 
execute the space exploration campaign.  It also includes the extended group of 
stakeholders who are not directly involved in the exploration campaign, but who are 
nevertheless crucial in providing support and funding.  I assert that all stakeholders must 
be aware of the benefit derived from the exploration value delivery system and of its 
delivery mechanism in order for the organization to be sustainable. 
 
 Current requirements analysis tends to  select architectures based on technical 
merit, and then build in consideration of stakeholders much later in the design process. 
Requirements analysis is well developed as a method for translating opportunities or 
needs into system requirements4,5. In many cases, the identification of requirements is 
levied from the customer-specified technical requirements  or past technical systems, 
without examining where needs derive from. Furthermore, there is often a selection bias 
which tends to highlight technical needs because they can be more easily quantified as 
requirements. I assert that requirements analysis has not mated well with stakeholder 
analysis in the past, because of difficulties translating between the output of stakeholder 
analysis and the inputs for requirements analysis. 
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Prof. James Wilson notes that this problem is not unique to requirements 
engineering, and is in fact exacerbated for government programs where no competition 
exists: 
 
“The tasks of operators in private organizations with vague goals 
become defined through a process of trial and error and internal 
negotiation that is then tested by competitive natural selection. The 
tasks of operators in government agencies with vague goals are 
probably set in much the same way, but without a regular test of the 
fitness of the solution. […] When the agencies have vague or 
inconsistent goals (as is usually the case), what the workers do will be 
shaped by the circumstances they encounter at the job, the beliefs and 
experiences they bring to the job, or the external pressures on the 
job.”6  
 
I propose that a sustainable exploration value delivery system results from 
deliberate design decisions, and that those design decisions are best realized through an 
understanding of the system’s stakeholders, their values and needs early on in the 
process.  Once values and needs are identified, system requirements can be defined, 
leading to the development of specific architecture choices not only for the exploration 
technical system, but also for the exploration enterprise and operating concept, as well as 
its policy environment.  
  
The general objective of this thesis is therefore to analyze this gap between 
benefit and requirements, and, more importantly, to provide a process for bridging the 
gap between stakeholders’ considerations and requirements analysis for large, complex 
systems. 
  
The use of stakeholder analysis has grown  steadily, diffusing in from rising 
interest in corporate governance7. This reflects a growing sense that the organization 
should act on the interests and values of its stakeholders. While interest on the corporate 
front centers around whether or not ‘maximizing stakeholder value’ is an appropriate 
measure of success, public enterprises are forced to tackle the key issues head-on, given 
that profit is not an available metric.  
 
 The key question for public enterprises is therefore how to measure value? I define 
value as a benefit perceived by the receiving party at the cost required to obtain it, which 
is a simplification of the Lean Enterprise definition of value : “how various stakeholders 
find particular worth, utility, benefit, or reward in exchange for their respective 
contributions to the enterprise”8. Benefit is always recorded from the perspective of the 
recipient, in an effort to capture the change in the stakeholder’s attribute that is actually 
related to value. Value is created by the organization in question by using its resources to 
create an architecture which produces outputs that satisfy the needs of its stakeholders. In 
this manner, I abstract across a number of different transactions (e.g. goods, services, 
information, political influence) and disciplines (e.g. systems engineering, science, 
political science, economics) using the language of value. Identifying which entities are 
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stakeholders shapes the network boundaries, scope, and the types of value that are 
considered in the  analysis. It is therefore important that the choices of stakeholders are 
consistent with the intended scope of the value flows.  
       
 Questions of value and stakeholder analysis are increasingly present in systems 
engineering analysis. For example, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook of 1995 
[Hoffman] makes no reference to stakeholders, but a recent NASA study, the Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study9, references consulting and communicating with stakeholders 
tangentially. The most recent version of the NASA Systems Engineering Processes and 
Requirements document (published March 6 2006) now requires stakeholder analysis as 
the first step in the requirements definition process, in order to “elicit and define use 
cases, scenarios, operational concepts, and stakeholder expectations”10.  
 
The specific objective of this thesis is to showcase a modeling technique by which 
stakeholder analysis can be used to differentiate between architectures. Large public 
architectures represent the ideal case study, because they do not have easily-derived 
technical requirements, and the proliferation of non-technical needs forces us to examine 
the bias in requirements-setting.  
 
Much of the discipline of system architecture has focused on methods for 
abstracting information from downstream in the design process up into the initial decision 
period. Techniques like parametric subsystem models and functional decomposition have 
facilitated this process. This thesis aims to do the same for the feedback systems from 
stakeholders that occur later in the design process. 
  
  While this thesis is written using NASA’s exploration value delivery system as the 
primary example, an effort is made to highlight the generic process, given that this 
process is broadly applicable.  
 
 This thesis is organized into four main chapters. The first explores the background 
and context for system architecture and stakeholder analysis in the literature and the 
available course material. The second chapter develops a network model for 
understanding the stakeholder context, and presents a quantitative methodology for 
sorting amongst different benefits. The third chapter showcases the results from this 
model. The fourth chapter presents a methodology and a test case for linking this network 
model directly to an architecture.   
 
 
 
 
 
Specific Objective 
Demonstrate a modeling technique by which stakeholder analysis 
can be used to differentiate between architectures. 
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2. Background 
 
 In this section, the relevant literature on related topics is presented, as well as the  
previous work performed at MIT on value modeling. The literature search is subdivided 
into three sections: 
 
Stakeholders and Complex Systems: This section delves into the academic context and 
motivation for the research.   
 
Network Theory: Overview of the computational techniques available for network 
modeling.  
 
Organizational Design: The relevant background on designing an organization for value 
delivery.  
 
The literature search is then followed by a discussion of the previous work completed in 
this area of research.  
 
2.1. Literature Search 
2.1.1. Stakeholders and Complex Systems 
 
Who are Stakeholders?  
 
Modern stakeholder theory originated with Freeman’s Strategic Management, A 
Stakeholder Approach11, published in 1984. The main tenets of stakeholder theory, as 
summarized later by Sternberg12 are: 
 
1. Organizations are accountable to all their stakeholders 
2. The objective of management is to balance stakeholders’ competing interests 
 
While a number of different management strategies are given in Freeman, ranging 
from defining stakeholders as only those who hold stocks in the organization to a 
Rawlsian strategy aimed at creating social change, the approach pursued in this thesis 
follows most closely in the Utilitarian tradition, which aims to maximize benefit across a 
diverse base of stakeholders.  
 
Donaldson and Preston13 provide an overview of the discipline’s justification. They 
note that stakeholder theory is difficult to falsify, in that differing degrees of ‘stakeholder 
management’ are difficult to quantify, and that no true empirically tested hypotheses are 
presented in the literature. Many arguments based on the descriptive power of 
stakeholder theory are given, and an attempt is made to formally link the discipline to 
agency theory, microeconomics, and contract theory.  
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One of the key questions in stakeholder theory is who to consider a stakeholder. One 
could attempt to capture all those who can have an impact on the organization, or more 
broadly, all those who are impacted by the organization.  
 
According to Kochan and Rubenstein14 there are three key criteria for categorizing 
stakeholders:   
 
1. Stakeholders must hold assets that are critical to the enterprise’s success 
2. Stakeholders must put their assets at risk in the enterprise 
3. Stakeholders must have sufficient power to compel influence.  
 
Sternberg offers a strong caution of adopting too broad a definition, noting that 
stakeholder theory doesn’t explicitly enable a prioritization of stakeholders. She also 
notes that even restricting stakeholders to those parties that affect the organization is too 
broad, noting that burglars should not be considered stakeholders. Finally, Sternberg 
notes that stakeholder theory doesn’t provide guidance on mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts between stakeholders.  
 
I use a narrow definition of the term stakeholder, requiring the possibility to affect the 
organization, as well as receiving some sort of output from the organization (i.e. having a 
stake). Based on this definition, one can then a separate group called beneficiaries, who 
receive outputs but do not have the ability to influence the organization.  
 
What is a Complex System, Why Might It Involve Stakeholders?  
 
The term complex system has been defined by Crawley as: 
 
Crawley’s Complex System: Having many interrelated, interconnected, or interwoven 
elements and interfaces15.  
 
Embedded in this idea are two  assumptions: 
 
1. The complexity is not easily represented. For example, an integrated circuit with 
several AND/OR logic gates has many interconnected elements, but can be easily 
represented as a circuit diagram with several instantiations of AND/OR gates   
2. The overall behavior of the system depends on many of the constitutive parts (if it 
was dependent on only one, the behavior would be easy to describe).  
 
Two additional definitions of complex systems are: 
 
De Weck and Magee’s Complex System: A system with numerous components and 
interconnections, interactions or interdependencies that are difficult to describe, understand, 
predict, manage, design, and/or change.16 
 
Sussman’s Complex System: […] composed of a group of interrelated units (component 
and subsystems), for which the degree and nature of the relationships is imperfectly known,  
with varying directionality, magnitude and time-scales of interactions. Its overall emergent  
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behavior is difficult to predict, even when subsystem behavior is readily predictable.17 
 
Note that de Weck’s and Sussman’s definitions layer on the idea of uncertainty or 
imperfect information, not included in Crawley. Given that complex systems are not well 
understood, it is natural to layer additional observed behaviors, although it is not 
necessarily known whether these behaviors cause the complexity or not.  
 
Mostashari18 provides a good system for classifying types of complexity:  
 
Behavioral complexity occurs when the emergent behavior of the system does not seem 
to relate to the individual behavior of the subsystems. 
 
Structural complexity “is a measure of the interconnectedness of the structure of the 
complex system” [Mostashari, p.40].  
 
Evaluative complexity denotes the idea that different actors can have different perceptions 
of the system, particularly differences in the valuation of outcomes.  
 
Nested complexity occurs when each subsystem can be a complex system in its own right. 
Therefore, it is not necessarily feasible to increase the overall detail of a model in order to 
get to a level that has no uncertainty.  
 
This is but a brief sketch of some of the factors that are often associated with 
complex systems. As with all models, complex systems models aim to capture the 
behavior of interest using a particular subset of the information available.  Stakeholders 
are one of these possible information sources which can increase the complexity of 
certain systems.  
 
First and foremost, multiple stakeholders can increase the evaluative complexity 
of the system, given that each does not necessarily derive the same benefit from the 
system. Second, stakeholders can increase the structural complexity of the system, as 
they provide resources that connect into the complex system, and they receive some 
portion of the output of the complex system (i.e. there are interfaces between 
stakeholders and the system which require structure in the system).  
 
One can then ask what types of complex systems would we expect the 
stakeholder-related complexity to play a central role in the overall complexity of the 
system, and by therefore, our understanding of the system? For example, we would 
expect large public engineering projects to have numerous, conflicting stakeholders, like 
the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System. However, for a complex system under private 
ownership, with sufficient central authority, one might not expect stakeholder 
considerations to dominate, like the Pickering, Ontario nuclear power plant. We might 
reasonably expect the importance of stakeholder consideration to scale with the number 
of stakeholders, the relative power of stakeholders, and the extent to which stakeholders 
have strong preferences about the design of the system.  
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One can imagine that the motivation for considering stakeholders might come in two 
forms: 
 
1. Pull: There is an immediate need to manage the stakeholders, because they will 
obstruct the process if not satisfied 
2. Push: The organization has managed to deploy the complex system, but for the 
next iteration, it perceives that stakeholder consideration could garner it more benefit. 
This would be more likely in a market environment.  
 
The remainder of the thesis presumes that appropriate motivation for considering 
stakeholders has been identified, and the question remains how to manage them. The next 
section starts this thread by identifying what avenues exist for integrating stakeholders 
needs into a design.  
 
Approaches to Integrating Stakeholders  In Complex Systems 
 
There are three possible ways to include stakeholders in complex systems planning, in 
order of increasing stakeholder involvement: 
 
1. Analyze stakeholder dynamics to create a prioritization of stakeholders, for use as 
a rough heuristic 
2. Capture soft priorities & determine metrics by which stakeholders want design to 
be evaluated 
3. Map stakeholder needs directly onto the design 
 
These are discussed in order below.  
 
1. Analyze stakeholder dynamics to create a prioritization of stakeholders, for use as 
a rough heuristic 
 
This was touched on above in the literature for stakeholder theory, in terms of the 
descriptive effort by stakeholder theorists. However, no mode of quantitative analysis 
was discovered in the literature purely on stakeholder dynamics, which partially defines 
the niche for this thesis. More specific elements of the literature that focus on elements of 
stakeholder dynamics relative to my quantitative framework are covered in the 
development of the quantitative framework.  
 
2. Capture soft priorities & determine metrics by which stakeholders want design to 
be evaluated 
 
This topic is the subject of many ESD monographs. Soft priorities include 
flexibility, manufacturability, sustainability, and risk minimization. While there is no 
limit to the number and type of soft priorities  stakeholders might care about, all metrics 
share common characteristics, as explored below.  
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Harry Cook19, a Professor in Product Development at the University of Chicago at 
Urbana-Champaign focusing on the Auto Industry, provides an excellent overview of 
possible methods for determining and evaluating metrics, from a product development 
perspective. He focuses on customers as the primary stakeholders, citing the economic 
theory behind pricing goods (price being the top metric for commercial products). Utility 
theory is discussed (mapping ‘usefulness’ as a function of performance), as well as 
prospect theory (utility theory when the benefits can be uncertain) and willingness to pay 
(defining value as the maximum exchange rate of goods & services for money). A closely 
related concept to WTP, Willingess to Accept (WTA), which seeks to define the bottom 
end of the scale, is relevant but not discussed in Cook.  
 
Interestingly, Cook decouples benefit from cost in most of his research. 
Theoretically, benefit (or performance) and price are two separate metrics by which 
customers evaluate a product. The MIT approach has been to couple these in the concept 
of value, which is defined as benefit at cost (crudely, benefit less price where if both can 
be expressed in the same units). However, Cook first examines the problem of benefit, 
which he encapsulates as ‘quality’, and then examines the price that can be extracted for a 
defined benefit. He later sketches curves of Value-Cost [Cook, p. 188], the equivalent of 
the MIT value concept, but does not explore the benefit-price space broadly.   
 
Cook references a framework for quality, which defines eight dimensions 
according to Garvin20:   
• Performance – Attributes central to the function of the product 
• Features – Attributes not central to the function of the product (ex. radio in a car) 
• Reliability 
• Conformance – Actual performance meets stated performance 
• Durability 
• Serviceability 
• Aesthetics 
• Perceived Quality – Essentially customer satisfaction 
 
Cook then provides a number of interesting studies of benefit as a function of 
performance for cars. For example, he graphs benefit as a function of front leg room, 
using an exponential model relative to an inputted ‘baseline’ leg room, which is defined 
as having benefit of 1.   
 
On the whole, Cook’s approach favors several smaller metrics for benefit. The 
majority of his work is developing these metrics, rather than identifying metrics, because 
the dimensions of benefit for his product are well defined by past designs. 
 
3. Map stakeholder needs directly onto the design 
 
The third method for integrating stakeholders into complex system design, ‘Map 
stakeholder needs into the design’, has been the subject of significant research in product 
development, and manufacturing, among others. I call the key challenge here The 
Problem of Requirements Derivation: Given that you know who your stakeholders are, 
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how do you capture what their needs are, and how do you map them onto the design? A 
survey of some methods for requirements derivation are presented below.  
 
Kano’s method21, developed by Prof. Noriaki Kano of Tokyo Rika University, 
provides a framework for assessing the importance of product qualities from the 
customer’s perspective. According to Kano, all product attributes can be grouped into one 
of three main categories, Must Be, One Dimensional, or Exciter, according to the level of 
customer satisfaction obtained for a given functionality of that attribute. For example, 
brakes on a car are a Must Be attribute, in the sense that the customer is dissatisfied if 
they are not present, but is not particularly satisfied if they are present – brakes are an 
expectation. Gas mileage on that car would be a One-Dimensional attribute, in the sense 
that the more functional the gas-mileage attribute, the more satisfied the customer is. 
Video screens in a car would be an Exciter attribute, in that most customers are not 
disappointed if they are not present, but they are excited if they are present. two 
additional are also possible, Indifference (where satisfaction doesn’t change with 
increasing functionality) and Reverse (where functionality increases dissatisfaction).  
 
 
Figure 1 Kano Categories 
 
The Kano method describes how two questions (one functional, one 
dysfunctional) per attribute can be used to determine which category each attribute falls 
into. While these questions are easily drafted for products, particularly where the 
architecture has already been determined,  it is not always reasonable to ask the 
dysfunctional question, particularly in a policy setting. For example, one could not 
reasonably ask “What if NASA does not receive funding from Congress?”. Therefore, in 
some cases, the questions must be modified for environments where relative change 
dominates. Another possible shortcoming of the Kano method is that it uses mostly 
 - 23 - 
existing forms to describe the theory, thus focusing his theory more on the requirements 
and design-facing considerations rather than needs.  
 
Kano’s theory compares favorably with other similar studies, which also highlight 
three main types of needs. For example, in a marketing study “The results, based on a 
sample of employees in marketing communications and public relations agencies, show 
that three different levels of exchange and communication – inevitable, necessary and 
desirous levels – can be expected”22. 
 
Kano’s theory was motivated by a broader study of quality control measures in 
Japanese firms.23 His criteria were used as the first step to defining what type of quality 
customers wanted, which was followed by a number of methods to attempt to design and 
manufacture to that quality. A number of quality methods have arisen since, some of 
which merit mention here for their methods of understanding quality.  
 
Quality Function Deployment (also called Quality Deployment and the Taguchi 
method)  arose out of the manufacturing sector in Japan. QFD aims to translate Customer 
Requirements (CRs) into Technical Attributes (TAs), keeping careful watch of the 
competition.  
  
There are several key ideas in QFD24: 
 
1. Use a matrix to map CRs to TAs, with different strengths of relationships 
2. Record which TAs are coupled (a rough design model) 
3. Use a prioritization of the TAs as an input to the design (derived from 
prioritization of CRs)  
4. Establish numerical target for TAs 
5. Benchmark satisfaction of CRs against competitors 
 
In particular, QFD methods aim to capture the above information in a single diagram, to 
facilitate inter-disciplinary dialogue about the problem.  
 
Chen et al. 25  note there is uncertainty associated with translating Customer 
Requirements into Technical Attributes because there is are multiple mappings of CRs 
into TAs as each customer requirement could be satisfied by multiple TAs. Some 
interesting work has been done on using fuzzy numbers to express the relative priority of 
CRs, as well as the mapping of CRs to TAs, in order to better capture the associated 
uncertainty.  
 
Lean, as derived from the Toyota Production System, focuses on identifying 
processes that impact value to the customer. Its focus on process, rather than creativity, 
architecture or design, belies its origins in manufacturing. However, Lean has been 
expanded to administration and product development, with mixed success. A recent MIT 
thesis by MacKenzie describes how value stream mapping can identify processes of 
interest to stakeholders. He notes that, with good data on the relative durations of 
different processes, time can be used a metric for cost, therefore a determination of value 
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can be performed. Specifically, a tool to map the time required for different processes 
was used. However, in the absence of good timing data, or where activities don’t 
contribute linearly to value, it can be difficult to link this analysis back to stakeholders. 
Additionally, MacKenzie’s analysis requires an existing process, and is therefore less 
useful for new designs. MacKenzie proposes a rudimentary segmentation of stakeholders, 
by which processes for low value stakeholders would be outright eliminated as 
‘wasteful’. In this respect, Lean doesn’t provide a framework for mapping stakeholder 
needs onto the design – rather, it provides a possible mechanism for evaluating the 
implementation of a design relative to stakeholders.  
 
If all we were interested in was ranking stakeholder needs, we might also consider 
Conjoint Analysis or Analytical Hierarchy Process26. Given a set of stakeholder needs, 
these methods generate a ranked list by performing pair-wise comparison of all needs for 
a given stakeholder. We would still need a method to determine how many needs to 
satisfy for each stakeholder, and we haven’t learned anything about the stakeholder’s 
relative priority of these needs to needs not serviced by our actions. Additionally, the 
pairwise comparison process can become tedious for more than 5 or 6 needs.  
 
As seen, a number of methods have been developed for capturing stakeholder and 
customer input for the design of complex systems. The choice of method and the level of 
detail of the analysis depends largely on what the desired output of the stakeholder 
analysis is, and how stakeholder input compares with the other upstream influences on 
the architecture (competition, regulations,  human resources, capital, etc.). Before delving 
more deeply into the specific stakeholder considerations that might be interesting to 
represent, it would be worthwhile to investigate some of the other dimensions of complex 
systems that have been represented previously.  
2.1.2. Modeling Complex Systems 
 
A number of different types of models are used for modeling complex systems, 
depending on the application. Because I define complex systems as capturing several 
different types of information, these models necessarily bridge several disciplines. Some 
examples include: 
 
Multidisciplinary Physical Models: Bringing together several disciplinary models, the 
complexity in these models arise from coupling between subsystems. An excellent 
example is the WingMOD MDO model created by Willcox to model the structural and 
aerodynamic aspects of a Blended Wing Body aircraft27.  
 
Network Models: These models address systems where the complexity arises from the 
quantity of actors / subsystems, rather than from significant coupling between any two 
actors / subsystems. Modeling of air transportation networks or supply chains fall in this 
category, such as the SpaceNet space logistics model28.  
 
Systems Dynamics: This discipline models systems which have time delays or a feedback 
structure. System dynamics models capture complexity in the form of non-traditional  or 
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abstract couplings between actors / subsystems.  A number of other model types exist 
which capture the time dimension, notably the Critical Path Method (CPM)29 for project 
management. In CPM, a series of processes are assigned completion times and 
interdependencies, from which the longest route through the network can be calculated, 
representing the minimum time necessary to complete the project. Some more recent 
CPM models have also included use of shared resources.   
 
Recognizing the old saying “All models are wrong”, each of the above types of 
model captures a particular dimension of a complex system. What we represent boils 
down to what we would like to capture about the system. The choice of dimensions 
should reflect the decisions to be made, the availability of appropriate data, and the 
organizational context into which the results will be integrated. With a view to examining 
the operational realities a value model will face, the next section provides an overview of 
the literature at the intersection of organizational design and system architecture.  
2.1.3. Organizational Design 
 
This section attempts to address the literature coverage of organizational realities. 
While the two previous sections began to walk through theoretical methods that lead to 
better design for value, this section will attempt to provide some context for value 
decisions, highlighting some of the litmus tests that can be applied to check a method for 
initial feasibility.  
 
There are two dimensions of organizational behavior that would be worth 
considering here, which is explored in more depth below:  
1. How do stakeholders typically interact with an organization?  
2. How are decisions actually made?  
 
How do stakeholder typically interact with an organization? 
 
Resource dependence theory maintains that an organization’s stakeholder 
interaction varies as a function of the resources it requires from stakeholders. Coff30 
focuses on bargaining power (some of which is grounded in resources) as the determinant 
of stakeholder outcomes. Coff highlights 4 dimensions of bargaining power: the ability to 
act together, access to information, replacement costs to the firm if a stakeholder exits, 
and cost of exiting to the stakeholder. Although in government scenarios, stakeholder exit 
might not be a realistic policy, Coff’s position could be extended to include costs of 
reduced stakeholder involvement.  
 
Craig attributes the success of the NASA robotic exploration programme to the 
existence of a “coherent external agent, The National Academy of Sciences”31. The 
existence of a clear and responsive client creates clear lines of communication, and a 
sense of oversight on value. Craig suggests that giving an external agency (whether it is a 
currently stakeholder or not) an oversight role would change the dynamics of stakeholder 
interaction, essentially by creating approval resources that NASA would need.  
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Assuming that an organization has an interest in engaging its stakeholders, one 
then has to ask the question of whether these stakeholders have an interest in interacting 
with the organization. Certainly this will depend on the history of interactions between 
the two, particularly whether the organization was seen to be responsive to external 
concerns. However, in addition to historical relationships, stakeholders may have reasons 
to guard information. Pfeffer32 notes that stakeholders with high bargaining power may 
only interact with the organization when it is necessary to release information in order to 
make their outcome the obvious choice. 
 
How are decisions actually made?  
 
A preliminary reading of political economy reveals a key axiom: All 
bureaucracies act to preserve their own existence. Allison opines that “a government 
consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal loosely allied organizations, each with a 
substantial life of its own”33. He continues, stating that Standard Operating Procedures 
are a natural result of the breadth of the mission of governmental agencies and the 
coordination required to deal with a complex set of constraints. Changes in these SOPs 
are more likely to occur after dramatic budget swings or performance failures.  
 
These comments echo Wilson’s quote on the effect of organizational culture on 
decision-making. Wilson quotes  Roger Boisjoly, a whistle-blower at Morton-Thiokol in 
the Challenger accident, who states “nobody [raises objections] without a complete, fully 
documented, verifiable set of data” [Wilson, 104]. Wilson also notes that in a constraint-
heavy public organization, “managers have a strong incentive to worry more about 
constraints than tasks, which means to worry more about processes than outcomes” 
[Wilson, p 131]. While this paints an negative picture of change in large organizations, it 
also emphasizes that any inclusion of a model as part of a process must have strong ties 
to outcomes to overcome the focus on tasks.  
 
Switching focus to the external component of the decision-making process, a 
number of works have explored the idea that decision makers can be understood as 
bargaining agents attempting to form coalitions. Weible discusses the advocacy coalition 
framework for explaining the behavior of policy actors. He states that ACF “predicts two 
precursors to a major policy change: changes in beliefs of a dominant coalition or 
changes in available resources and venues [sic]  which are brought about external shocks, 
policy-oriented learning, or hurting stalemate”34. In the context of my model, external 
shocks (like a political shift in the Congress) would be considered exogenous, policy-
oriented learning would be captured, but is not considered a driver of change, and hurting 
stalemate would only be captured if regret were incorporate (as stalemates rarely arise out 
of benefit).  
 
 The difficulty in organization theory is that differences across organizations and 
decisions make it difficult to create general principles, beyond the basics of incentives, 
power, and coalitions. Therefore, many of these issues are treated in the NASA context 
through the thesis, recognizing however that there is a limit to how specific one can make 
the context without delving into individual organization trees.  
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Having now examined some of the relevant background for the benefit, 
stakeholder, modeling, and organizational context in which the central architecting 
questions of this thesis lie, I proceed to discuss some of the previous work on 
stakeholders conducted at MIT.  
2.2. Previous MIT Work 
 
This section attempts to provide a brief overview of the intellectual work and the 
context for this work previous to my arrival in September 2005.  
 
There are 5 main contributors, whose work I will artificially segregate to simplify the 
discussion. The majority of this work was performed during the NASA Concept 
Exploration and Refinement study over the 2004-2005 academic year. As such, the 
complex system under study was originally the NASA lunar transportation system.  
 
The overall framework for the system architecture work was created by Ben Koo35, 
in collaboration with Bill Simmons and Ed Crawley. The premise is that aerospace 
applications often do a poor job of examining the entire design space. Rather, a number 
of possible approaches are identified, then one or two are chosen for detailed study based 
on a past experience, judgment, and legacy considerations. Koo’s innovation was to 
create a modeling framework to force the designer to enumerate all of the variable 
choices for the architecture, and then formally express the constraints between different 
variable choices in the concept of the design, yielding a much broader architecture space 
than is typically considered. A screenshot of Koo’s modeling language is shown in the 
figure below, for a specific model built by Simmons. Once all feasible architectures are  
enumerated, they are ranked using metrics, in order to select a subset for detailed study. It 
is worth noting that solid parametric models are a requirement for this approach, in order 
to determine the attributes of given architecture for input to the metrics based only on the 
selection of its architecture variables. The placement of metrics on the critical path to 
architecture selection is suggestive of possible stakeholder-related benefit metrics.  
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Figure 2 Object Process Network for M Transportation Architectures 
 
Ed Crawley’s36 needs framework forms the foundation for the idea of stakeholder 
related benefit metrics. There are several keys ideas listed here, drawn from his ESD.34 
System Architecture course.  
 
 Crawley defines an architecture as “The embodiment of concept, and the 
allocation of physical/informational function to elements of form, and definition of 
interfaces among the elements and with the surrounding context.” Formally then, 
selection of an architecture means choosing a concept, determining requisite functions, 
identifying possible forms, allocating functions to forms, and defining interfaces between 
elements and interfaces with the architecture. The contention that stakeholder benefit 
analysis could help select an architecture is possibly related to the following subset of 
those functions: 
 
1. Determining requisite functions. Functions must alter an attribute of the operand 
in order to deliver value. This suggests value is to some extent driven by change, 
rather than steady processes.  
2. Selection of forms which impact cost.  Crawley defines value as benefit at cost.  
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3. Defining interfaces with the surrounding context. This was the genesis of the idea 
that the organization produces outputs, the sum total of which must capture all 
value delivery. Nothing which remains internal to the organization actually 
delivers value.  
 
Crawley then identifies the concept of the need, which must be satisfied by the 
outputs of the architecture. The key here is that needs satisfy beneficiaries, which are 
distinct from stakeholders. Beneficiaries are those parties that receive benefit from the 
organization, but do not necessarily contribute resources or hold a stake in the 
organization. A beneficiary for NASA could be the Department of Agriculture, which 
may use the results of space-based terrain mapping, but is not dependent on NASA in 
order to accomplish its mission, nor does it contribute to NASA’s mission. 
 
Finally, Crawley distinguishes between solution-specific and solution-neutral 
functions, as shown in the diagram below. Leveraging the concept of solution-neutral 
functions enables us to define needs and their relationship to the architecture, without 
picking a specific architecture. This is one of the necessary ingredients for using a Koo’s 
approach to architecting for benefit considerations.  
 
 
Figure 3 Crawley's Decomposition of Needs to Form  
(Adopted From Crawley ESD.34 Course Notes) 
The next contributors are Geilson Loureiro37 and Eric Rebentisch [Rebentisch], 
who created the first instantiation of the NASA value model. Among other activities 
during the NASA CE&R project, they created a series of black box models of 
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stakeholders, concretizing the ideas of needs as inputs and organizational interfaces as 
outputs. These black box models were the linked together, connecting outputs to inputs, 
forming ‘value flows’ and creating a network model of value. The implications and 
benefits of these decisions were not immediately expressed, and are discussed later in this 
thesis. Although there was a desire to use a quantitative framework to evaluate these 
feedback loops, one was not realized, thus creating the opportunity that this thesis 
partially fills.  
 
Additionally, Loureiro and Rebentisch helped create the concept of proximate 
metrics, based on these value flows. Proximate metrics were the first set of benefit 
metrics, but were not directly linked to organization’s outputs (as is done later in this 
thesis). Finally, Rebentisch and Crawley expressed a desire to rank the benefit to each 
stakeholder separately, forcing the recognition that the contributions to value for many 
stakeholders are not well modeled.  
 
The final contributor is Sandro Catanzaro38, who conceived of a reciprocal model 
whereby an organization should value its outputs based on their ability to generate the 
organization’s input. Catanzaro constructed a probabilistic model that attempted to 
incorporate the uncertainty associated with value  mapping. Furthermore, Catanzaro took 
the approach of modeling many cycles, enabling a differentiation between short term 
value and long term value. His model captured detail in terms of the accomplishment of 
possible objectives, but then approximated stakeholder interactions by single pairwise 
comparisons, as shown in the diagram below in the ‘Stakeholder Interactions’ matrix. 
Catanzaro assumed that all stakeholders can provide all resources, each to a different 
extent.  
 
Figure 4 Catanzaro's Stakeholder Architecture Model 
Catanzaro’s model provides a number of important foundational  concepts, but 
leaves many open research directions. While his association matrices provide a general 
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solution, many of the pairwise associations are not used, incurring significant 
computational and complexity costs in the process. His use of a probabilistic model 
assumes that the uncertainty can be captured from a spread relevant transactions, which 
are not necessarily available. Additionally, his study focused on a disparate and 
incomplete set of decisions, framed in terms of goals rather than grounded in previous 
work by Crawley on needs, thus leaving out a number of interaction effects.  
 
Therefore, I identified opportunities to create a complete model, formalize the 
rules by which a stakeholder model is created, simplify the modeling layer to bring out 
relevant feedback loops, and assess the architectural implications of this work. Each of 
these opportunities is explored in turn in the subsequent chapters.  
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3. Value Loop Thinking 
 
So far, I’ve motivated the idea that benefit is not captured or analyzed in current 
architecting processes, and I’ve worked through some of the academic considerations 
which would be desirable to capture in a benefit model.  
 
In this chapter, I present a methodology that ties many of these considerations 
together. I introduce a numerical method for evaluating the strength of stakeholder 
feedback loops, with a view to prioritizing stakeholders and identifying important loops. 
Specifically, I provide answers to the following questions:  
 
 Determine how to interpret Kano levels 
 Determine how to interpret influence around a loop, through an agent  
 Introduce competition in loops 
 Derive scheme to incorporate Kano, importance, competition 
 Determine how to best extract these three data from stakeholders 
3.1. Building a Value Flow Model 
 
In order to address a number of concerns relating to the first instantiation of the 
value model, a systematic reconstruction was undertaken. Specific attention was paid to 
connectivity (ensuring all inputs were derived from an output somewhere else) and to 
explicitly identifying modeling decisions that determine the amount of detail captured in 
the model. For completeness, the full process for constructing the model is given below. 
The conjugation ‘we’ is used throughout Section 3.1 to indicate that the majority of the 
underlying work was a team effort, as described in Section 2.3 Previous MIT Work.  
 
There are four main steps to constructing this model, each of which is discussed 
in more detail below.  
1. Identifying Stakeholders 
2. Discovering Stakeholder Needs 
3. Modeling Stakeholders 
4. Creating Value Flows 
 
Once the model has been created, I will discuss qualitatively which aspects of 
stakeholder behavior I want to capture, and will then present a numerical methodology 
that captures this behavior quantitatively.  
 
Identifying Stakeholders 
 
 My definition of stakeholders requires that stakeholder have the possibility of 
affecting the organization and receiving some sort of output from the organization. 
Therefore, sketching all parties that can affect the organization is the first step in 
identifying stakeholders. Listing all of the outputs of the organization and who they flow 
to is the second step. One then needs to reduce these two sets to the groups that meet both 
criteria. 
 - 34 - 
 
Generally, the difficulty with stakeholders is not in defining the largest possible 
set. Corporate mission documents, legislation and past transaction histories all provide 
suggestions as to who could be considered a stakeholder. The real difficulty is applying 
one’s definition of ‘affecting the organization’ and ‘receiving output from the 
organization’ consistently.  
 
For NASA, stakeholders are identified by answering the question: ‘who are the 
stakeholders of the space exploration systems of systems to whom benefit might flow?’ 
Sources for answering this question were: the Constitution of the United States, the Space 
Act of 1958 as amended39, the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE)40 as well as working 
group discussions.  
 
   Three of the major groups are explicitly mentioned in the top-level objective in 
the Vision for Space Exploration: ‘The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. 
Scientific, Security, and Economic interests through a robust space exploration 
program.’ The Vision for Space Exploration also implicitly notes the US People as a 
benefactor of space exploration: “A significant human component can inspire us – and 
our youth – to greater achievements on Earth”. I broke out Educators as a separate 
stakeholder, to explicitly capture this commitment to youth and training. The Media was 
also added to recognize that there is typically an intermediary between the NASA and the 
US People, which has the potential to influence value. The Executive and Congress 
were added as the constitutional agent for the US People. Finally, International 
Partners are included for their mention in the Space Act of 1958, which mandates that 
NASA “shall make every effort to enlist the support and cooperation of appropriate 
scientists and engineers of other countries and international organizations”. In the Vision 
for Space Exploration, international participation is encouraged to the extent that it 
“further[s] U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests”. The eight stakeholders 
groups, plus NASA, are shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 5 Stakeholder Input Output Diagrams 
Interestingly, the Space Act of 1958 explicitly identifies Mankind as a 
stakeholder: “for the benefit of all mankind”, but Mankind is not mentioned in many 
recent documents, including the Vision for Space Exploration.  
 
The table below provides a more in depth definition for each stakeholder.  
 
Table 1 Stakeholder Definitions for NASA Model 
Stakeholder Definition 
Economic The for-profit actors that interact directly or indirectly with 
NASA. Examples include contractors and aerospace firms 
Educators The individuals and institutions that comprise the US 
educational system, from the primary level to universities. 
Executive and Congress The leglislative and executive branches of the US government. 
This include the individuals, committees, agencies other than 
security, and advisors 
International Partners The foreign governments, national space agencies, and foreign 
contractors could potentially interact with NASA.  
Media The firms responsible for the acquisition, composition, and 
distribution of news and entertainment internationally which 
could potentially cover NASA. 
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NASA The US government agency which is tasked with the civilian 
use of space, including headquarters and centers. 
Science The international body of scientists, communities, and 
institutions which perform or advise on science within 
NASA’s mandate 
Security The US government agencies, civilian and military, whose 
primary purpose is the provision of intelligence, or offensive 
and defensive capabilities.  
US People The US population, not limited to those of voting age.  
 
 
These eight stakeholder groups are classified into four types, identified by color in 
the figure: public (grey), security (pink), economic (green), science (yellow). These types 
were created to explicitly identify that some stakeholders, such as educators and media, 
are intermediaries in the process of delivering value to the US People.  
 
The level of aggregation chosen for stakeholder groups determines the level of 
detail of the remainder of the model. Given that the number of possible links in the 
system scales quadratically with the number of nodes, one should chose the minimum 
number of stakeholders that will capture the important outflows of the value creating 
organization. For example, I abstracted the military space interests as “Security”, despite 
the fact that it is made up of the 3 branches of the military plus associated agencies, 
because they all have similar needs from the NASA perspective. The key is to converge 
on a level of detail that is uniform through the system, and that communicates the 
important concepts. 
 
It is important to make the distinction between stakeholders and beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries are those parties that receive benefit from the organization, but do not 
contribute resources or hold a stake in the organization. A beneficiary for NASA could be 
the Department of Agriculture, which may use the results of in-space terrain mapping, 
but is not dependent on NASA in order to accomplish its mission, nor does it contribute 
to NASA’s mission. It is desirable to exclude beneficiaries who are not stakeholders in 
this analysis, because they will never close the value loop back to the value creating 
organization. Beneficiaries often form a superset of stakeholders – I took the approach of 
identifying all beneficiaries, and then culling the list to remove those that are not 
stakeholders, using the filters mentioned above. 
 
 Having identified the stakeholders, the next step is to capture their needs, in order 
to determine how value is created.  
 
Discovering Stakeholder Needs 
 
In this section, we determine the needs of all stakeholders. This process will help 
identify conflicts between stakeholders, to the extent that their needs conflict or are 
synergistic. Additionally, needs form the true metric by which an architecture’s value to 
stakeholders is determined.  
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 I used three techniques to elucidate needs. 
 
First, I asked “Which inputs were required by the stakeholders?”. For example, 
scientists clearly require science data, and commercial launch providers (within the 
economy stakeholder group) need customers in order to generate revenue.  
 
Second, I asked “What are the outputs of the value creating organization, and who 
they are provided to?”. The question then becomes, what needs are these outputs 
satisfying? For example, NASA is charged with inspiring the American youth to pursue 
science and engineering careers, which suggests that the American people have a need to 
be inspired by exploration. However, it is important that needs are not created simply to 
match outputs. Those outputs that do not link to true needs do not deliver value – these 
are an important output of the analysis, and will be treated separately.  
 
Third, I combinatorially paired stakeholders other than the value creating 
organization, and asked whether there are relevant transactions that play out between 
them. Understanding which transactions are relevant becomes clearer once the value 
loops have been identified and labeled, but at this stage, it is best to err on the side of 
discovering more needs.  
 
 Typically, the difficulty is not in listing needs, but rather in culling the list of 
needs for the independent and salient entries, such that they can reasonably be mapped to 
stakeholders. Our process generated 81 stakeholder inputs, for a total of 48 distinct needs, 
ranging from ‘Protecting against foreign claims of sovereignty’ to ‘Attract a skilled and 
motivated workforce’.  These were recorded in input-output diagrams centered on each 
stakeholder (and the value creating organization), shown in the figure above.  
 
Each of these needs represents a possible requirement on NASA’s architecture. In 
order to downselect to the requirements that will be satisfied, we have to determine how 
needs are related to value, which will be accomplished by modeling stakeholders.   
 
Modeling Stakeholders 
 
 Having documented all of the needs of stakeholders, the question becomes ‘How 
are needs related to value delivery?’. I postulate that the delivery of value is often related 
to the core objective(s) of each stakeholder – the next step is therefore to model the 
objectives of stakeholders. Our aim here is to explain how and why each stakeholder 
transforms the inputs they receive (according to their needs) into outputs they produce.  
 
 I model each stakeholder using three attributes: 
 
To: An objective function or purpose. 
By:  A listing of processes and outputs used to accomplish the purpose. 
Using: A listing of transferable assets and inputs  required to execute the processes 
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This model has several key ideas embedded in it. First, all stakeholders have different 
goals, as embodied in the ‘To’ statements.  The outputs of the value creating organization 
are used to satisfy a range of different stakeholder goals. Second, each stakeholder can be 
measured relative to their ability to produce the outputs of the processes listed under 
‘By’. Third, ‘Using’ highlights the transferable assets and inputs that stakeholders require 
NASA to provide. These transferable assets and inputs then help define the requirements 
for NASA’s architecture.  
 
 For example, I represented the Objective of the US People as ‘To attain life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’. This suggests that somehow, each input should be 
related to the objective. For example, ‘life’ suggests that health must play a role, which 
reminded us that significant physiology research is conducted by NASA, and should 
somehow provide value to the US People. An example of a ‘To By Using’ model is 
provided in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 6 To By Using Model of the US People 
 
The ‘To By Using’ model is clearly related to the input-output diagrams. The 
added complexity provided in the ‘To By Using’ is an exercise provided to help discover 
additional inputs and outputs, by providing a logical model that links the inputs to the 
outputs within a stakeholder. One can think of this as a consistency check for the needs 
derived. 
 
However, there is another important function of ‘To By Using’ model: it can help 
to limit the number of input-output combinations. I captured part of this input-output 
connectivity by listing ‘stocks’ for each stakeholder on the input-output diagrams. Each 
stock represents a measure of the satisfaction of a stakeholder objective. For example, I 
list ‘Quality of Life’ as a stock for the US People, which is derived from the objectives 
‘Attain Life’ and ‘Pursue Happiness’. However, to be clear, these are not System 
Dynamics stocks, in the sense that they fill up over time with a given rate. Therefore, 
‘internal assets’ is perhaps a more representative term for these ‘stocks’.  
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That being said, the  core purpose that internal assets serve in a modeling sense is 
to restrict groups of inputs from groups of outputs. As defined before, loops in this model 
are created by branching at each node in the network. The more branches are available, 
the more loops. If all inputs can connect to all outputs, then each outputs represent a 
possible branch. Internal assets are needed to restrict this input-output connectivity, to 
ensure that chains of links represent realistic causation.  
 
Therefore, the number and type of internal assets is chiefly a modeling decision. 
The internal assets I chose for the Science stakeholder are shown below. While I could 
have theoretically chosen hundreds of internal assets to represent the goals of the Science 
stakeholders 3 internal assets were sufficient to restrict the input-output pairings to 
reasonable loop rationales.  
 
Figure 7 Connectivity of Inputs to Outputs Using Internal Assets For Science 
Stakeholder 
 
  
Principle 
Internal assets restrict the input-output connectivity of a 
stakeholder model 
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Value Flow : Connecting Outputs to Inputs 
  
 Having modeled each stakeholder individually, the next step required is to 
connect the stakeholders together, using the inputs and outputs that have been discovered.  
 
 At this stage, many of the output-to-input (stakeholder to stakeholder) 
connections have already been formulated in the mind of the modeler, and are easy to 
connect. For example, having listed ‘Science knowledge’ as an input to the Educators, it 
is clear that this derives from an output of the Science stakeholder. The value of this step 
comes when the modeler discovers inputs that have no matching output, or outputs that 
do not connect to an input. Given the criteria I used to identify stakeholders, it is not 
desirable to have unterminated value flows. This dynamic reinforces the iterative nature 
of this modeling process, where inputs and outputs are deleted and created. This approach 
represents a systematic process that can help identify areas where value delivery is poorly 
understood or executed in the systems being modeled.  
 
 The key to resolving many of the output-input discrepancies revolves around the 
level of detail created in the model. I chose a low but uniform level of detail for this 
initial effort, analogous to a crude macroeconomic model of the US economy. In this 
manner, I represent the steady state conditions, rather than enter into the complexity of an 
event-driven model. For example, International Partners provide ‘International Space 
Systems’ to NASA, rather than providing the ‘Leonardo Module’ for a specific flight to 
the International Space Station. This also facilitates the connection to exploration 
architectures, in that it recognizes that all architectures should provide the same type of 
outputs to their stakeholders, and obviates a need to create separate value network models 
for different architectures. In this sense, the model I created enables a realistic 
representation of both the Apollo- and Shuttle-era architectures, net of differences in 
scope between these two and the current VSE.  
 
 The resulting value network is illustrated in abbreviated form in the figure below. 
A select group of value flows is illustrated, as the full set contains 81 links is too complex 
to illustrate on a small diagram. A full list of all the links in the model is given in 
Appendix 1, including a description of each link, and where possible, examples of past 
benefit flows.  
 
It is important to note that in constructing this model, I have introduced a 
significant bias. I don’t illustrate all possible links between any two stakeholder pairs – I 
illustrate only those that enable us to fill gaps between NASA outputs and NASA inputs. 
As such, the model is geared towards prioritizing things that are of interest to NASA – 
we can’t necessarily focus on another stakeholder, and ask for the full set of feedback 
loops that originate and terminate at that stakeholder.  
 
 It is useful at this stage to clarify some of the terminology used. I use the term 
Value Flow to mean the connection of an output to an input in the model – it is the 
provision of value from one stakeholder to another. An individual value flow is uni-
directional, and does not necessarily imply a return transaction.  
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The term Value Chain will be used to mean a collection of Value Flows, 
connected by stakeholders. For example, “NASA provides Science Data to the Science 
community, which provides Science Knowledge to Educators” would be a value chain 
starting at NASA and ending at Educators. Typically, in doing so, we are implying some 
sort of causality, in that participants in the chain have a responsibility or objective to 
propagate value. A well formed value chain should be explainable in terms of an 
obligation or incentive connected to the ‘To’ statement of the stakeholder at that link in 
the chain. For example, the reason Science creates science knowledge from science data 
is related to Science’s objective ‘To create new scientific knowledge and thought’.  
 
 
Figure 8 Value Network Diagram (Not All Links Shown) 
 Finally, I use the term Value Loop to denote a Value Chain that returns to the 
starting stakeholder. Value loops are at the heart of this mapping exercise, in that they 
illustrate which stakeholder needs are satisfied by strong feedback loops, and which 
needs are not well satisfied. An example of a loop is “NASA provides inspiration to the 
US People, who provide political support to the Executive and Congress, who rewards 
NASA with funding”. By building the model up from a series of value flows, the process 
fosters creativity in loop identification, in that we can examine many possible chains of 
value flows to determine if they help explain real behavior. For example, by combining 
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value flows I created the loop: “NASA provides launch contracts to the Economic 
community, which provides launch services to the Security community, who in turn 
could provide support for NASA to the Executive for NASA funding”. This stimulated 
the idea that that the Economic community has a commercial launch industrial base, such 
that NASA purchasing launch services indirectly helps the Security community’s need 
for launch services. However, not all combinations of value flows yield realistic value 
loops. An example of a less useful  loop would be “NASA provides Space Technology to 
the Security community, which as a result provides Security Contracts to the Economy”, 
because there isn’t a causal link between Space Technology and Security Contracts.  
 
 Notice that much of the behavior in this model appears to be determined by these 
loops, rather than by direct transactions between actors. This is a reflection of the indirect 
benefit that characterizes public complex systems. I will investigate the indirect nature of 
this benefit in much greater detail through the thesis, but it is important to note up front 
that this begins with value loops.  
 
 
 It is worth spending a moment to reflect on how many loops there are here. Given 
that I defined limited input-output connectivity using internal assets for each stakeholder, 
not all flows can trace to all other stakeholders in the network. However, what I haven’t 
done is define if inputs are required simultaneously. Therefore, if two inputs connect to 
one output, then there are two chains create from that one output. This is desirable from a 
theoretical perspective, given that we are searching for independent pathways through the 
network to achieve maximum influence. However, it also means that we will have lots of 
loops, many of which will differ by as few as one link.  
  
 
Figure 9 Combinatorial Input Output Pairing 
 
Principle 
Indirect benefit delivery forces consideration of value loops 
over simpler transaction models.  
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 I categorized individual value flows into 6 categories, in order to examine 
whether most value loops are constituted of similar flows. The six categories represented 
in our model were: 
 
1) Policy – Flows that relate to the motivation or transaction of policy decisions. Ex. 
Political Support, International Agreements.  
2) Money – Flows that represent funds changing hands. Ex. Corporate Taxes, NASA 
Market Funding.  
3) Workforce – The flow of employment and job-related expertise between different 
stakeholders. Ex. Skilled Workforce, Stable and Rewarding Employment.  
4) Technology – Sharing of technology between stakeholders. Ex. Space 
Technology flowing from NASA to the Economy.  
5) Knowledge – The transmission of knowledge from one stakeholder to another. 
Ex. NASA provides Space Resource Knowledge to the Economic community.  
6) Goods and Services – The transaction of actual technical goods and services. Ex. 
International Space Systems.  
 
Note that the majority of the value loops are composed of several types of flows. 
This implies that there are several conversion steps that happen within a stakeholder to 
transform, for example, a skilled workforce input into exploration system output. These 
transformations are accomplished by the organization’s business and cultural processes.  
 
First, it is possible that this makes it more difficult for those inside an 
organization to understand which inputs are critical to which outputs. In particular, where 
one group is responsible for receiving inputs, and a second is responsible for using those 
inputs, then the perception within the organization might well be that ‘of course we own 
X’, especially where there are few communications lines between those on the ‘client’ 
side, and those on ‘inside’. This problem is exacerbated when those on the output side 
aren’t the same ‘client’ facing people as from the input side.  
 
Second, it is possible that this is one of the phenomena that makes it more 
difficult to conceive of value loops, in the sense that connections between stakeholders 
are less tangible when there is a conversion of flow type. There is certainly an interaction 
between conversions of flow type and visibility down loops, in the sense that a loop with 
no conversions will be easier to understand, even going back 3 or 4 links, compared with 
a loop with multiple conversions.  
 
The ability of players in the system to visualize internal connectivity and loops in 
the system has a direct impact on their understanding of their role, in that it can mean the 
difference between treating troubles as ‘exogenous’ and ‘random’ vs. ‘endogenous’ and 
‘controllable’.  
Principle 
Network diagrams can help represent and book keep complex 
value flows characterized by indirect value delivery 
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Key Modeling Decisions 
 
 Having now constructed the value model, there are several questions that arise as 
to how the model reflects the theoretical underpinnings expressed earlier, and as to how I 
created logically consistent flows. I focus on the theory questions first, and then treat the 
practicalities of the implementation second.  
 
There are four main questions which arise from the theory:  
1. Does each need have a corresponding stock? 
2. Are operands identified in the stakeholder network?  
3. When does the absence of a flow create benefit? 
4. What happens when the physical flow travels in the opposite direction from the 
benefit?  
 
1. Does each need have a corresponding internal asset? 
 
Rigorously, each need should be satisfied by a Solution Neutral Process operating 
on an operand. The reader will recall that needs were primarily discovered in this context 
by examining flows, not internal assets. It was easier to discover needs through flows, 
because flows are more concrete than stocks in many cases. For example, it is much 
easier to visualize Stable Employment than it is to visualize Quality of Life.  
 
 However, rigorously, we have to define needs as levels of the internal assets, and 
flows as the Solution Neutral or Solution Specific Processes that satisfies those needs. In 
this manner, the attributes of a process map directly to the attributes of a flow, some of 
which we list directly on the flow. For example, I show Stable Employment, where 
Stable is an attribute of Employment. Not all relevant attributes are listed, as this would 
create an unmanageable level of detail. Rather, where a single attribute is central to the 
value of the flow, it is shown in the model.  
 
 While I have now define all needs as having associated internal assets, it is worth 
noting that not all needs of all stakeholders are represented in this model – only the needs 
which NASA may directly or indirectly have the ability to influence are captured.  
 
2.  Are operands identified in the stakeholder network?  
 
 Operands are the objects which are modified by processes. It is the change in state 
of the operand that satisfy the needs of stakeholders, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 I believe that one of the most common types of operand in the model is an 
individual within a stakeholder group. It is individuals that are ‘modified’ when NASA 
provides employment to the US People, and it is individuals that satisfy the need for  a 
Science Community.  
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 On the whole, operands have not been identified through this process. Identifying 
operands would be the key step involved in creating actual stocks over internal assets. 
For example, where I currently show NASA Contracts influencing the Economy’s 
Industrial Base. What operands would have to change to create value to the Economy? 
The available heavy machinery, corresponding production lines, and the organizational 
processes for defining requirements, to name a few. If these operands were explicitly 
identified for all processes (read flows), then we could begin to think about the mapping 
of operands to stocks for the satisfaction of needs.  
 
3.  When does the absence of a flow create benefit? 
 
 I introduced a significant bias in framing the benefit in positive terms for this 
model. For example, I show “Science Opinions and Policy Support” between Science and 
the Executive & Congress, rather than “Science Opinions and Policy Advice”.  
 
 The flip side of this positive bias is that sometimes the absence of a flow creates a 
benefit. For example, the absence of launch vehicle explosions helps create a sense of 
trust in NASA.  Therefore, ‘absence of a negative flow’ can be equivalently represented 
as a positive flow.  There are three modeling techniques I could use to represent this 
information:  
a. Show a negative flow like “exploding launch vehicles” 
b. Show a positive flow like “absence of exploding launch vehicles” 
c. Show the action that is more closely linked to the benefit, like the 
proclamation of safety by a leader 
 
On the whole, I have erred on the side of representing flows that correspond to 
physical or informational objects. For example, I show Manned Exploration Events and 
Media Content, rather than Inspiration flowing to the US People. This would suggest that 
I represent the negative flow.  
 
The answer depends on what we want the model to represent.  
 
If the model is constructed to demonstrate the benefit the organization creates, 
then the positive representation of the absence is most appropriate.  
 
If the model is constructed to simulate the benefit of an architecture, the again the 
positive representation or no representation at all would be appropriate.  
 
If the model is constructed to simulate the consequences, positive and negative, of 
the architecture, then the negative flow should be represented.  
 
 
Finally, in cases where the negative is highly unlikely but the benefit (here trust) 
is required on a regular basis, it makes more sense to represent the benefit as 
proclamations by a leader. This would be most relevant to organizational behavior 
models.  
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4. What happens when the physical flow travels in the opposite direction from the 
benefit?  
 
 In the context of organizations, there are many examples of benefits that travels in 
the opposite direction of the physical or informational flow. For example, issuing 
guidelines to contractors does not produce benefit to the contractors. Rather, the 
compliance with those guidelines benefits the organization. Situations like this are more 
likely to occur for policy flows, particularly where power or organizational authority is 
exercised. This therefore overlaps with the discussion of the negative benefit flows – 
exercising authority comes with the threat of being fired or demoted for non-compliance.  
 
 From a modeling perspective, the difficult thing is that the frequency with which 
threats are exercised differs from the frequency with which orders are given. I submit that 
the most representative flow to illustrate is the compliance with the order (because it 
actually generates benefit, and because it occurs more frequently), noting the order in the 
title. For example, “compliance with NASA guidelines” flowing from a contractor to 
NASA. The question of stakeholder threat power is an important one, and will be 
expanded on later in the thesis.  
 
Practical Modeling Decisions  
 
 In the process of creating the model, a number of modeling decisions were made 
to simplify value loops, in order to make the model easier to understand. The key 
decisions are described below.  
 
 I abstracted the workforce flows by asserting that the US People are the source of 
science and engineering inspired students. These students are provided to the educators, 
and then become the source of a skilled workforce. I chose to represent the body of 
experience within the educators, because it is simpler than representing skilled workforce 
flows between all actors, and because the educators are the only stakeholder for whom 
educating the workforce is a central goal. When we add to this the value chain that 
describes the Economy and Science support for NASA funding in response to stimulating 
students, we create a value loop termed the “Inspiration Loop”. The build up of the 
industrial base is then captured separately within the Economy.  
 
 Universities are cleaved into the research function, which is stored under Science, 
and the education function, which is stored under Educators. Science knowledge is then 
passed from Science to Educators, in order to enforce the connection.  
 
 Science missions are lumped under NASA, rather than under Science. I show a 
flow of a Science Funding to the Science community, which returns Science Systems 
through to NASA. NASA then operates all science missions, return Science Data to 
Science, who then return Science Knowledge and Science Opinions to NASA.  
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 I show reciprocal international agreements being transacted between the 
International Partners and the Executive and Congress, rather than directly between the 
International Partners and NASA. I then require that the Executive provides policy 
direction to NASA related to these agreements. However, actual Systems are transacted 
directly between NASA and the International Partners, such as International Space 
Systems and NASA Instruments & Modules.  
 
3.2. Qualitative Ranking of Loops 
 
Having now constructed a model that is internally consistent, the question 
becomes: What do we want to evaluate in a loop? Ideally, the goal is to better understand 
where NASA can act to ensure it receives its required inputs. Does this imply that we 
should take a controls perspective - evaluating the polarity and the gain of each loop? 
Conversely, we could proceed on the premise that a weighted average of stakeholder 
needs will satisfy stakeholders the most, which will in turn return the resources to the 
organization.  
 
The chief problem here is understanding the agent problem – that is, when you 
deliver value through an agent, how do you ensure that agent does the job properly? Each 
stakeholder acts as an agent to other stakeholders, which is why the agent problem is key 
to understanding how stakeholders decide to produce their outputs, based on the inputs 
they receive. If we had well defined rules for the translation of inputs to outputs, we 
might opt for a controls perspective. If there are no rules, then the blind faith approach 
described above would be more suitable.  
 
The academic framing for the agent problem lies mostly in economics and 
political science. Economics focuses centrally on aligning incentives for behavior 
between the principal and the agent. For example, Hermalin41 investigates the assumption 
that market competition will lead to fewer agency goods (goods purchased by the agent 
which don’t add value for the principal). To do so, he develops a model to measure 
managerial purchases of perquisites in a publicly owned company. Other economists look 
at the effects of debt in reducing agency costs42 (by restricting the agent’s available cash), 
and at the effects of increased compensation to executive in reducing agency costs43. 
Incentives typically focus on executive compensation structure, including managerial 
ownership, salary, and bonuses. Many of these models capture manager behavior in terms 
of utility functions, and agreement between the principle and the agent in terms of single 
contract negotiated.  
  
 The political science literature on agency theory focuses on four sub-problems: 
information asymmetries between principal and agent, transfer of risk to the agent in 
exchange for compensation, moral hazard (lack of effort or withholding of information 
by the agent), and adverse selection (choosing agents that don’t have the skills to do the 
job). These questions are interesting, but less relevant to the problem at hand. Information 
and risk exchange are relevant to the extent that they inform what inputs are required are 
for the agent to do its job. Moral hazard is largely a descriptive endeavor, where we are 
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interested in a prescriptive methodology. Adverse selection is not relevant here, given 
that our level of detail in modeling does not enable us to choose specific agents. 
However, thinking about this effect more generally, we could think of choosing different 
paths to influence the beneficiary based on selection criteria of the agent – stakeholders 
involved along different paths.  
 
What we really want to know here is what aspects of the contract and the actual 
exchange cause the agent to do their job. On the surface, the economics literature appears 
more relevant. However, there are two central difficulties. First, in the public sector, we 
don’t have a pure exchange model, with respect to the negotiation of contracts – agent 
contracts can be themselves loops, or the contract can be legally required or executive 
orders. Second, many contracts cannot be reduced to a cash transaction. This makes it 
more difficult to value incentives, or the outcome of those incentive programs in terms of 
behavior. What we can learn from the economics model is two things:  
 
1. Importance matters. The more central the compensation to the agent is to the 
agent’s survival, the more incentive the agent has to complete the task.  
 
2. Competition matters. Stakeholders where multiple individual players 
compete to perform the agent function will give the principal more power, 
provided the compensation is important to the agent.  
 
On the surface, the political science literature does not appear particularly useful, 
because it does not develop a generalized agency model. Tests are applied within case 
studies to determine the extent to which one political actor acts as an agent to another, but 
those tests are context specific. For example, Moe44 examines information as a source of 
bureaucratic power in political environments, as well as sources of political power. His 
case study focuses on teacher unions, whereby the bureaucrats (teachers) exercise 
significant political influence, thus weakening top-down political control. McCubbins 
argues that administrative procedures, such as “decisions procedures and appeals 
processes”45 help overcome this effect, as well as the inherent information advantage 
bureaucrats have over politicians. This specific case study, while it does provide insights,  
informs one of the individual links our model, not a framework for evaluating all of the 
agents in the model. The political science does bring up two key insights though:  
 
3. There is a choice between “Event-driven” vs. “Information Layer” 
models. Questions of information asymmetries raised in the political science 
literature assume that these asymmetries can be modeled or assessed. 
However, there is a fundamental modeling decision to made, as to whether 
information, goods and services are actually propagated in the model, or 
whether multiple real transactions are abstracted as a single ‘average 
transaction value’. While the former is certainly more desirable for its higher 
level of fidelity and verifiability, it is not always feasible to capture all of 
these transactions. I decided to pursue an “Information Layer” model, as I 
wanted to test if one can create useful results without attempt to model 
specific transactions. However, this means that more labour has to be put into 
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design modes of verification for the model, because the output cannot 
necessarily be empirically compared to a real world experiment.  
 
4. Many principals are actually agents for another stakeholder. For example, 
NASA uses the Media as an agent to deliver content to the US People, but 
NASA itself is an agent of the US Executive and Congress. Therefore, a 
model has to either provide a global framework whereby individual 
transactions define relationships between principal and agent, or keep track of 
who’s the agent and who’s the principal in each scenario. For the latter, one 
could imagine a recursive framework that redefines roles through a value 
chain, but we’re still left with a question of defining contracts in some 
generalized reference frame. 
 
When I put these four insights together, it becomes clear that the best way to get 
agents to do their job is to provide them with something that is important to them. This 
classical ‘buyer/supplier power’ is a simple but powerful predictor of behavior, and one 
that can spans all different types of transaction. Furthermore, this approach enables a 
framework built on individual transactions. Competition can then be layered on 
afterwards, to bias this buyer/supplier power upwards on downwards based on the 
availability of alternatives in the market.  
 
Therefore, in a generalized exchange, particularly for the delivery of indirect 
benefit, I have motivated why it necessary to model the behavior of agents in order to 
understand the behavior of the exchange. The next section will create a quantitative 
methodology that capture the salient aspects of agent behavior, importance and 
competition.  
3.3. Numerical Methodology 
 
Beauty in things exists merely in the mind which contemplates them 
 
   - David Hume, 1742 
 
Having constructed a network model of stakeholders, and having investigated the 
central dilemma that we face in constructing feedback loops, it is now time to establish a 
numerical framework for prioritizing loops.   
 
Ideally, this quantitative framework should have the following qualities:  
 
1) Valuation of individual flows, rather than loops as a whole. Given that our aim is 
to discover which loops dominate, it would not be appropriate to specify those 
loops up front.  
2) Easy computation of loop value based on combination of flow values.  
3) Method should enable the valuation of loops having different flow types. For 
example, how should be able to compare the input of policy direction against the 
input of funding. 
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4) Loop valuation should not explicitly depend on loop length. This suggests that a 
product rule would be favorable over an addition rule.  
5) Output range should remain bounded to facilitate interpretation 
 
What does stronger mean? Here, I use Catanzaro’s work to define stronger loops 
as “more likely to enhance the inputs that the organization requires”. Therefore, the 
question I am answering is “Which outputs should I focus on so as to increase my 
inputs?”. Notice that this is closely relate to the question of “Which stakeholder receive 
the most benefit from a given set of outputs”, but not identical, in that I haven’t defined 
rules for propagating benefit among stakeholders. The question of which stakeholder 
receive the most benefit will be addressed in the Chapter 5 Linking Stakeholders to 
Architecture.  
 
This method advocates a selfish bureaucracy, in a sense. By valuing stakeholders 
on their ability to provide resources back to the organization, we’re no longer optimizing 
based on the ‘most benefit to the greatest number of people’. This fits with Wilson’s 
assertion of the perpetuating bureaucracy, whose organizational culture acts to preserve 
the agency in spite of external changes to the conditions which gave rise to its mission 
[Wilson, p. 74]. In a sense, this is analogous to the principle in economics that 
individually greedy decisions build the most stable global outcome, and it ignores 
questions of Nash equilibria (acting in one’s own best interest and that of others). Taking 
a broader perspective, one can argue that the oversight provided by the Executive and 
Congress is responsible for NASA envelope of action, which leaves NASA in a position 
to maximize output based on a given input.  
 
We can also ask the question of variability of inputs – if the goal of our modeling 
process is to determine which path can best be used to influence inputs, we presume that 
inputs can be significantly modified. This is examined in the following chapter on results.  
 
The reader will recall that I had investigated several methods for capturing 
stakeholder needs (Kano, Quality Function Deployment, Lean), and had identified 
several of the types of attributes that metrics for stakeholder need satisfaction capture. In 
a sense, each of these methods helped define the strength of an individual value flow, 
with respect to the beneficiary. Therefore, the necessary steps here are to chose a method 
for capturing needs, determine how to assign numerical values to individual links, and 
then to find a method for combining links into loops.  
 
Choosing a Method for Valuing Individual Links 
 
I chose to combine Kano’s method with an anchored scale for importance, to 
define the individual link value. Kano’s method was chosen over QFD and Lean because 
it provides a clearer method for prioritizing needs, and also because it comes with a 
predefined method for collecting stakeholder input.  
 
It is important to recognize that I have made an assumption here – I have moved 
from using Kano’s methodology to rank attributes of a design to ranking the needs 
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satisfied by the design. What’s the difference? Whereas attributes refer the solution-
specific portion of a design, needs are solution-neutral phenomena, that isn’t necessarily 
linked to a particular past design. Why might this be a concern? The Kano methodology 
is grounded in questions that require users to rank their satisfaction relative to the 
presence or absence of an attribute – if they have not previously used a product (solution 
specific form), then they may have to conceive of a solution-specific form in order to 
answer the question. Essentially, needs are more abstract than attributes.  I think this is 
reasonable approximation because the same human behaviors of expectation and 
excitement are prevalent in both cases. However, this means that we’ll have to develop 
methods to ensure that users are referencing realistic solutions.  
 
 The chief difficulty in using Kano is that the methodology mixes binary attributes 
(the car has brakes or doesn’t) with continuous attributes (gas mileage). Exciters and 
Must Haves are much more easily understood for binary attributes, whereas One 
Dimensional attributes are more easily understood for continuous attributes. The key to 
unwrapping this problem is that Kano doesn’t specify a particular (baseline) level of 
performance. It doesn’t ask “If you have brakes that help you stop from 60km/h in 10m, 
how satisfied are you?”. The functional and dysfunctional questions only reference 
whether the attribute performance is “good” or “poor”.  
 
 There are (at least) two approaches to solving this dilemma: 
 
1. Global Approach. Construct utility curves for each stakeholder need, mapping 
satisfaction as a function of performance. This is both time-intensive, and requires 
that stakeholders have a good understanding of their projected satisfaction at a 
number of different levels of performance. 
2. Local Approach. Capture the stakeholder’s baseline level of performance, how 
important it is to them, and how their satisfaction varies locally with performance. 
Less time is required, but a lower fidelity is achieved.  
 
 
Figure 10 Global vs. Local Approach to Utility Modeling 
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I chose  the Local Approach, because I think it is difficult to define exact levels of 
performance when referring to flows at our level of abstraction. For example, any 
definition of performance levels for ‘Plans and Progress Reports’ is going to involve an 
artificial scale of performance. Notice that in using this method, I will not use the 
information on the baseline level of performance. This information will be used later to 
link architectures to the satisfaction of needs.  
 
In order to create a Local Approach, and in doing so, to solve the Kano ‘baseline 
behavior’ problem, I introduce an important scale, which modifies the Kano scale. As 
these two scales are coupled, I will first discuss the numerical scale for importance, 
because it is conceptually simpler, and will then discuss how the Kano scale was chosen 
and combined with the Importance scale to create the desired behavior.  
 
Importance Scale 
 
 I used an anchored scale of ‘Importance’, in addition to the Kano questions. The 
scale is shown in the table below.  
 
Table 2 Anchored Importance Scale 
Not 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Important Very 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
0.11 0.33 0.55 0.78 1 
 
There were three decisions made to create this scale:  
 
1. How many points on the scale? If there are too many points (10+), respondents 
may not use the whole scale, choosing instead to focus on the top 50%, among 
other problems. Too few points (3 or less) would not reveal sufficient detail about 
stakeholder needs.  I settled on 5 as a reasonable compromise. Note that by using 
an odd number, I allow the theoretical respondent a ‘safe haven’ in the middle of 
the scale. Using a even number would force respondent to decide between 
‘somewhat important’ and ‘very important’. While it useful to force respondents 
to make difficult tradeoffs in order to ensure they are reflecting on their 
preferences, I felt that there are situations in which it is unrealistic to deny them a 
middle ground, particularly in a policy environment. Additionally, if I wanted 
simply a ranked list, I would have chosen another method. 
  
2. Whether or not the bottom anchor corresponds to zero or not?  A zero bottom 
anchor is appropriate for vetting input that stakeholders themselves provide. 
Given that all the links in the model were created by the modelers, I already felt 
that the links included were necessary, even if they scored low. The lowest value 
was essentially chosen as 10%, with some minor other considerations from the 
Kano scale coupling (to be discussed below) moving it to 11%. 
 
 - 57 - 
3. Whether to use linear or non-linear spacing? I chose linear spacing, although I 
contemplated a non-linear scale with multiple values at the high end equal to 1. 
The choice of spacing doesn’t really show an impact until we combine the  
importance scale with the Kano information, so I will defer until then to discuss it.  
 
With respect to the anchors chosen for the scale, I identify four types of 
importance anchors:  
 
Benefit / Worth : How important is the benefit flow?  No additional prompts.  
 
Vitality : What would happen if you did not receive this input? Is this important enough 
to bet your business on? Does the inflow represent a piece of the critical path? This 
introduces an element of risk tolerance, which will vary significantly across actors. 
Where some actors are constrained with respect to the maximum level of risk they can 
take on, they would be forced to list almost all items as ‘Vital’, reducing our ability to 
discriminate between them.  
 
Replacement : How easily could you replace this flow with a similar one from another 
source? This begins to include ideas of competition and buyer power, which I wanted to 
address separately.  
 
Willingness to Pay : If this flow were removed, how much would pay to bring it back? 
The inclusion of money as a comparative language is clearly not appropriate here, as the 
focus of this benefit work is enabling comparisons across flow types that cannot 
reasonably be assigned a numerical value.  
 
I chose to use the Benefit / Worth anchors. I resisted the urge to use the other 
three, because they mix other ideas in with the specific idea of importance (although they 
would provide more context).  
 
Kano Numerical Scale 
 
Although I have now illustrated how I modified Kano analysis to include 
Importance, I haven’t illustrated how to derive a single value for each stakeholder need. 
There is one key parameters that I use to define the relationship between these two scales, 
which I call the Kano Multiplier.  
 
Kano Multiplier : This number specifies the equivalency between Kano categories at a 
fixed level of importance. I used a Kano Multiplier of 3, which means that 3 One 
Dimensional Flows are equal to one Must Have flow. This was a somewhat arbitrary 
decision, so in the next section, I have included a sensitivity analysis on the Kano 
Multiplier. One can also think of the Kano Multiplier in terms equivalence at different 
levels of importance. Using a Kano Multiplier of 3, and our set importance scale, then the 
following two needs are equivalent: 
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Table 3 Kano Multiplier Example 
 Need #1 Need #2 
Kano One Dimensional 
(K = 0.33) 
Exciter 
(K = 0.11) 
Importance  Somewhat Important 
(I = 0.33) 
Extremely Important 
(I =1) 
Combined Scale K*I = 0.11 K*I = 0.11 
 
In an ideal world, one would determine the Kano multiplier using conjoint analysis on a 
subset of the needs, in order to define relative tradeoffs. However, given that this is a 
global variable (applied across multiple stakeholders), this would require taking some 
sort of average value across all stakeholders.  
 
Combined Kano-Importance Scale 
 
Given the above information, it is now possible to show what the combined scale 
looks like. The figure below shows a color mapping of Kano – Importance space.  
 
 
Figure 11 Kano - Importance Surface 
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There are two possible interpretations of the methodology I’ve created by 
combining Kano and Importance information:  
 
1. Importance is fine tuning Kano. We’ve specified the Kano category, Importance 
us allows us to rank within a Kano category, and we’ve also allowed stakeholders 
to modify the Kano rankings where there are differences in maximum utility 
across different Kano categories (ex. between One Dimensionals and Exciters). 
 
2. Kano is tuning the Importance ranking. Importance is the primary stakeholder 
input, but then we weight their preferences by the possibility of detriment. 
Essentially, this presumes that the respondent doesn’t properly account for 
detriment in answering importance questions, requiring a correction. On a minor 
note, the presumption of the ‘possibility’ of detriment requires some assumptions 
about the uniformity of performance ranges considered across different Kano 
categories. With a Kano Multiplier of 3, we’ve used a heavy weighting.  
 
Thus far, I’ve defined a method for valuing individual links. It is useful to step 
back for a moment to understand that I’ve only captured a limited subset of Garvin’s 8 
markers of quality in my method. I argue that perceived quality is included in the method, 
in that the respondent is aware of the origin of the benefit flow when answering the Kano 
questions. We could conceivably also use the methodology to define values for the 
Reliability, Conformance, Durability, and Serviceability of an individual flow, but we 
would then need a method for weighting between these attributes. The point is that I 
haven’t defined all the attributes of utility because I’m using the Local Approach. 
Table 4 Markers of Quality Captured by Kano & Importance 
Markers of 
Quality 
Captured by Kano 
& Importance? 
Performance   
Features  
Reliability  
Conformance   
Durability  
Serviceability  
Aesthetics  
Perceived Quality  
 
 Using this link valuation technique, I created surrogate data for each of the 
stakeholders. An archive of this information is presented in Appendix 1. Each link was 
valued from the perspective of the stakeholder in question – no adjustments were made to 
link values in order to create desired behavior at the network level. Given that the 
purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate a methodology, rather than to calibrate the model, 
choosing link values was seen to be sufficient.  
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Composing Loops From Individual Links 
 
 Of the original five desired attributes for the overall method (Value Links, Loops 
Composed from Links, Enable Different Flow Types, Valuation Not Dependent on Loop 
Length, Bound Output Range) I’ve already satisfied one – valuation of individual links. 
The following paragraphs describe the decisions I made to compute the strength of loops.  
 
 The intent here is to tie high importance links together. The two relevant decisions 
are: 
 
1. Numerical Range for Links : Several ranges are possible, namely [0,1] or [0,2] or 
[-1,1] 
2. Link Combination Method: Additive or Multiplicative  
 
 If using an additive rule, I could have used negative numbers to show detriment 
and positive for utility. I could then attempt to use information layer to model utility, but 
this would require a physical layer to convert a stakeholder’s utility to a given output (in 
physical terms). However, I had already decided that I wanted a purely ‘Information 
Layer’ approach. Using an additive methodology with only an information layer would 
cause loops to increase with increasing length, which violates the fourth requirement.  
 
 Using a multiplicative rule, the product for a loop can remain bounded if we 
chose a [0,1] range. This has the associated property that all links less with a value less 
than 1 will decrease the strength of the overall loop, which again violates our concern that 
loops valuation should be independent of loop length. Alternatively, I could use a [0,2], 
with the link valuation distribution centered at 1. This violates the fifth requirement 
(bounded output), but may solve the fourth requirement (valuation independent of loop 
length), provided link values are evenly distributed about 1.  
 
 I chose a Multiplicative rule with the [0,1] range, because I didn’t think it was 
reasonable to enforce any requirements on the distribution of link values. A given set of 
stakeholders could have only Must Have needs, or only Exciter needs, which would skew 
the distribution. Additionally, I think that a broader range of loops value would be more 
difficult to read, because the output cannot be easily interpreted in terms of the link 
methodology.  
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 For example, the figure below illustrates a typical loop: 
 
 
Figure 12 Example of the Multiplicative Rule for Loop Valuation 
  
Given that I’ve chosen a multiplicative rule on a [0,1] scale, the reader will note 
that the ‘value’ decreases through a loop. Rigorously, the ‘value’ doesn’t decrease, 
because I’m not computing a real quantity. However, is it reasonable that most loops 
values decrease with the addition of a link? There are two perspectives:  
 
1. Each additional link represents an additional stakeholder who must be 
engaged in the process. If the links are path-dependent (that is to say, 
stakeholder perceive more than simply the link nearest them), or if there is 
some over-arching rationale for the loop that stakeholders need to understand 
in order to use the system, then it could be more difficult to coordinate more 
actors, all else being equal.  
 
2. Each additional link represents an opportunity to brand NASA involvement 
in the loop value, or an alternative vehicle by which the loop can be 
influenced. This view might be favored if we believed links are not path 
dependent.   
 
Unfortunately, neither of these propositions is properly falsifiable. The utility of 
the model is dependent on whether the output provides a reasonable and actionable 
output which is not otherwise logically obvious. If the output stimulates the architect and 
policymakers to consider new alternatives, then the model has been successful. Ideally, 
we would construct models under both interpretations, to examine the feasibility of 
construction and the utility of the output. Due to time constraints, I have elected to focus 
on the former – in particular, my decision was swayed by the difficulty of capturing 
‘options’ in a policy-space.  I feel that the problem of determining the distribution of link 
values that yields reasonable loop behavior is more tractable under the initial conditions 
expressed in this thesis.  
 
In order to further examine this problem, it will be essential to determine the 
correlation between loop length and rank. My hypothesis is that by constraining the 
feasibility of the shorter loops using internal assets and a reduced set of links, we will still 
see strong behavior from lengthy loops.  
 - 62 - 
 
So now we’ve developed a method for ranking loops, subject to some questions 
on sensitivity, calibration, and  match with intuition. The final piece of the puzzle 
revolves around causality – how do you we know that the input causes the output, for a 
given loop? I discuss this question at the loop level, rather than at the link level, because 
different loops have different ‘rationales’ or ‘logical flow’, which impact how we think 
about what causation is occurring, on a higher scale than with links. For example, in 
order to understand why the Security community provides ‘Opinions and Policy Support’ 
to the Executive and Congress, we have to look beyond the incoming link, ‘Commercial 
Launch’. Later on, when I discuss the top ranked loops, the reader will note that I give 
some loops names, according to the ‘rationale’ behind that loop.  
 
 That being said, causation is difficult to evaluate – it is most easily treated by 
manually sorting through loops to identify poor connections, because there is little we can 
encode to measure causation. One then has to modify the internal assets in order to 
eliminate those poor connections.   
 
All that remains is to enumerate all possible loops. Given that the focus is on 
identifying new loops, and discovering which loops are the most important, I erred on the 
side of fewer internal assets, to enable more connections. The model was implemented in 
OPN. Simply stated, at each node, the number of paths through the network branches to 
cover all possible outputs. When this algorithm is applied recursively to all nodes, the 
result is that the network explores each feasible path within the network. This belies an 
important assumption: each individual link has the ability to influence the succeeding 
stock and output – no two inputs are ever required to be simultaneously present in order 
to cause an output. In terms of the importance framework, this can be translated as 
“inputs are independent of each other, weighted only by their Kano-Importance value”. A 
screenshot of the model is given below.  
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Figure 13 OPN of the Stakeholder Value Model 
 
A full description of the modeling techniques used to create the OPN network can 
be found in Appendix 2. The only salient concern that merits mention here is that the 
model is dynamically bounded – at each timestep, a token must meet a minimum accrued 
partial loop value in order to be propagated forward. This implies that when the model is 
run, not all possible loops are evaluated, due to limited computational resources. Later, I 
will investigate whether the loop evaluation scheme is convergent or not – that is to say, 
whether we can estimate the total weighted average of all loops based on a subset, or 
whether the addition of new low-value loops will always cause our average to move.  
 
The reader will recall that I had identified 3 types of models for complex systems, 
namely Multidisciplinary Physical Models, System Dynamics Models, and Network 
Models. The model I have created is something of a hybrid. It most closely resembles an 
abstract System Dynamic model, except that stocks and flows are not explicit quantities. 
However, in terms of the size of space and the search for dominant loops, this model 
shares some characteristics with conventional Network Models. While I have not yet 
incorporated any elements from Physical Models, I will show in the next chapter that 
these can be effectively linked using proximate metrics.  
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How might these disciplines help inform the computation of loops? Graph theory 
can be used to show that the number of loops in a strongly directed graph (liker my 
model) can be bounded by 2np(n-1)!, where n is the number of stocks and p is the number 
of flows and auxiliary variables. In practice, this is not a useful bound, as an {n=10, p 
=10} system already has 1035 loops.  
 
There have been some nascent investigations into numerical techniques for 
identifying the strength of individual loops, using a technique call Loop Eigenvalue 
Elasticity Analysis (LEEA)46. LEEA relies on decomposing a graph into a shortest 
independent loop set, which is the graph theory terminology for the smallest set of 
geodetic loops (the shortest path from x to y plus the shortest path from y to x), from 
which all other loops can be constructed as a linear combination. More rigorously, the 
Independent Loop Set (ILS) is the smallest set where all of the incidence vectors (which 
define which edges from a graph are in a cycle) for the independent cycles are linearly 
independent. Kampmann47 has shown that the ILS for a graph is equal to:  
 
! 
ILS = N " n +1 
 
 where: N is the number of arcs 
  n is the number of nodes 
 
For my model, we have to create a node and two arcs out of each flow in order to 
translate my terms into graph theory. Therefore, with 80 flows, I have 160 arcs and 109 
nodes, for 52 independent loops. Unfortunately, this definition creates the smallest 
possible loops, which doesn’t constrain the loops to begin and end at a particular node.  
 
LEEA then uses the systems’ characteristic polynomial (which defines all of the 
input and output relationships) for the independent loop set to discover the modes of 
behavior for the system (defined by the eigenvalues of the characteristic polynomial). 
The key to LEEA is that the strength of the loop is defined as the eigenvalue elasticity:  
 
! 
" =
d#
dg
g
#
 
 
where: λ is the loop eigenvalue 
            d is the loop gain 
 
 This is not directly applicable to my model, in that there is no explicit time 
behavior (stocks are do not literally accumulate as a result of inputs), and because the 
model has exogenous inputs. However, there are some useful analogies we can draw. 
First, it would be interesting to investigate the network to discover the independent loop 
set, by relaxing the constraint that all loops have to begin and end with a given node. 
Second, if we consider the loop Kano-Importance value to be the gain, and the NASA 
output to be analogous to the eigenvalue, we can investigate which outputs have the 
greatest elasticity.  
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 Should a proper system dynamic model ever be constructed to analyze benefit 
flow, it would be interesting to conduct a full LEEA. However, as a caution, the user 
should be wary of the linearization requirements of current LEEA, as well as 
computational difficulties relating to larger models having to do with repeated 
eigenvalues. 
 
 Having now defined the numerical methodology I will use to evaluate the 
behavior of the network, the next step is to examine the outputs of the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 66 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 67 - 
4. Loop Results 
 
This chapter has several goals:  
  
1. Define what types of results can be drawn from the existing model 
2. Examine the results against sanity checks 
3. Analyze the results to determine what can be learned 
4. Answer the concerns raised earlier, namely 
a. Does my numerical scale create realistic equivalencies between different 
loops?  
b. Does loop length correlate with rank?  
c. Fundamentally, does stringing together strong links create strong loops?  
5. Extrapolate the results to answer the question some of the value questions beyond 
the scope of the model 
 
All data presented in this section is derived from Kano-Importance data created 
by the author. The data is intended to be representative of the opinions of the individual 
stakeholders considered, and some calibration analysis is provided below, but biases will 
necessarily be present. As such, the focus is to demonstrate the methodology using 
reasonable values. Should the methodology and results appear useful, real data would 
need to be collected.  
4.1. Model Outputs 
 
The model outputs shown in the section below were drawn from a sample of 252 
loops, created using a bound of V > 0.01 on each link. 
4.1.1. Ranked loops 
 
The top seven loops are shown graphically below.  
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Figure 14 Top 7 Value Loops 
 
 From this most basic view, we can already note a couple of things. First, not all 
stakeholders are represented in the most important loops – in fact, only half are present. 
Second, the model enumerates loops that differ only by one link. Third, there are a 
dominant set of NASA outputs and inputs that appear in many loops.  
 
 Looking now at a larger fraction of the data, the top 30 loops are shown below, 
with only the flows indicated. 
 
Table 5 Top 30 Value Loops 
Rank Score Path 
1 0.780 Stable and Rewarding Employment + Votes + funding 
2 0.608 Stable and Rewarding Employment + Votes + Policy direction 
3 0.550 NASA Science Funding + stable employment + Votes + funding 
3 0.550 NASA Science Funding + Science systems 
5 0.429 NASA Science Funding + stable employment + Votes + Policy 
direction 
5 0.429 Plans and Progress Reports + Policy direction 
7 0.330 NASA Science Funding+ Science Opinions and policy support 
8 0.257 NASA Contract Funding + Commercial launch + Security Benefits  
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+ Votes + funding  
8 0.257 Human Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information  
+ Votes + funding  
8 0.257 NASA Contract Funding + stable employment + Votes + funding 
8 0.257 Space Acquired Data + Security Benefits + Votes + funding 
8 0.257 Human Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information 
8 0.257 NASA Contract Funding + Commercial launch 
8 0.257 NASA Contract Funding + Exploration Systems 
15 0.201 NASA Science Funding + Science Knowledge + skilled workforce  
+ Stable Employment+ Votes + funding 
15 0.201 NASA Science Funding + Science Knowledge + Skilled workforce  
+ stable employment + Votes + Policy direction 
15 0.201 Science Data + Science Knowledge + skilled workforce  
+ Stable Employment + Votes + funding 
15 0.201 NASA Contract Funding + Commercial launch + Security Benefits  
+ Votes + Policy direction 
15 0.201 Human Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information 
+ Science and Eng Inspired Students + Skilled workforce 
15 0.201 Human Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information 
+ Votes + Policy direction 
15 0.201 NASA Contract Funding + stable employment + Votes + Policy 
direction 
15 0.201 Space Acquired Data + Security Benefits + Votes + Policy direction 
15 0.201 Unmanned Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information  
+ Votes + funding 
15 0.201 Human Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information  
+ Policy direction 
15 0.201 NASA Science Funding + Science Knowledge + Skilled workforce 
15 0.201 Science Data+ Science Knowledge + Skilled workforce 
15 0.201 Stable and Rewarding Employment + Public opinion and policy 
support + funding 
15 0.201 Unmanned Exploration Firsts + Entertainment and Information 
29 0.182 NASA Market Funding + stable employment + Votes + funding 
29 0.182 Space Acquired Data + stable employment)+ Votes + funding 
 
Notice that there are number of ties (13 loops at #15), despite the fact that the 
loops are 4 and 5 links long. This suggests that feasibility has eliminated a number of the 
short loops, in that the full space of value permutations are not represented. For example, 
for loops with {length = 2, value > 0.2}, there are 19 possible combinations, only 6 of 
which are represented in this model. 
 
Recognizing that it is easier to rationalize the output by observing it, I composed  
a separate list of what I thought were the top 7 loops.  It is interesting to see how my 
choices diverged from the model outcomes.   
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Figure 15 Comparison of Expected vs. Realized Top Loops 
 
There are a couple of factors at work here:  
 
1. I picked a greater distribution of stakeholders and links. Part of this is that 
the model will enumerate similar links, whereas a person wouldn’t typically 
do so.  
 
2. My links were on average longer than those in the model (3.25 vs. 2.75) for 
the Top 8. However, if I had chosen my top 50 loops, I would also have 
expected to see my group more narrowly distributed about 3 or 4 than the 
model – a result of the increased difficulty of conceptualizing longer loops.  
 
3. It was more natural for me to focus on benefit rather than regret. Essentially, 
I didn’t weight regret highly, which explains why jobs are not placed highly. 
 
4. My Loop 3 is typically given as justification’s for NASA’s spending, but 
neither ranks significantly in the model. The model is suggesting that 
NASA’s ability to influence the relevant stakeholders here is lower – this 
does not pass judgment on the probability of the event happening. Rather, 
the model functions on conditional probability: “If you had this benefit, how 
would it impact you?”. We would therefore expect powerful but low 
probability mechanisms to be over-represented in the model results. This, 
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however, argues in favor of the discrepancy here.  The real answer for Loop 
3 relies on the competition aspect – there are a number of other sectors that 
stimulate commercial launch.  
 
5. My Loop #6 is not a feasible loop in the model. There is a specific modeling 
decision responsible for this – I required international agreements be 
transacted at the Executive level, whereas actual goods and services are 
transacted directly by NASA. This suggests that NASA cannot directly 
influence the number of international space systems it receives – it has to 
take indirect routes through the Executive. This philosophy is certainly 
endorsed by Administrator Griffin, who has suggested a number of times 
that NASA’s goals are set externally. However, encoding this in the model 
ignores the facilitative discussions, operational realities, and architectural 
attributes that all have an impact on international collaboration. Significant 
post-analysis will be required in order to evaluate whether this was an 
appropriate modeling decision, provided in Section 5.3 Architecting in the 
Real World.  
 
Given the loops that many of the loops represented in the Top 50 stem from the 
disbursement of money by NASA, rather than the benefit associated with what that 
money was spent on, I compiled a list of the top Non-Welfare loops. Specifically, I 
eliminated loops that begin with NASA providing money and loops that generate 
employment. The results are shown in the table below.  
Table 6 Percentage of Non-Welfare Loops 
Loops % Non-Welfare 
Top 50 38% 
Top 100 43% 
Top 200 45% 
  
Interestingly, the percentage welfare seems to be decreasing slightly as we take 
progressively broader sets of loops. Despite the fact that money links are a minority in the 
model, in many cases they represent the most desired inputs, which biases their loops 
towards the top section of the loop rankings.  
 
The distribution of rankings is shown in the figure below. It is apparent that this is 
a relatively steep curve, as I noted earlier – feasibility constrains many of the 
permutations which would contribute to a more gradual slope. There are roughly 60 loops 
that have a loop value greater than 0.1 – this is equivalent to a strong loop with a single 
weakest link equal to 0.1, of which 2/3 of the Kano-Importance combinations are greater. 
There is a trade-off here, between a desire to rank loops more evenly to allow for error in 
the modeling assumptions, and a desire to have that the tail of the curve converges to zero 
reasonably fast, so that we can bound the solutions without enumerating all loops. This 
will be investigated more thoroughly in the sensitivity analysis to the Kano Multiplier.  
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Figure 16 Distribution of Loop Rankings 
4.1.2. Stakeholder Importance 
 
 The charts below represents the  most direct output of the analysis, a 
determination of which stakeholders are most important. However, I will argue that this  
is not in fact the most useful product of the analysis, essentially because it is difficult to 
make decisions based on a ranking of stakeholders.  
 
 To determine the ‘importance’ of stakeholders, I used a weighted sum of the 
stakeholder’s participation in important loops, called the Stakeholder Loop Occurrence 
(SLO). For each time that a stakeholder participates in a loop, the score for that loop is 
added to the stakeholder’s total. The final values are normalized by the sum of the scores 
for the loop set considered.  
 
! 
SLO(s) =
r
i
i"S
#
r
i
$i
#
 
 
where: r = rank of loop  
s = the set of all loops that contain the stakeholder  
i = loop index 
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This necessarily places all stakeholders at an equal participation rate within the 
loop. The alternative would have been to weight the stakeholder’s participation in the 
loop by their input score (assuming a benefit pull), or the score of the stakeholder who 
receives their output (assuming a benefit push). However,  this would double count the 
stakeholder’s contribution to the loop, as their link value has already been factored into 
the loop score.  
 
 
 
Figure 17 Weighted Stakeholder Occurrences in Loops 
 
 There are at least 3 regimes shown here. Clearly, the Executive and the US People 
participate in many more important loops than do the remaining stakeholders. Science 
and the Economy play the next most important roles, followed closely by the Media and 
Educators. Lagging well behind, we can see that the Security community, and in a small 
but non-zero capacity we see the International Partners.  
 
 Notice that the loop model produces a very different output than if we were to 
value stakeholders by their direct inputs to NASA, as shown in the graph below. This 
graph represents what a myopic, reactionary view of stakeholders would look like. Note 
the strong emphasis on the economy, the non-existence of Security and US People 
stakeholders, and the resurgence of International Partners. 
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Figure 18 Stakeholder Valuation by Direct Inputs to NASA 
 In the following discussions, I discuss how these stakeholder weightings compared 
with existing data.  
 
How does NASA view its stakeholders? 
 
 A recent internal study48 (Dec. 29, 2006) by the NASA Communications Office 
provides an informal view of the perceptions of NASA employees as to the relative 
importance of different audiences for NASA. Note that the use of the word ‘audience’ can 
be interpreted differently from ‘stakeholder’, but for this coarse analysis Iwill consider 
them equivalent. The study cannot be verified as original, as it was leaked on 
NASAwatch.com website – however, a nearly identical ‘Validation Session’ copy was 
officially released by NASA on November 6, 2006.  
 
 The survey was conducted on October 11-13, 2006, using 80 NASA employees, 
with a 50/50 split between Headquarters and Center personnel, and with each center 
represented. The chief bias concern here is that communications personnel dominated the 
sample, although there were representatives from all directorates included. This might 
suggest a bias towards ‘traditional’ stakeholders, the US Public and the Executive.  The 
data from the survey is shown below.  
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Figure 19 NASA Communications Office Study of NASA Stakeholder Perceptions 
  
 Using some rough analysis, I converted the NASA survey data to equivalent terms 
in terms of my importance scale. Specifically, I equated NASA’s “Very Important” with 
my “Extremely Important”, and NASA’s “Fairly Important” with my “Important”, and 
assumed that the remainder (not all columns sum to 100% in the diagram above) was 
equivalent to my “Not At All Important”. Using these values, I converted the four 
stakeholders represented to my importance scale, equating Industry with Economy, 
Science Community with Science, averaging White House and Congress to create the 
Executive and Congress. For the US People, I used the relative percentages of the 
population49 to scale Youth, Women, and Seniors, assuming that the remainder of the 
population corresponds to the average of the 3. These assumptions should be taken as 
crude at best, but they do allow us to make a relative comparison of the stakeholders. 
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Figure 20 NASA Internal Survey Data Converted To Importance Scale 
 
 We can see that there is less differentiation between stakeholders in this data than 
in the model output. While the Executive and US People still come out on top, we can see 
that the relative importance of Science and Economic stakeholders is much higher. What 
is most interesting about the data is the broad differences in importance scores of the 
different categories of US People. For example, Youth 18-30, who represent only 9% 
percent of the population, are much higher ranked than other segments.  
 
 Shifting our focus to recently published NASA studies, what can we glean about 
the prioritization of stakeholders from the relative priorities of goals? The deputy 
administrator held a press conference on the Exploration Strategy and Architecture in 
December of 2006, defining six ‘themes’ for lunar exploration:  
 
• Human Civilization (US People) 
• Scientific Knowledge (Science) 
• Exploration Preparation (NASA / US People) 
• Global Partnerships (International Partners)  
• Economic Expansion (Economy) 
• Public Engagement (Educators / US People)  
 
I have asserted the corresponding stakeholders from my model in brackets above. 
Note that the Security community is not noted as a stakeholder, nor is the Media 
(although Public Engagement could be construed to include the Media). Unfortunately, 
the list of chosen objectives corresponding to these themes was not published, so we 
cannot infer which themes are most strongly backed by requirements. The largest 
discontinuity between my model and the NASA presentation is clearly the presence of 
International Partners. While there is a clear desire to include International Partners, 
current NASA policy suggests that they should not be placed on the critical path, 
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particularly with respect to transportation capabilities. This is in keeping with the 
valuation of International Partners in the model, which asserts that the benefit would 
potentially be great, but that there is a desire not to have regret associated with placing 
International Partners on the critical path, should there be delays. I’m not asserting that 
this is the correct policy, but simply that pains were taken to make the model data reflect 
current policy.   
 
How Does the Executive View NASA’s Stakeholders?  
 
Documents from the Executive don’t enable us to get a better sense of a 
prioritization of stakeholders. As noted in Section 3.1 Rebuilding the Model for 
Consistency, the Vision for Space Exploration defines five main stakeholders (including 
security!), but doesn’t provide a prioritization. Recognizing that there could be negative 
consequences for the Executive of defining numerical rankings of stakeholders, this was 
to be expected.  
 
How Do the US People View NASA’s Stakeholders? 
 
 The best source of data on NASA’s perceived stakeholder context comes from 
public surveys, where there are no consequences to individual respondents to asserting 
priorities. Several data points exist:  
 
The Harmonic study50 asked “Who is NASA for?”. This is analogous to asking 
“What is the one thing NASA should do?”, but should at least give an idea of what the 
public thinks is NASA’s single-most important stakeholder. No sample size was given in 
the data. 
• 60% the public, of which 30% said exclusively the American public 
• 18% the government 
• 15% scientists 
• Remaining 5% not shown in survey  
 
It is interesting that this survey also ranks the government above scientists, as my model 
does. Additionally, the fact that the Economy is completely non-existent in this case is 
quite surprising! 
 
The Gallup poll (in the Strategic Communications study) asked a slightly different 
question: “What do you think is the main reason NASA continues to explore?”. 
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Figure 21 Gallup Poll Data on Motivation for US Exploration 
 
The analogy from my model is to examine all the value chains that start at NASA 
and end in the US People. Using a bounding threshold of V>0.01, I examined all chains 
that end in the analogous value flow. Given that my model doesn’t differentiate between 
the exploration producing entertainment and exploration producing inspiration (until we 
see the output of the US People), my results are the equivalent of lumping ‘Human nature 
to explore’ with ‘To motivate children to study math and science’.  
 
 
Figure 22 Objective of Value Chains Ending at US People 
 
 We can see that my model predicts roughly the same Entertainment & Inspiration 
and Security Benefits, but then undervalues Science and overvalues Economic Benefits. 
Science is undervalued because the US People don’t directly benefit from Science 
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Experiments in my model, they benefit from entertainment from science knowledge, and 
they enjoy indirect economic benefits from that science knowledge. As such, part of the 
Science benefit is caught in the Economic benefit, and another component is caught in 
Security benefit. The overvaluation of Economic Benefit is partially due to my benefit 
accounting (as described above), but more significantly, because of my weighting on 
detriment, which values the jobs from NASA much higher than a survey respondent ever 
would. It is worth noting though that there is a distortion between asking for ‘the most 
important output’ vs. allocating a fixed budget to several activities.  
 
There are clearly large discrepancies between how different groups view NASA’s 
Science mission. Within NASA’s, 75% of the civil servant respondents highlighted 
“Advances Knowledge” or “Enhances Scientific Discovery” as NASA’s top priority. 
From the Public’s perspective, Science’s share of the top priority spot varies from 15% to 
24% (as shown above, variation based on how you ask the question). My valuation is 
much closer to Public’s than to the NASA numbers, and I would go so far as to suggest 
that NASA’s actions don’t necessarily reflect the high numbers from the poll, even from 
a basic budgetary standpoint.  
 
The difficulty with these questions is first, how does one realistically use this type 
of stakeholder information? In order to better answer this question, I re-examined the 
stakeholder question in a different light.  
 
4.1.3. Reciprocal Stakeholder Power Analysis 
 
 Further thought on the issue of stakeholder valuation led me to the idea that the 
relative balance of power between stakeholders is one of the key piece of information that 
a decision maker uses. Therefore, the question becomes “How do these feedback loops 
inform the balance of power between stakeholders and the organization?”. 
 
I  postulate that there are a number dimensions of stakeholder power:  
 
1. Importance of the resource  
2. The availability of alternative sources (buyer and supplier power) 
3. Formalized reporting relationships (legal power) 
4. Each stakeholder’s ability to modulate their outputs (threat capability) 
Principle 
Computation on value flows can discover discrepancies 
between how different groups perceive the mission of the 
organization 
 - 80 - 
 
Figure 23 Dimensions of Power Between Two Actors 
We can examine the importance dimension using our existing framework of 
stakeholder value loops. We can compute an approximation of the importance of the 
benefit that flows between NASA and each of its stakeholders. Each of the graphs below 
defines the sum of benefit chains that are provided to each stakeholder, and the sum of 
the chains that pass from that stakeholder back to NASA.  
 
This analysis is shown with three different filters. First, I examine only the direct 
transactions between NASA and a stakeholder. Previous analysis indicates these are in 
the minority, composing just 8% of the important value loops. Second, I show the direct 
transactions plus the top 5 Indirect chains (ranked using the Kano-Importance 
methodology) between NASA and a stakeholder.  I define an indirect chain as any set of 
links that passes through at least 1 other stakeholder. My results show indirect chains 
with as many 6 links occurring. Third, I capture all chains with a value greater than 0.01 
which captures as many as 100 value chains in each direction.  
 
The horizontal axis represents the sum of the value chains, with the numbers 
inverted in the ‘From Stakeholder’ case for plotting. The exact numerical value is less 
important – the numerical framework I employ is intended for making relative 
comparisons.  
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Figure 24 Power Balance For Direct Transactions 
We can see that there is a net bias in direct transactions towards stakeholders. 
That is to say, NASA is a net contributor to its environment, or in other terms, NASA’s 
stakeholders, on average, have more power over the relationship. It is also interesting that 
NASA receives nothing directly from Security or the US People.  
 
 
Figure 25 Figure 25 Power Balance With Top 5 Indirect Chains 
 
If I now include the Top 5 Indirect transactions, the balance shifts – NASA values 
what it receives from stakeholders more than they value NASA’s output. Notably, NASA 
values highly what Security provides, but doesn’t have much leverage over Security. The 
balance of power with the Executive and Congress has also shifted in favor of NASA.  
 
 
Figure 26 Power Balance With V>0.01 Indirect Chains 
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Looking at a broad view of the balance of importance (the above figure), we can 
see that the average balance is close to neutral, but individual relationships vary 
significantly. For example, NASA provides more to International Partners than it values 
the return, and NASA receives more benefit from Educators than it can possibly 
influence.  
 
We can also note some unusual outputs – for example, one would predict from 
this model alone that NASA exerts power over the Executive. As I have not included 
legal power (by which the Congress exercises monitoring authority over NASA), or the 
relative ease with which outputs can be modulated to threaten the receiver (where the 
Executive and Congress have significantly more latitude), I do not capture the important 
dimensions of this relationship. In this sense, direct only links were a better predictor of 
the balance of power.  
 
The relative balance of power with stakeholders should inform how the architect 
thinks about the prioritization of requirements within the architecture. In an organic 
architecting process, I assert that concerns of important stakeholders will be satisfied 
first, in order to avoid having that stakeholder exercise their power. This essentially 
amounts to minimizing the organization’s regret. The remaining design space is left to 
optimize the benefit to the remaining stakeholders.  
 
Reciprocal Stakeholder Power Analysis With Competition 
 
 Having conducted the first order analysis with only importance balances, we can 
ask what else would be required in order to add competition? The reader will recall that I 
identified importance and competition as the two most significant concerns to model 
from the perspective of the agent problem. Additionally, competition was the second 
factor identified in understanding reciprocal stakeholder agreements.  
 
  I focus only the outputs of the stakeholder for which the stakeholder has a 
monopoly, but then excepting those chains where the input to the receiver is a 
monopsony. Alternatively, I could attempt to bias the individual link values up or down 
based on the level of competition – however, it would be difficult to measure the 
premium that is extracted across different goods and services.  
 
 For a first pass, I examine only the monopolistic (1 vendor) and oligopolic (2 
vendors) markets, less the monopsonistic markets (1 buyer). For the oligopolistic 
markets, I halved the transaction value, to recognize that an oligopoly has less bargaining 
power than a monopoly. Again, I use 4 filters: Direct, Top 5, Top 10, and Top 0.1. If 
there are not enough monopolies to fill the top 5 or 10 with only monopolies, I fill the 
remainder with the oligopolies at half value.  
 
 To determine which flows represented monopolies, I required that monopolies 
have the ability to band together to withhold the output. For example, scientists cannot 
form monopolies, because they are too distributed. However, the Air Force can form a 
monopoly.  
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Figure 27 Power Balance With Competition Filter for Direct Transactions 
  
 The above figure shows the output of this analysis. Specifically, the blue and red 
bars, marked ‘Comp’ for Non-Competed, show the uncompleted balance of power. The 
Yellow and Green bars then layer on the other ½ of the value from oligopolistic flows, as  
well as the other competed flows.  
 
The competition filter has eliminated a number possible benefit chains. Note that 
NASA has a one way relationship with 5 of its stakeholders when competed flows are 
eliminated. Note also that the Executive has no direct flows to NASA that aren’t 
monopolies, as we would expect. The only stakeholder that sees a significant balance of 
power change through the competition filter is International Partners, which moves from 
being neutral to a NASA advantage.  
 
 
Figure 28 Power Balance With Competition Filter Including Top 5 Indirect Chains 
 
 In the Top 5 Indirect flows, we can see that NASA offers monopolistic flows to 
each stakeholder. While NASA is certainly unique, this could also be an artifact of the 
level of detail chosen for NASA (17,000 employees vs. several orders of magnitude more 
for each of the Economy, the US People, International Partners, and Science). We can 
also see that the Educators provide a lot of competed goods (essentially, one university 
could never hold buyer power over an industrial group), as do Science and US People.  
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Figure 29 Power Balance With Competition Filter Including V>0.01 Chains 
 
 Choosing a larger set of the data, many of the relationships remain stable with 
respect to the previous level of detail. However, we can see a significant amount of 
competed flows to the Executive bolstering NASA’s power (which is in turn limited by 
the legal constraints and reporting relationships).  
 
 
Figure 30 Power Balance Aggregated Across All Stakeholders 
  
 Finally, looking at the balance of competed and non-competed flows, we can see 
that NASA’s outflows are more likely to be monopolies than are those of its stakeholders. 
Considering only monopolies and oligopolies, NASA is a net contributor, as compared 
with an neutral or even stakeholder- heavy importance balance when all flows are 
included.  
 
Having answered the question of competition for NASA’s outflows, the real 
question becomes “Can NASA really extract monopolistic pricing?”. I believe the answer 
is No for the majority of outputs, in part because of legal constraints and stakeholder 
complaint loops. Furthermore, NASA is not a provider of essential services (with the 
exception of jobs and some types of funding), which suggests that NASA’s threat would 
be a hollow one, if not a contested one. This reinforces our decision to focus on positive 
feedback loops in creating the model.  
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Note that I’ve only represented the first onion layer on competition, in the sense 
that all of the links in the value chain between NASA and the stakeholder face possible 
competition – as shown graphically in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 31 Layers Of Competition In Value Chains 
Given the above analysis however, we can see that competitive analysis may be more 
appropriate at a lower level of detail, where pricing premiums can be measured and 
modeled.  
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4.1.4. Important Outputs and Inputs 
 
 One perspective on the job of the architect is to allocate the outputs of the 
organization to maximize inputs, as shown below in the diagram.  
 
 
Figure 32 Outputs As Decision Variables Controlling Inputs 
 
 This section provides specific answers as to how this methodology informs that 
question. We can begin to answer this question by constructing the influence matrix A 
shown below, where individual entries Aij contain all paths from Oi to Ij .  
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Figure 33 Decomposition Of Value Network Into An Influence Matrix 
 Having constructed A, note that the individual entries are not directly of interest. 
It is the allocation of outputs of the organization that is important. This breakdown of 
outputs can be determined by summing across each row of A, which provides a value of 
the impact potential of each output. This sum already incorporates how important the 
input is to NASA!  
 
 This matrix also provides a methodology for understanding how well the 
organization can expect to influence its inputs. Summing down the columns of A captures 
all possible paths in the network that lead to that particular input.  
 
 The following subsections illustrate how these measures can actually be created 
and interpreted.  
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Important Outputs 
 
Rather than creating the matrix A then summing columns or rows, it is possible to 
jump straight to the answer by creating a sum over all loops that contain the benefit flow 
in question. However, given that the total number of loops in a sample is variable, a 
normalization is necessary. I propose normalizing by the sum over all loops, such that the 
sum under the weighted outputs curve sums to 1.  
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where: OOL = Output Occurrence In Loops 
r = rank of loop  
o = the set of all loops that contain the output  
i = loop index 
 
 
Figure 34 Weighted NASA Outputs 
 
This graph is one of the most important outputs of the model, in that it provides 
an indication of how the organization should align its outputs to create the strongest case 
for feedback loops. This graph can be used in two fashions: 
  
1. Comprehensive: One should measure the architecture on its distribution of 
outputs to be aligned with this graph. 
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2. Differential: Once the architecture has been designed, this graph provides the 
architect with the most highly leveraged outputs for use in adjusting feedback 
loops to compensate for the value flows where the architecture is less strong.  
 
In general, I would characterize the outputs as uncontroversial, with a few 
exceptions I will note below. Similar attributes (like NASA Contract Funding and NASA 
Market Funding) maintain their relative rankings as expected. Stable employment again 
ranks high, as we would expected from the ranked loops. Exploration Firsts are also 
ranked highly, which matches the goals respondents chose in the surveys, as highlighted 
earlier. 
 
It is interesting to note that Science Funding figures so prominently in NASA’s 
outputs, and yet Science is at best an average stakeholder. First, we note that in this 
model, the Science community (including scientists inside within NASA), has been 
abstracted to a group outside NASA. Therefore, Science Funding is one of the key 
methods by which Science Knowledge is stimulated. Second, Science Funding is more 
powerful than the other major NASA input to Science (Science Data), because Science 
Funding stimulates all three Science internal assets (Community, Technology, and 
Knowledge), whereas Science Data stimulates only one (Knowledge).  
 
It is also interesting to note that Space Acquired Data ranks slightly higher than 
Science Data. The distinction between the two is that Space Acquired Data focuses on 
measurements useful for design purposes, which might not otherwise merit scientific 
attention. Examples include calibration of radiation models or re-entry models. Space 
Acquired data is present in fewer loops, but they are on average shorter than Science Data 
loops. For the relative funding for the two sources from NASA, and the fact that Science 
Data is a broader categorization, I might have expected Science Data to come out higher. 
The use of a high detriment weighting could potentially be responsible for this relative 
bias on applied outputs. 
 
NASA Launch and Space Services ranks comparatively low. We can ask the 
question of whether this can be attributed to the low input value (which might be biased 
by the current unavailability of launch services from NASA), or whether this is a 
reflection of structural phenomena in the model. We can see from the graph below the 
discrepancy between the Kano-Importance Data (marked Kano for brevity) and the Loop 
Data. Specifically, the Kano-Importance Data shown here represents the average of the 
Kano-Importance values for all stakeholders who receive the output. I have simply 
renormalized the loop data to the greatest individual value, rather than using the sum over 
all links to normalize.  
 
Principle 
Weighted outputs provide an indication of how the organization 
should align its products to create strong feedback loops to its 
inputs of importance.  
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Figure 35 Comparing Weighted NASA Outputs Against Kano Importance Data 
 
The above graph shows that NASA Launch and Space Services’ low ranking 
results from it initial value. The rationale for the initial value was that each of the clients 
receiving this service has moved to alternative sources (Air Force to EELV, International 
Partners to Russian launches), to minimize the detriment associated with not having 
launches, with the exception of modules for the International Space Station. 
 
Discrepancies where the Loop data is significantly lower than the Kano-
Importance data result from weak loops. We can see in particular that the outputs that 
transit through the Media all exhibit this phenomena. Science data also shows poorer loop 
performance than would be expected by Kano, perhaps reflecting the tenuous relationship 
the pure sciences have had with applied science. These discrepancies indicate that the 
network model is producing a different answer than would be gained of only examining 
direct transactions. In the case of the media and science, I believe this is an accurate 
trend. 
 
The most stark contrast, in percentage terms, comes from NASA offering 
Participation in Exploration Missions. I have already highlighted that the model structure 
was intentionally designed to force international agreements to be negotiated between 
governments, rather than at the agency level. However, anecdotal evidence would suggest 
that there is a significant amount of inter-space agency dialogue that sets the tone for 
international collaboration, before, during and after the formal international agreements. 
This suggests that there are more direct loops by which NASA can influence international 
partners, which are being overly penalized by the structure I created. Possible future 
solutions would include changing the stock structure within International Partners, or 
allowing loops which visit the same stakeholder twice.  
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The astute reader will notice that some loops have higher values than the original 
Kano value. How is it possible to have a decrease in the loop value? To be rigorous, I am 
comparing similar but different scales that happen to have the same range. The loop 
values are a sum of the loop products, weighted by rank, as compared to the pure link 
values. Therefore, a loop will exceed its starting link value when there are multiple loops 
starting with that link which are ranked highly. There is also a small averaging effect, 
whereby averaging across different stakeholder preferences, I have represented a slightly 
different Kano value. However, this would only be a problem if the one link that is 
furthest from the average was also the only one to be associated with strong loops, which 
is unlikely.  
 
Taken as a group, flows with high positive discrepancies highlight structure in the 
model that acts to boost a link’s importance. For example, NASA Contract Funding 
exhibits this behavior, even without including an economic multiplier on government 
spending.  
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Important Inputs 
 
Switching focus to NASA’s inputs, the exact same procedure is required to rank 
the input flows by their presence in important loops.  
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where: IOL = Input Occurrence In Loops 
r = rank of loop  
I = the set of all loops that contain the input  
i = loop index 
 
 
 
Figure 36 Weighted Inputs to NASA 
  
The results here are relatively straightforward. NASA has the greatest 
dependence, but also the greatest possible influence on, the two inputs it receives from 
the Executive.  
 
It is interesting that in the aggregate, the model indicates NASA values Science 
Knowledge at a relatively low level, despite Science Knowledge’s impressive role an 
enabler for other stakeholders in the model. It is worth reminding the reader that this 
model does not incorporate an internal model of NASA. The likelihood is that the 
external inputs which serve to provide both outputs as well as foster internal capabilities 
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(like Science Knowledge) would see their rankings improve dramatically if an internal 
model for NASA were incorporated.  
 
Examining the discrepancies between the Kano-Importance Data and the Loops 
Results, we can clearly see that this behavior was not programmed in by the link values.  
 
 
Figure 37 Comparing Weighted NASA Inputs Against Kano Importance Data 
 
4.2. Sensitivity to Numerical Choices 
 
Having now thoroughly examined the potential outputs of this type of network 
stakeholder analysis, it is necessary to examine how sensitive different parameters are to 
the numerical modeling decisions made.  
 
 First, I examine whether a multiplicative rule forces a correlation between short 
loops and high average loop value. Second, I examine whether there is a similar 
correlation between short loops and low loop rank, where the rank is the ranking of all 
feasible loops in the network model.  
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Figure 38 Correlation Between Loop Length and Average Loop Value For V > 0.01 
 
 
Figure 39 Correlation Between Loop Length and Loop Rank for V>0.01 
 
 It appears there is a strong correlation of loop length with average loop value, but 
a weak correlation with loop rank (with max and min rank shown by error bars). We can 
see that the highest loop rank is somewhat bounded based on loop length.  
 
What we can’t observe are the number of possible loops in the system for each 
loop length, because I have dynamically bounded the model based on a minimum loop 
value. For example, there are 27 possible loops of length 2 in the model (which I can 
observe because this isn’t computationally intensive), 22 of which are captured by using 
V > 0.01. If the distribution of loop lengths was anything but flat (i.e. if there were more 
loops of length 3 than of length 2), then we would see it reflected in the above graphs, 
regardless of the numerical methodology (because the average loop value of the most 
common loop length would dominate). As I scale the length of loops up, I would expect 
to see significantly more possible permutations, which would decrease the average loop 
value, and increase the average loop rank. Unfortunately, because it is not 
computationally possible to enumerate all of these loops, I can’t plot those curves.  
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 However, I can compare the values of the top 20 loops in each length category, in 
order to normalize for loop lengths that are more prevalent. Using this data, it is clearer 
that loops of length 2, 3 and 4 do not exhibit a length bias for average loop value , but 
that there is some question for loops of length 5 and 6.  
 
 
Figure 40 Correlation Between Loop Length and Average Loop Value for Top 20 
Loops of Each Length 
It is interesting to note that the dispersion in loop ranks is lowest for length = 4 
(shown in the figure below), which was also the average length for the loops I generated 
for comparison before the model. This may reflect an additional cognitive bias in 
building the model, in that four links was roughly the ‘expected’ length. 
 
 
Figure 41 Correlation Between Loop Length and Loop Rank for Top 20 Loops of 
Each Length 
 Having identified that there is some correlation of value with length, we can ask 
the question “Is this reasonable?”. Experience would suggest that it is difficult to be 
aware of much more than 2 transaction ahead or behind a particular stakeholder. This 
would suggest that loops of length greater than 3 will contain stakeholders who are 
unaware of the root provider of benefit. Unfortunately there are few tests I can conduct to 
verify this idea, so this will have to be accepted as a potential difficulty with the model. 
One alternative solution would be to run both multiplicative and additive rules on the 
model, and then derive the final rankings as a combination of both.   
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Kano Multiplier Sensitivity 
 
 When this numerical methodology was created, the Kano Multiplier was chosen 
to be 3, but I expressed a desire to perform sensitivity analysis on it. This section applies 
a Kano Multiplier of 2 (KX2), as well as a linear Kano scale (entitled KX123), and then 
looks at how loop length and rankings change. Through all of these tests, a constant 
dynamic bound of V > 0.01 is used.  
 
 Three comparison statistics were created. The first measures the percentage 
overlap of loops between two sets of rankings. Therefore, if four out five loops are 
common to both sets, but a fifth is unique to each set, the overlap would be 80%. The 
second measures the absolute distance (difference in rank) between the same loop in two 
sets. The distances for all common loops are then averaged to create a summary statistic. 
Finally, I also capture the maximum distance within a set, which is obviously bounded by 
the size of the set (two ranks can’t differ by more than 250 if there are only 250 loops in 
each set, because the loop must be present in both sets to begin with).  
 
Figure 42 Kano Importance Values With Different Kano Multipliers 
 
 
Figure 43 Kano Importance Values Sorted 
 To begin with, the distributions of link values are shown above for comparison. 
The first figure is kinked where the distribution moves to a lower Kano level. We can see 
that the higher the Kano Multiplier, the smaller the area under the curve.  
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Table 7 Comparison of Model Output Under KX2 and KX3 
KX 3 vs. 
KX 2 
Percent 
Overlap 
Average Distance 
 
Max Distance 
 
 Top 5 100% 0 0 
 Top 10 70% 0.6 1 
 Top 20 75% 2.0 8 
 Top 50 98% 3.6 12 
 Top 250 94% 14.7 90 
   
 It is interesting to note that much of the re-arrangement occurs within the Top 50, 
which corresponds roughly to the thick part of the original rankings curve. If the model is 
used to focus on a certain subset of important loops, it would therefore be advisable to 
choose the Top 50 over the Top 20.  
 
 Similar behavior is observed for the linear Kano scale, with slightly greater 
deviations.  
 
Table 8 Comparison of Model Output Under KX123 and KX3 
KX 3 vs. 
KX123 
Percent 
Overlap 
Average Distance 
 
Max Distance 
 
 Top 5 80% 0 0 
 Top 10 70% 0.3 1 
 Top 20 95% 2.4 11 
 Top 50 94% 1.8 26 
 Top 250 92% 20.8 122 
 
 Note that the average value of loops increases, as the tradeoff with Kano is not as 
steep. We can see that the difference between the sets is most pronounced for shorter 
loops. Therefore, the behavior of loop value with length is relatively insensitive to the 
choice of Kano multiplier.  
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Figure 44 Sensitivity of Average Loop Value By Length To Kano Multiplier 
 
 Most importantly, how does the prioritization of stakeholders change? The graph 
below shows that the change is almost negligible. This suggests that we are seeing small 
changes in rank between different loops, but that the normalization chosen (sum of all 
loops) is doing its job.  
 
 
Figure 45 Sensitivity of Stakeholder Occurrence To Kano Multiplier 
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Kano Importance Correlation 
 
 I originally suggested that the Kano scale would not necessarily be independent 
from the Importance scale. In the charts below, this phenomena is examined. In order to 
allow for small changes in individual decisions, I’ve bucketed the Importance scale in 3: 
Low Importance, defined by the points “Not at all important” and “Somewhat Important”, 
Important, defined by the points “Important”, and Very Important, defined by the points 
“Very Important” and “Extremely Important”.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 46 Correlation of Importance Scores to Kano Scores 
 
 The correlation is clearly the strongest for Must Haves, and the weakest for 
Exciters. However, in each case, there is a distribution across the full breadth of the 
Importance scale. This indicated that different information is being captured in each. In a 
manner of speaking, the Importance scale allows the user to highlight realistic priorities, 
or flows where there is little expectation of changed in flow rate. The Kano data allows 
the user to specify official policy information, in a sense. For example, ‘Protection 
Against Claims Of Sovereignty’ might be a flow that the government might not be 
willing to lose (Must Have), but in terms of an operational agenda, it might rank low on 
the important scale. 
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4.3. Testing The Output Variability Assumption 
 
When designing the loop methodology, the reader will recall that it was assumed 
that inputs and outputs are variable. The purpose of strong loops in this model is to 
identify outputs to modulate, so as to impact inputs. Therefore, this section performs a 
brief check to ensure that outputs and inputs are in fact variable.  
 
 It is possible to quantify many of the links in the model, either directly or with 
indicators. However, it quickly became clear that the inputs and outputs of NASA were 
the mostly easily quantifiable, and also the best tracked, of all the flows in the model. 
This is not because economic, education and security indicators are no tracked. Rather, 
the specific impact of NASA actions can be difficult to track. Some localized studies 
have been performed, however. For example, many centers publish their estimation of 
impact on the local economy, including economic spending multiplier effects51, but none 
of this data is aggregated nationally, and is therefore not immediately useful. The outputs 
and inputs for which appropriate data could be found is shown in the table below.  
 
Table 9 NASA Inputs and Outputs For Which Link Data Is Provided 
Outputs  Inputs  
Access to highly visible events  Commercial launch services  
Human Exploration First Events  Exploration systems  
Humans in Space Events  Funding  
NASA contract funding  International launch services  
NASA education material  Internationally provided space 
systems 
 
NASA instruments and modules  Media Entertainment and 
Information 
 
NASA launch and space services  Participation in international 
exploration mission 
 
NASA Market funding  Policy Direction  
NASA Mission and Event 
Content 
 Science knowledge  
NASA Science Events  Science opinions and policy 
support 
 
NASA science funding  Science systems   
NASA space technology  Skilled and motivated 
workforce 
 
NASA Space technology 
demonstration Events 
 
Participation in NASA 
Exploration Missions 
 
Plans and progress reports  
Protection against claims of 
sovereignty in space 
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Science data  
Space acquired data  
Space resource knowledge  
Stable and rewarding 
employment 
 
Unmanned Exploration First 
Events 
 
 
 Financial outputs are the most easily reported, and the most stable of outputs. 
NASA Science Funding is calculated from the NASA Annual Procurement Report52, 
which has buckets for Educational and Non-Profit Institutions. As such, Science Funding 
to internal NASA scientists or industrial scientists is not reflected here. NASA Contract 
Funding is also calculated from the NASA Annual Procurement Report, using the 
‘Business Firms’ bucket. NASA Educational Funding is derived from Education 
Programs in the budget breakdown by enterprise in the NASA Performance and 
Accountability Report (PAR)53. NASA Launch and Space Services is calculated from the 
PAR statement of intragovernmental revenues, which includes military and civilian 
agencies - the most prominent of which are the Air Force and the Dept. of Commerce 
(NOAA), respectively. NASA Employment is calculated from a published survey of 
NASA average salaries54 multiplied by the number of employees, as the PAR does not 
explicitly break out salary costs.  
 
 It can be seen from the graph below that many of the budgets seem to be 
calculated as a relative percentage of the previous year’s budget. However NASA 
Contract Funding and Science Funding both show broader variability, the former likely 
the result of Return to Flight spending, and the latter as a result of increased exploration 
spending.  
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Figure 47 NASA Financial and Service Outputs Over 6 Years 
 
The distribution of NASA Events shows significantly more variability. For the 
purpose of this study, only missions and launches were counted, rather than attempting to 
track individual news reports related to missions. Humans in Space events is calculated as 
Shuttle and Soyuz launches. NASA Science Events are calculated as a Science Missions 
launched, not including International Missions with NASA equipment on board. Surface 
missions are counted as Unmanned Exploration rather than Science, for bookkeeping 
purposes. Humans Exploration Firsts are defined as new planetary or orbital missions, 
none of which have been executed over the timeline examined.  
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Figure 48 NASA Events Over 5 Years 
 
 NASA Plans and Progress Reports is inherently a lumpy measurement, because 
major initiatives arise on a decadal basis, but individual meetings and consultations take 
place on a daily basis. Two indicators are given below, which try to strike a balance of 
detail. First, formal congressional hearings per year is . Second, NASA press releases per 
year are also shown. While the most common type of press release focuses on a current 
mission, many are also provided on future missions and science data or imagery releases.  
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Figure 49 NASA Plans and Progress Reports Over 5 Years 
 
 Thus far, all of the graphs shown track NASA Outputs. The graph below shows 
the NASA Inputs that can be readily tracked (only 3 of 12 total inputs), in addition to the 
redundant inputs from the direct transactions like Exploration Systems (the same value as 
Contract Funding) and Skilled Workforce (the same value as NASA Employment 
output). We can see that NASA Funding does not vary significantly, despite annual 
optimistic projections or historical comparisons to the Apollo funding. However, both 
commercially-purchased and international launches do vary somewhat, although the data 
is admittedly lumpy due to a dependence on mission timing. 
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Figure 50 NASA Inputs Over 6 Years 
Overall, funding shows the least volatility over time, and events show the greatest 
changes. However, funding represents the nearest term decision in many cases, whereas 
events arise out earlier decisions and effort.  This data is sufficient to conclude that there 
is some variation in outputs and inputs. This data is not sufficient to determine whether 
past architecture had a causal effect on outputs, because the time series is not long 
enough, not all outputs have been captured, and I haven’t defined what the relevant 
exogenous factors in the NASA inputs might be.  
 
Given that NASA has shown variability in outputs, we next need to examine the 
idea that different architectures can produce different outputs.  
4.4. What Questions Have I Not Answered? 
 
Notice that I haven’t answered the question “What loops produce the most 
value?”, because there are no actual events. However, this analysis suggests that if these 
loops were allowed to run over multiple cycles, they would provide the best chance for 
modulating outputs to create the best reinforcing loops. I have also included a discussion 
which suggests that a selfish bureaucracy produces the most value to its stakeholders in 
the longer term, provided there is oversight to ensure that it doesn’t extract rents. 
  
 To these ends though, I also haven’t answered the question of whether NASA is 
the best provider of value per dollar relative to other agencies that produce the same 
outputs. There is an effort to value inputs relative to the availability of other sources, but 
all competing flows are not illustrated in the model, given the difficulty in setting bounds 
on what else is ‘relevant’. 
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I also haven’t answered what NASA’s top priority should be, if it could do only 1 
thing. This creates some difficulties relative to survey data, but I can make some 
assumptions to suggest that the top output should be the top priority. Namely, if the 
ranking scale I used with Kano-Importance isn’t saturating (such that the highest priority 
items aren’t sufficiently differentiated), and if we assume (contrary to the earlier analysis 
on competition) that none of NASA’s outputs are irreplaceable, and finally, if we assume 
that all outputs are independent (i.e. the absence of 1 doesn’t handicap another), then we 
can say that NASA’s top output is its highest priority.  
 
I haven’t answered what NASA does best currently, or where the biggest value 
holes are. The analysis performed here was designed to be sufficiently generic that 
individual programs would fit into the framework, but this analysis was not directly 
conducted. However, the comparison analysis of NASA’s perceptions as compared to 
survey data does offer some hints.  
 
Finally, I haven’t answered how this ties to architecture, which, it so happens, is 
the topic of the next chapter.   
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5. Linking Benefit to Architecture 
 
 The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that the benefit methodology created 
in previous chapters can be used to differentiate between exploration architectures. More 
specifically, this chapter explores what attributes of architecture can be linked to value, 
how one might actually implement this link, as well as the relevant operational 
considerations. Throughout this chapter, the focus is on evaluating architectures for 
benefit, rather than encoding benefit as requirements.  
  
This chapter provides answers to the following questions:  
 
 How can we create proximate metrics more systematically? 
 Are metrics a way around goals, or a way to create them? 
 Can we determine a process to more systematically project needs onto 
goals? Could this facilitate bookkeeping of stakeholder need to goal 
relations?  
 How can we identify and deal with needs that are congruent, 
orthogonal, or opposing? 
 How can we deal with uncertainty and likelihood of change in a need? 
 
5.1. Framework for assessing the link to architecture 
 
This section defines the relevant concepts for assessing the link between benefit  
and architecture. First, three architecting methodologies are examined for their ability to 
create this link. Second, a framework for assessing the relationship between the two 
models is created.  
 
This section focuses entirely on ‘computing’ stakeholder satisfaction, without 
regard for the realities of an organic decision process. These concerns are then discussed 
in Section 5.3 . 
 
How do other architecting frameworks create the link to benefit?  
 
 Three architecture frameworks were examined for their ability to tie stakeholder 
considerations to technical designs. The three used were the NASA System Engineering 
Processes and Requirements55, the Dept. of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF)56, 
and the IEEE Standard 1471.2000 Recommended Practice for Architectural Description 
of Software-Intensive Systems57. A brief description of each is given below, followed by 
a comparison. As these frameworks err on the side of more considerations rather than 
brevity, one certainly has to question whether the processes are all realistic. I have 
therefore placed emphasis on guidelines for dealing with stakeholder needs, and the 
sector of the architecture that receives stakeholder-derived information.  
 
 NASA’s Framework is most traditional system engineering representation of the 
three. Indeed, it is not explicitly an architecture framework, but rather a set of processes. 
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The framework explicitly requires that stakeholders be consulted in order to define “use 
cases, scenarios, operational concepts”, “needs, wants, desires, capabilities, external 
interfaces, and constraints”, as well as “expectations” as a function of project phase. 
These stakeholder inputs are assumed to translate directly into technical requirements 
through a decomposition analysis. However, stakeholder input also forwarded into the 
validations process, as captured by “Measures of Effectiveness” (as opposed to Measures 
of Performance), as shown in the diagram below. These MOEs are not elaborated on 
further in this document. 
 
 
Figure 51 NASA Stakeholder Expectation Definition Process 
 
 Putting aside the top-down process, NASA also defines the steps required during 
the Design Review process. These review guidelines give no direct indication of 
stakeholder consideration. The Mission Concept Review requires “the need for the 
mission” and “mission objectives” to be identified – this is suggestive of the technical 
criteria, although “mission objectives” are not mentioned earlier in the document. The 
System Requirements Review requires the specification of “interfaces with external 
entities”, and now highlights the multiple needs the mission will serve. The Critical 
Design Review requires a validation plan, which was earlier linked to stakeholders. All 
three of these Reviews note that technical requirements must be written and satisfied, but 
the question of “expectations” that are not well encoded as requirements is not addressed.  
 
 This merits particular emphasis – NASA has defined stakeholder preferences as 
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inputs to its process, but has not made use of these inputs at the critical stage, the 
evaluation of architectures! 
 
 The DOD’s Architecture Framework is much more extensive. Four architecture 
“views” are defined, three of which are as shown in the figure below. The fourth view is 
named the “All View”, and includes a high level overview of the purpose of the 
architecture, and the first layer of information from each of the 3 other views. In 
particular, the All View captures the relevant goals, constraints and limitations placed on 
the decision (which could be interpreted as stakeholder needs), as well as the authority 
for making the architecture decision (which could be external to the architect).  
 
 
Figure 52 DoDAF Architecture Framework 
 Fewer descriptive words are used to describe stakeholder input in the DoDAF – 
“needlines” are simple but profilic, used to describe goods, services, and information 
provided to key players, illustrated in Operational Views #2 and #3. However, an 
enormous emphasis is placed on operations and interoperability with systems outside the 
boundary. These needlines are fed forward into the System View, in System View #1 
(Interface Description) and System View #7 (System Performance Requirements).  
 
 Relative to the NASA framework, more emphasis is placed on evaluating the 
architectures against derived criteria. Specifically, the system is validated against 
Capability Needs, System Performance Requirements, Operational Measures of 
Effectiveness, and Level of System Interoperability. This emphasis on metrics rather than 
derived requirements suggests a broader consideration of operational needs.  
 
 IEEE 1471 places stakeholders in the most central position of the three 
frameworks. This is readily seen from the diagram below, given the central placement of 
stakeholders in the process. IEEE 1471 also casts the widest net in terms of information 
polled from stakeholders, citing needs and constraints, purpose and vision for the system, 
feasibility of constructing the system, risks of system development and operation, 
maintainability, deployability, and evolvability of the system. The IEEE 1471 is also the 
most generic framework, in that the number of architecture ‘views’ defined is open to the 
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architect. Two central requirements are imposed on views: Each stakeholder concern 
must be represented in at least one view, and each view must define what model or 
process is used by that view. Architectures are then evaluated for their ability to 
reproduce views, although there are no clear criteria given on how one should match 
architectures to views. The IEEE 1471 framework is primarily concerned with 
representation, and as such, little guidance on process is provided. This was to be 
expected in the software industry, where the design space is typically broader and more 
versatile than in the hardware and systems worlds.  
 
 
Figure 53 IEEE 1471 Architecture Representation 
  
 Notice that DoDAF and IEEE 1471 explicitly evaluate architectures, whereas 
NASA searches for the architectures that meets all the constraints. All of these 
frameworks highlights stakeholder concerns, but only DoDAF and NASA define 
traceability of stakeholder concerns. Of these two, DoDAF defines explicitly how 
information gathered from stakeholders is translated or used, where NASA only defines 
this implicitly through connectivity. Notice that NASA and IEEE use many words to 
define stakeholder input – in practice, it can be difficult to understand how stakeholder 
‘opportunities / wants / desires’ are incorporated into a system model, in that these terms 
don’t necessarily have separate technical meanings. 
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 The most telling difference is likely the use of stakeholder concerns in architecture 
evaluation. DoDAF once again scores highly, whereas NASA is inconsistent. This 
suggests that NASA does the broadest initial consultations, but is the least responsive on 
the back-end of the design process, which would square with the level of feedback 
available to the architect based on completed designs in the military relative to the space 
agency. However, one must be careful in reading too much from abstracted processes, 
given that actual design processes are non-linear, iterative, and full of uncertainty.  
 
 Note finally that none of the architecture frameworks consider indirect benefit. 
Clients are identified, and their needs defined, but no one client is defined as the agent of 
another. Without clear rules for defining benefit propagation, this is to be expected. 
Further, one would expect this to be a larger problem for NASA than the IEEE, given the 
scope and public nature of NASA’s work.  
 
 Having now examined how some other architecture frameworks have considered 
benefit, I now define a framework for computing the benefit of individual architectures 
using a benefit network model.  
 
Framework 
 
 The fundamental postulate of my work is that the value outputs of NASA can be 
tied to an architecture model. However, the fundamental difficulty here is that many of 
the benefits will be produced over decades, so there is significant uncertainty associated 
with the use of traditional indicators. For example, a traditional indicator for Science 
Knowledge is scientific papers produced, but there is no way to determine this short of 
waiting 15 years. 
 
There are three sets of decisions to be made here on the strategy for capturing how 
different architectures may produce different benefits: 
 
1. Cardinal or Ordinal? We could either rank architectures against their ability to 
produce each value flow (Ordinal Utility), or provide an estimation of the strength 
of preferences (Cardinal Utility).  Note that cardinal utility provides both the 
ranking that ordinal utility does, as well as more information 
 
2. If cardinal, real numbers or scales? Given that we will be creating an 
abstraction from a technical level within the architecture to a  high level benefit 
delivery, is it reasonable to attempt to tie real numbers to measures. Alternatively, 
we could have an anchored scale to represent likelihood, which would still 
express some aspects of preference strength.  
Principle 
Stakeholder inputs should be traceable to metrics and criteria 
at the architecture evaluation phase 
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3. Include soft attributes like ‘manufacturability’ or not? Many of the benefit 
flows have multiple attributes, some soft and others hard. For example, the value 
of “Exploration Systems” is defined by quality, cost, timeliness, etc. The DoDAF 
captures ‘soft’ stakeholder expectations in the evaluation of an architecture. The 
difficulty with soft expectations is that they require implicit tradeoffs – if one 
architecture is superior on manufacturability, but the other is superior on 
extensibility, the eventual decision will express the architect’s mental model of 
uncertain costs savings from manufacturing against the future benefit from an 
extensible design.  
 
 The tradeoff here is on human input – some of the decisions above rely on human 
input to evaluate each architecture. Human input may produce a more realistic decision 
process, but is more difficult to make rigorous. Given the prior history of the System 
Architecture group at MIT in executable architectures, and the goal of this section to 
define sensitivity to benefit delivery (which is much easier numerically), my decision was 
to pursue a cardinal approach, using realistic quantities, and only incorporating attributes 
which can be related back to an architecture variable. That being said, the focus on the 
evaluation of this method will therefore have to question the realism of this numerical 
approach relative to traditional ordinal approaches.  
 
 The approach taken here is to define ‘proximate metrics’, which represent the 
information that some architectures have a higher likelihood of producing a given output. 
This higher likelihood could arise out of greater re-planning capability, robustness of the 
equipment to different scenarios, or a number of other factors. The defining characteristic 
of these measures is that they don’t need to assume needs are independent – one 
architecture variable can define the satisfaction of several needs. 
 
 A preliminary set of proximate metrics was originally developed by Catanzaro, 
Loureiro and Crawley. These are modified and expanded for the purpose of the case 
study in the next section. The desirable qualities for these metrics, as well as the meaning 
of ‘real numbers’ becomes more clear as these metrics are outlined.  
 
 One final note on the framework, before the delving into the details. I made a 
decision to use an architecture model without constraints, for simplicity. Architecture 
variables are defined, but it is assumed that any combination of variables yields a feasible 
architecture. Furthermore, no cost models or physical models are included in the 
architecture, which means that we can only rank architectures on benefit. As the cost is 
undefined, so is the value (where value is defined as benefit at cost).  
 
Hypothesis 
Architectures will produce different ranges of benefit for 
different benefit flows 
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 Therefore, in order to investigate the hypothesis of whether architecture can be 
differentiated by benefit, I examine the spread of benefit produced by the defined 
architecture space. If the variability is uniform across benefit flows, the hypothesis will 
be rejected. If the variability is diverse across benefit flows, we will then have to question 
whether the chosen inputs and method were appropriate and realistic – if so, then we can 
accept the hypothesis.  
  
5.2. Architecture Test Case  
5.2.1. Choice of Variables  
 
For the architecture test case, I chose six variables to define the architecture for a 
lunar campaign. These were not intended to span a full architecture space, but rather to 
define enough of a space to allow for the possibility of benefit differentiation. The six 
variables chosen were: 
 
1. Heavy Lifter Launch Capability : The LEO injection mass (in MT) capability of the 
heavy lift launch vehicle.   
 
2. Global Access : Whether or not the architecture caries a requirement to be able to land 
anywhere on the moon. While all landing sites are accessible on entry, the propulsive cost 
/ time required to perform ascent varies between landing latitudes.  
 
3. Crew Size : The number of crew members landed on the moon.  
 
4. Duration of Stay : The number of days the crew is on the lunar surface, during a sortie 
mission. For a campaign schedule with varying sortie durations, the average duration 
would be used.  
 
5. Science Mass : The cargo mass in kilograms dedicated to science instruments per 
sortie mission. This does not include rover or spacesuit mass. It is recognized that the 
actual boundary between science systems and the remainder of the vehicle will be fuzzy 
(for example, in the case where an instrument draws its power from the lander, does one 
consider the fractional battery use as science mass?), but at the current level of 
abstraction, this is a reasonable approximation 
 
6. Rover Range : The one day maximum distance from the base that the rover can drive, 
including battery considerations and estimated part lifetimes. Note that the total distance 
traveled by the rover on a straight out-and-back mission would be double the Rover 
Range, as I have defined it.  
 
Using these 6 variables, I first took a holistic look at the model, and asked which 
value flows we would expect the variables to affect. A tree diagram of those connections 
is shown in the figure below.  
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Figure 54 Connectivity of Architecture Variables (at right) To NASA Output Value 
Flows (at left) 
 
Note that the architecture variables do not span the space of network flows. Only 
7 / 21 possible flows are affected by the test architecture variables. Observe that NASA’s 
output flows fall into three categories: Architecturally-determined Flows,  Schedule-
determined Flows, and Organizational Decisions. For example, NASA’s ability to 
provide Plans and Progress Reports is primarily driven by the schedule set for the 
campaign, whereas the amount of Educational Material is almost purely an organizational 
decision, made largely irrespective of the architecture. Of the 21 flows identified, I label 
16 as Architecturally-determined Flows, implying that 1/4 of the value space will not 
discriminate between architectures.  
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The 5 flows which I postulate will not be affected by the architecture are: 
 
• Stable and Rewarding Employment 
• Protection against claims of sovereignty over planetary bodies by other nations 
• NASA Educational Content 
• NASA Instruments and Modules to International Partners 
• Plans and Progress Reports 
 
 
  The proximate metrics outlined in the following section will define how widely 
the remaining 3/4 do discriminate.  
 
 The ranges for the architecture variables are shown in the table below. These 
values were chosen to represent a reasonable design space for a lunar outpost mission. 
  
Table 10 Minimum and Maximum Test Values For Architecture Variables 
 Min Max 
Heavy Lift Launch Capability 67MT 130MT 
Global Access? Equatorial Global 
Crew Size 2 6 
Duration of Stay 5 days 30 days 
Science Mass 100 kg 1000 kg 
Rover Range 10 km 100 km 
 
5.2.2. Proximate Metrics 
 
Proximate metrics are used to connect the architecture variables to the value flow 
delivered. I first highlight some of the desirable qualities of such metrics, and then 
describe the metrics that were created.  
  
The function of a metric is to bring together a number of different types of 
information into a single value, on which useful decisions can be made. Given that there 
are many possible ways to aggregate or layer data from a mission, how should we 
determine which proximate metrics to create? The answer arises out of the value model – 
Principle 
Not all benefit flows will differentiate between architectures – 
some types of benefit will be produced regardless of which 
architecture is chosen. 
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a proximate metric is required for each NASA output. Therefore, the rigor with which the 
value model was created allosws us to determine the number and description of the 
proximate metrics.  
 
This does not solve the problem entirely, in that it does not create specify how 
proximate metrics are defined. In the long term, good metrics have to be evaluated by 
their ability to correlate indicator variables to behavior. There is significant work on this 
for science satellites, particularly for telescopes58,59. However, given that there are few 
metrics for exploration, we can make some reasonable assumptions in order to begin to 
design these metrics.  
 
For reference, I have included Cook’s description of the function of performance 
measures below [Cook, p.141]: 
 
1. Track sources of competitiveness 
2. Encourage improvements that benefit the enterprise, its customers, and society.  
3. Benchmark against your major competitor 
4. The sum of local measures should equal the performance of the enterprise.  
5. Be in harmony with the organizational structure.  
 
In order to facilitate decision making, I enforce that each metric should condense 
the inputs to a single value, for ease of later computation. While I do intend to propagate 
this scheme through all  values flows in the model, and I have constrained each flow to be 
a uni-dimensional quantity, I don’t intend to further condense multiple flows into 
aggregate ‘Total Stakeholder Satisfaction’ values. The intent is that the architect’s 
decision space should act at the same level of complexity as the original value flow 
model.   
 
In order to examine different ways of combining these different types of 
information, I first delineate between additive versus multiplicative metrics. Additive 
metrics suggest the component inputs are all tradable, or in other words, each have the 
same potential to deliver value. Product metrics, particularly  normalized ones (defined 
on [0,1]), suggests co-dependency of components, in that the product cannot be 
maximized unless all components are active. Product metrics have the unique quantity 
that doubling a component’s contribution doubles the output. Both additive and 
multiplicative metrics are employed below, depending on the situation.  
 
Finally, with a view to enabling ‘useful’ decisions, I submit that some form of 
stakeholder input is required. Ideally, the metric used should coincide with a physical 
value of interest to the stakeholder, on which the stakeholder can then offer an anchored 
Principle 
The outputs of the organization in a value network model 
define the space of proximate metrics required for 
architecture evaluation 
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opinion of benefit. For example, for NASA Launch and Space Services, the key concern 
for receiving parties is the launch mass the lifter is capable of. I use the concept of the 
utility curve to encapsulate stakeholder input. The utility curve maps the input value (as 
the independent variable) to the perceived value to the stakeholder.  Monotonically 
increasing utility curves are used, defined by the 0%, 10%, 90% and 100% value levels, 
with linear interpolation in between.  
 
 
Figure 55 Example Of  A Parameterized Utility Curve 
 
In this manner, I can represent value delivery with clear thresholds (such as 
Humans in Space Events, which saturate media coverage above certain frequencies of 
events) by defining the 100% value mark at the threshold, as well as representing open-
ended value delivery flows (such as ‘Science Data’), where a marginal increase will 
continue to deliver marginal value, by setting the 90% or 100% levels to unachievable 
levels. Given that the purpose here is to enable relative comparisons between 
architectures, I am more concerned that the metric captures the full space of input ranges 
(and therefore all architecture value movements with relevant value impacts are captured) 
than with defining the precise upper bound at which a stakeholder can be said to be 100% 
satisfied with the value delivered.  
 
Two examples are used below to illustrate the methodology, namely the metrics 
for Human Exploration First Events and for Science Data. Architecture variables are 
shown at the bottom of the metric diagrams in grey.  
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The Exploration First Events metric captures two basic attributes, the number of 
exploration events and the frequency. Given that the test architecture chosen is limited to 
the sortie phase, I used new destinations and night stays as simple proxies for exploration 
events. The number of events is then passed through a utility curve,  which represents the 
number of events within a campaign which the public would perceive as ‘exploration’,  
before the mission type would become routinized to the extent that further missions 
would represent ‘Humans in Space Events’, rather than ‘Exploration First Events’. The 
90% threshold for this curve was set at 3 events for this phase of the campaign. The 
campaign’s ability to provide these events depends on the global access architecture 
variable, as well as the duration variable. The events are totaled, and then passed through 
the utility curve. I calculate the frequency of new destination visits based on a flight rate 
and the extent to which the architecture builds in site revisit requirements / assumptions. 
Given that neither of these is trades in our test architecture space, both are set to 
reasonable maximum values. The frequency and quantity aspects of this metric are 
modeled as a product, in that flight frequency and the capability to go to new places are 
required to produce Exploration Firsts.      
Figure 56 Exploration Firsts Events Metric 
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The Science Data metric abstracts across all types of data (visual survey, sample 
return, imaging, etc.) by capturing a Quality and a Quantity aspect. I make the 
simplifying assumption that the Quantity of Data is proportional to the available crew 
science hours, which in turn is influenced by crew number and mission duration. The 
bounds on Quantity of Data are determined using a ‘operating hours per instrument’  
guideline, where the 90% threshold is set at 10h/instrument (well in excess of the Apollo 
computed average of 1.23h/experiment, assuming a 60% science & experiment time 
fraction 60,61). This calculation does not yet incorporate planned autonomous operation - 
for example, some of the Apollo experiments operated for 45h or longer. Quality of data 
is a multiplicative composition of the accessible area (defined by rover range), rover 
speed (which enhances choice and flexibility in the areas to study), diversity of landing 
sites (defined by the Global Access variable), and Mass Per Science Instrument (MPI). 
Each of these components has an individual utility curve, given that a generalized metric 
for the quality of science data (like Signal to Noise Ratio) is not available. For example, 
the MPI 90% value was set to 100kg, double the Apollo 16 average of 49kg per 
instrument.  The Quality and Quantity metrics are normalized on [0,1], and then 
multiplied to yield the Science Data metric final value.  
 
 
Figure 57 Science Data Metric 
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The remaining proximate metrics were developed in a similar manner, each aligned 
to a particular value flow. Therefore, I have a [0,1] completion value for each of the 
NASA output value flows. The next section explains how the state of stakeholder internal 
assets are calculated using our network model. 
 
Note that I have satisfied Cook’s performance measures guidelines 2 and 4 only. 
Guidelines 1 and 3 (track sources of competitiveness, benchmark against competitors) is 
not relevant in a public model. Guideline 5 (relation to organizational structure) will be 
covered in Section 5.3 Architecting in the Real World.  
5.2.3. Propagation in the Benefit Model 
 
 The benefit model already contains all of the connections necessary to trace a path 
from a NASA output to all of the stakeholders impacted, but it does not yet contain 
equations for calculating flows or internal assets as a function of NASA outputs.  
  
Predictably, I chose normalized scales for internal assets and flows, in order to 
facilitate computation. Given that connectivity is already established by the network 
model, the only aspect that remains is to determine the relative weightings of the inputs.  
  
For stock inputs, I use the Kano-Importance values as weights. I tested a set of 
weights that I created specifically, but I found that the difference between my decisions 
for weightings and those computed from the Kano-Importance were roughly equal to the 
error from differences between decision makers (on the order of 20%). Using the Kano-
Importance data does introduce a significant new assumption: the weighting of inputs to a 
stock is assumed to be the same as the weighting of those inputs to the stakeholder as a 
whole.  
  
For flow inputs (which are the outputs of internal assets), I assigned my own 
values to the weightings of the internal assets. Given that the internal assets were created 
with the outputs in mind, the vast majority of outflows depend on only one stock. For 
those that depend on more than one stock, the weighting is typically an even distribution.  
  
Given that we now have information, solving the system is the final step. The 
equations described above are initially formulated into a linear system of coupled 
equations of the form AX = 0, where X is a vector of all of the value flows and internal 
assets (including the known values for NASA’s outputs), and A is a coefficient matrix 
containing the flow to stock and stock to flow mapping described above. This solution 
setup is shown graphically in the figure below. 
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Figure 58 Solution Form For Link Values 
 
5.2.4. Test Results 
 
From the set of test architecture values, I am chiefly interested in how broadly 
they span the benefit space described. Identification of benefit flows that are insensitive 
to changes in architecture values sheds light on both  prioritization in the design process, 
as well as opportunities for greater stakeholder interaction. Given that I have not yet 
introduced budget or performance constraints, I do not select architectures at this stage – 
I merely examine the minimum and maximums of the value space.  
  
The first test of our model is to ask how great a variation in NASA outputs it 
yields, shown in the diagram below.  
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Figure 59 NASA Output Flow Ranges 
 The test architecture ranges cover a fairly wide range of the benefit space defined, 
with the exception of NASA launch services. This is due to the construction of the utility 
curve, which assumes that a marginal increase in the maximum launch weight, over a 
Delta IV Heavy, would provide significant value, and doubling the security community’s 
current launch mass would deliver 90% of the value. However, this only gets us to the 
lower end of the test architecture range. Human in Space Events shows a fairly narrow 
range as well, primarily because the duration component of the metric, which postulates 
that the public’s perception of a ‘long’ stay in space is on the order of a year, which is 
well outside the architecture space.  
  
After propagating these 7 NASA Outputs through the model, and assuming the 
other 14/21 outputs are equal to 1, we see the following behavior. Note that  a blank bar 
indicates that the flow or internal asset contains only the value one, not zero, because we 
assumed all other flows are at their maximums. Internal assets are indicated with “(IA)”.  
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Figure 60 Value Ranges For Stakeholder Inputs And Internal Assets 
 
The model demonstrates that several flows are insensitive to the architectural 
space we have established. For example, international agreements vary very little, as does 
the Economy’s ability to provide Exploration Systems. We also see large ranges over 
some flows, notably Science Knowledge and Goods and Services Derived From Space 
Technology (from the Economy to the US People).   
 
With a view to capturing the extent to which different stakeholder see a wide 
range of value delivery, I computed the average range over which their input flows 
varied. This is not intended as a measure of stakeholder satisfaction, because it does not 
apply a weighting to different inputs.  
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Figure 61 Average Value Ranges Across Stakeholders 
 
 Science internal assets show the greatest variation by far. Given the selection of a 
subset of value flows that I have chosen, it is reasonable to wonder whether I have 
applied some selection bias, and in doing so, have illustrated more of the decisions 
relevant to science but not those relevant to other flows. While this is a legitimate 
concern, an examination of the remaining architecturally significant flows suggest that 
we are unlikely to see a radically different picture, because the remaining flows also 
focus on science and the economy: 
 
• Participation in NASA Exploration 
• NASA Contract Funding 
• NASA Market Funding 
• Unmanned Exploration First Events 
• Space Technology Demonstration Events 
• NASA Science Events 
• Space Acquired Data 
 
From a basic logic perspective, we might reasonably expect that the most 
technical stakeholder is likely to be most sensitive to architectural decisions. However, if 
we judged the output to be under-representing the sensitivity of non-science flows, there 
are several avenues of recourse:  
 
1. Verify utility curves for the corresponding NASA outputs, particularly if 
there is a unique mapping from the output the flow in question. One could 
also examine the relative sensitivity of the metric to particular utility 
curves within that metric.  
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2. Examine the diversity of outputs contributing to the flow. If one output 
can compensate for the lack of a second output (additive rule), then an 
inverse correlation between the two metrics could cause the flow to 
remain constant.  
 
Consider adjusting the number of links of different stakeholders. An under - 
representation of the connectivity of one flow to NASA’s outputs would cause the flow to 
vary with a narrower set of outputs than appropriate, which may not be representative. 
 
That being said, the hypothesis was broadly defined as demonstrating 
differentiation among architectures by benefit, which was achieved. I highlight 
demonstrating, because the input values to the model are notional, which implies that 
calibration of the specific sensitivity of different stakeholders would require survey data.  
 
What can we tell from this type of information?  
 
Assuming for a moment that we could define the sensitivity of different flows to 
stakeholders accurately, the question becomes what use would it be? First, it would 
inform who should be allowed input to the design process – stakeholders who are 
insensitive to benefit should not have the opportunity to influence design decisions. 
Second, where decisions are taken in light of a stakeholder’s sensitivity to a particular 
flow represents an opportunity to build buy-in with that stakeholder in response to a 
decision taken in their favor. 
 
Adding constraints would be the next step in exploring this sensitivity. With a 
coupled model of benefit and cost, one could examine the relative change in sensitivity or 
priority between stakeholders necessary to cause a change in the best architecture. This 
would be a significantly more tangible outcome of a stakeholder sensitivity analysis.  
 
Moreover, with constraints one could examine benefit for different architectures 
graphically, but where not all flows can be satisfied. The sample output produced below 
is one graphical representation, where flows are illustrated differently depending on their 
Kano category. The height of each flow is determined by its Kano-Importance value 
(read as the maximum utility), multiplied by a ‘completion’ factor determined from the 
proximate metrics. Must Haves are represented as negative, therefore at zero completion 
the bar has a maximum negative value, and for 100% completion, has a height of zero.  
Hypothesis Confirmed 
Architectures will produce different ranges of benefit for 
different benefit flows 
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Figure 62 Notional Stakeholder Benefit Graph From A Particular Architecture 
Additionally, one could sum these input flows at ratios defined by their Kano-
Importance values to produce a per-stakeholder benefit graph as given below.  
 
Figure 63 Notional Stakeholder Benefit Chart With Kano Breakdown Shown 
 
 - 131 - 
5.3.  Architecting in the Real World 
 
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice.  
               But, in practice, there is. 
  
- Yogi Berra 
 
The approach thus far has been to look for quantitative methods by which one can 
encode and analyze information on stakeholders as relates to architecture selection. Given 
the relative complexity and novelty of these methods, efforts were made to keep the 
inputs simple. This required a number of assumptions, in terms of the inputs, the 
dynamics of the model, and the utility of the outputs. The function of this section is to 
analyze a number of additional considerations, many of them relaxations of the original 
assumptions, to determine the extensibility of the model, the potential impact of the 
current output, and most importantly, the shortcomings.  
5.3.1. On Inputs 
 
Thus far, I have used very high level needs. In reality though, needs exist at many 
different levels of detail. For example, the needs of International Partners may be very 
granular, such as the allowable vibration through an interfaces, but still relate to 
fundamental architecture variables (like staging and landing area choice). By contrast, the 
needs of the US Public may be very high level, as shown in the current model. 
 
 This raises several questions:  
 
1. Should we attempt to build a model into sufficient detail that the satisfaction of 
all needs can be computed? 
 
The real difficulty is that value for different stakeholders is based on different 
aspects of the design. For the overall need to explore the moon, the needs of different 
stakeholders act at different points on the system. The contractor may care if the Specific 
System Form includes solid rocket motors, while the scientists operating an experiment 
may care about attributes of the operating process like a continuous uplink capability. I 
have represented this in the diagram below by showing that value derives from different 
levels of decomposition of the OPM. In reality, these OPMs are really nested, so I could 
actually draw a separate OPM for each granular need.  
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Figure 64 OPM of Needs Decomposition With Potential Value Attributes Shown 
(Adopted From Crawley ESD.34 Course Notes) 
The trade-off that has to happen here is the depth of modeling vs. time to make an 
architecture decision. The interfaces in the system also have a significant impact – a 
system with clean interfaces and separate forms for each function will be significantly 
less complex to model in more detail that would a system where a handful of forms serve 
multiple functions.  
  
2. Should low level needs be traceable to high level needs?  
 
There are a number of tensions here. First, zooming needs (specifying attributes) 
can reduce architecture options, but could help define more specifically what 
stakeholders are concerned with. Second, zooming needs out to significant detail and 
defining a mapping can obscure the satisfaction of the original high level need, 
incentivizing a ‘letter of the law’ approach over the ‘spirit of the law’. Third, as 
suggested above, some needs may naturally lie at different levels of detail – creating high 
level needs to help roll up all needs may obscure the meaning of the original need. 
Finally, needs are purposefully expressed from the perspective of the stakeholder, and it 
may therefore be difficult to define levels of detail across needs. This can be done at the 
expense of tying needs more closely to a specific architecture. 
 
 Rather than focusing on the traceability of needs, I submit that evaluating 
satisfaction of needs (whether by verification and validation, or by using proximate 
metrics) is the more important aspect to focus on. If creating a tree of needs aids if the 
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evaluation, then it should be entertained as a possibility. Otherwise, it may create more 
complexity than required.   
 
3. What are the implications of building a benefit model at more detail? 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the number of stakeholders chosen defined the level 
of abstraction for the model. If we had chosen a greater number of stakeholders, we 
would likely have expanded the Science and Security groups to specific institutions, and 
also defined the sectors of the economy and the people relevant to the network. This 
would result in several challenges:  
 
1. The temptation to sketch different attributes of flows. For example, the 
quality, timeliness, and cost of individual exploration systems. Each of 
these qualities needs a model to determine fluctuation in the attribute, 
based on changes in input, which would scale the size of the model 
dramatically.  
 
2. Duplication of paths. As we define more actors, it becomes possible to 
use several actors to perform the same function. For example, we could go 
define different news agencies, each of which produces media content. 
Unless the type of content differs significantly, this doesn’t help us 
represent more information about the strongest loops, because there are 
now more loops in the model of equal strength.  
 
3. Tendency towards an event driven model. There is a point beyond 
which detail cannot be increased without naming specific actors. Taking 
contractors as an example, different architectures will favor specific 
contractors, which implies the architecture will have to capture elements 
of form in sufficient detail to differentiate between contractors. I remain 
concerned about the validity of modeling benefit in this detail, given the 
uncertainty involved.  
 
4. Potentially easier valuation of inputs. The more specific the input, one 
would expect it would become easier to define the benefit, given that the 
receiver can compare specific instantiations from the past, and there is less 
averaging across heterogeneous groups (assuming smaller stakeholder 
groups are more homogeneous).  
 
5. Longer paths through the network. The modeler would have to define 
more specific procedures for managing the level of detail, to ensure that 
less detailed areas did not create a bias towards shorter loops.  
 
This discussion tends somewhat towards the negative side of creating a model 
with more detail. Part of this hesitation stems from the unknown, given that it has not yet 
been attempted. However, I am more concerned that it would shift focus away from the 
softer considerations of benefit, and introduce a false confidence in details. The reality is 
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that many of these tradeoffs are difficult to make, and the dynamics of different options 
involve significant human action and decisions. While attempts have been made to 
linearize these behaviors into deterministic input-output functions, the emphasis needs to 
be on the feedback loops that really create benefit, many of which are observable from a 
given architecture, but cannot necessarily be decomposed into atomistic attributes. 
Therefore, the human ability to conceptualize the level of detail in the model is an 
important component of the success of the model. 
 
4. What if needs change? 
 
There are a couple mechanisms by which needs could change. The baseline 
performance expectation for a flow could change, which would shift the Kano curves. 
The stakeholder perception of the importance of a need could shift, relative to their other 
inputs. Or the stakeholder could define new flows that represent new needs. The section 
below tackles these problems in order. Note first though that the framework here is 
primarily deterministic, as compared with Catanzaro’s stochastic method, for reasons the 
outlined in Section 2.3. The reader is directed to Catanzaro’s thesis for a more complete 
exploration of the survey problem and non-homogenous stakeholder expectations.  
 
Change in the baseline performance expectation occur routinely in consumer 
products, as technology disperses through the market, transitioning from Exciter to Must 
Have typically. Where the performance of the attribute encounters physical limitations, or 
saturates satisfaction at higher levels of performance, the coupling between performance 
expectations and changes in Kano category will be accentuated. In space systems, where 
product cycles are measured in single digits, one might expect performance expectations 
to vary less over time. Certainly competition from other nations and private ventures will 
also shift expectations. Fundamentally though, this is easily accommodated by re-
computing the model with new values.  
 
Change in stakeholder perception of a need could be the result of re-aligned 
internal objectives or market entry of a competitor with a substitute service for that need. 
Assessing the likelihood of internal changes can be divided into uncertainty around needs 
and conflicts around needs. Uncertainty in the priority of needs could potentially be 
examined by performing pairwise comparisons of needs and analyzing the priorities for 
logical conflicts. One might also see hints of this behavior from centrally clustered Kano-
Importance data (regression to the mean), or negative correlation between Kano 
categories and Importance. Looking for conflict within a stakeholder group is an easier 
task, accomplished by examining the variation in rankings or scores of the same needs 
across the population. Higher rates of conflict might indicate a higher probability of 
change in the future.  
Principle 
The human ability to conceptualize the level of detail in a 
benefit model is an important component of success when 
attributes of the benefit are observable but not decomposable. 
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There is unfortunately no direct analysis that can be performed to determine how 
likely a stakeholder is to suggest new needs, because new needs are by definition 
exogenous. One could certainly examine the stakeholder’s past requirements definition 
history, as well as the quality of the needs-identification process. One might expect this to 
be a bigger problem for individuals rather than groups – the hope is that surveying groups 
captures a bigger set of possible priorities, which can then be fed back to all individual 
members for ranking.  
 
The question that arises here is should uncertain or changeable needs be treated 
differently in terms of potential benefit? The simplest treatment would use differences in 
group survey data to define possible ranges for individual link values. Running the 
minimum, maximum, and average cases would enable one to produce error bars on the 
stakeholder participation in important loops, as well as the distribution of input and 
output flows from NASA. One could also defined variation in rank of loops as a metric to 
indicate how changes in link value impact the model output, as discussed for link 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
 The other mechanism for addressing uncertainty in strong loops would be to 
establish a tradeoff between uncertainty and rank, such that loops with a higher number 
of links with variance, or loops with links with greater uncertainty would appear lower on 
the ranked list. Given that the purpose of strong loops is to identify chains where one can 
propagate influence, less certain links would certainly be less useful in causing change. I 
would be hesitant to apply such an ‘uncertainty weighting’, simply because it would 
imply that individual link values are already calibrated against observed behavior. 
However, uncertainty and change are central themes in system architecture, and one 
could certainly entertain a discussion of robustness vs. optimality of benefit in different 
uncertainty climates.  
 
Needs Framework 
 
With a view to enabling future pre-processing of needs, I propose the following 
framework, which divides needs into four categories of interaction.  
 
1) Common needs 
2) Synergistic needs 
3) Conflicting needs 
4) Orthogonal needs 
 
Common needs are the easiest to recognize – two stakeholders have the same 
need. For example, both NASA and Security have a need for a skilled workforce.  
 
Synergistic needs result when the satisfaction of one need acts to help satisfy 
another, or when the same action acts to satisfy different needs. Synergistic needs often 
result when two stakeholders are connected to each other – for example, satisfying the 
media’s need for ‘Access to high visibility events’ helps satisfy the US People’s need for 
‘Entertainment and Information’. Another example of synergistic needs occurs when 
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launching a spacecraft satisfies both the Economic community’s need for ‘Contracts’ as 
well as the Science community’s need for ‘Science Data’.  
 
Conflicting needs are significantly more difficult to recognize, because they often 
result from an external constraint – such as the conflict between ‘Gather science data’ and 
‘Test new technology in space’ under the constraint of fixed funding.  
 
Orthogonal needs are needs that are not influence by the satisfaction of other 
needs – for example, we can say that the US People’s need for goods and services 
derived from space technology is independent of their need for stable and rewarding 
employment. The reality is in fact that relatively few needs are actually orthogonal, as the 
satisfaction of a need by an architectural feature often has some implication for cost, 
schedule, performance or operational risk. 
 
  Using a coupled architecture-stakeholder model, one should be able to determine 
which needs are synergistic, conflicting, or orthogonal. Changing an individual 
architecture parameter at a time, one would expect the covariance of synergistic needs to 
be positive, the covariance of conflicting needs to be negative, and the covariance of 
orthogonal needs to be zero. This approach is certainly computationally intensive, in that 
it requires testing all pairs of needs across a range of values for each architecture variable. 
However, there are additional difficulties. First, the existence of step function utility 
curves could cause different behavior across different ranges of architecture variables. 
Should one therefore test over the whole architecture space, or over the whole utility 
curve range? I would advance that testing over the architecture space is more relevant, 
and that if conflicting or synergistic behavior is observed over some limited range, then 
that classification should be favored over ‘orthogonal’. 
 
  One would also need to define rules for dominance of these classifications. It is 
conceivable that two needs could represent opposite behavior with respect to two 
different architecture variables. Should the stronger relationship be used? In part, the 
answer relates to how one intends to use the information. If conflicting / synergistic needs 
are to become rules of thumb for the architect, then only the strongest relationships would 
be highlighted, leaving out those with opposing behavior.  
 
  One way to narrow the permutations required for analysis would be to only 
compare inputs to a particular stakeholder. If comparing across stakeholders, one would 
have to find a way to control for causal relationships, where two flows are synergistic 
because the output of one is the input to the other. In this sense, processing for conflicting 
needs would be more the more interesting piece of information, as the current model 
essentially attempts to string together synergistic needs.  
Principle 
Covariance of needs in a coupled architecture-stakeholder 
model will identify conflicting, synergistic and orthogonal 
needs. 
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5.3.2. On Dynamics 
 
There are 2 significant assumptions that this model makes with respect to the 
dynamics: 
 
1. No time-phasing 
2. The strength of one loop is independent of the strength of other paths or loops.  
 
How Would Timing Work In A Benefit Model? 
 
The time dimension is a particularly difficult one to model, in that it requires very 
detailed organizational models of stakeholders on the benefit side, and a detailed 
understanding of internal timelines for architectures. At first glance, one might also 
discount the importance of timing to NASA. It has often been joked that NASA has a 
discount rate of zero, in that a mission is worth the same to NASA whether it is launched 
this year or next year, provided it is successful.  
 
 While timing may not play a large role in benefit delivery for individual missions, 
it plays a significant role in the political and economic contexts NASA interacts with. 
Deadlines have long played a significant role in Congress’ oversight with NASA, from 
Kennedy’s “before this decade is out” to the current 2010 deadline for shuttle retirement. 
The choice of architecture impacts the fixed cost ratio for operations, which drives timing 
incentives for contractors, as well as the flexibility in responding to Executive deadline 
pressures or strategic initiatives.   
 
Additionally, I have inferred that the architecture causes benefit at the same time 
it receives the resources it needs. In many cases, this is not realistic – the Congress 
provides investment well before it realizes the political benefits of that investment. This 
delay is bigger for loops where we see physical goods propagating, but smaller for certain 
types of information (like approval). Given the uncertainty in causality, I don’t think it is 
necessarily feasible to model the timing of benefit being delivered to stakeholders, but we 
can still draw lessons based on a rough evaluation.  
 
I divide stakeholders into net creditors (providing resources before the benefit is 
realized) and net debtors (receiving benefits before providing resources). Some types of 
creditors will hold power over the organization after their resources have been given 
over. While there exist fewer formalized protections for creditors in the intra-government 
case (as opposed to commercial finance), threat of future budget cuts and the re-
appropriability of resources will define how much power stakeholders might have. Net 
debtors who hold important resources are a greater risk to the organization, in the sense 
that they have the opportunity to observe the architecture and the benefits before 
contributing resources.  
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Figure 65 Time Expanded Benefit Transactions For Creditors and Debtors 
 
Some simple case studies can help test these theories. For example, parliamentary 
oversight can occur relatively late in a design process, when design switching costs are 
high. In this sense, the Executive and Congress are debtors in the approval process (as 
opposed to the financial process). This would suggest that the concerns of the Executive 
should be tracked through the design process, which in the US consists primarily of the 
division of labour between NASA centers and contractors. However, these labour and 
project management decisions can be largely decoupled from the architectural decisions, 
so we would expect the Executive and Congress’s feedback on the architecture proper to 
be more of a binary approval. As such, NASA’s debtor relationship with Congress does 
not offer much power, because it can’t appropriate resources (approval) based on the 
credit (design work) it extends.  
 
The financial relationship between NASA and the Executive provides another 
case study, where the Executive is now a creditor to NASA. Architectures which enable 
variable costing decrease NASA’s ability to lobby for additional funding, as the regret 
associated with not funding an additional mission is less than that for canceling an entire 
program with high fixed costs. However, the feedback loop between financing and direct 
benefits is much quicker than the approval process, which might caution against using 
power to realize desired outcomes, for fear the credit drying up in the future. If we think 
of the goal of stakeholder management as minimizing the use of power, we would view 
operational flexibility is a politically desirable quality. 
 
The benefit that creditors provide need not be monetary. Science is also a net 
creditor of NASA, with respect to its role in goal selection. Scientists provide opinions on 
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what science questions are most pressing, in return for which NASA makes a preliminary 
selection of landing sites. Individual scientists then invest time and choose research 
directions in order to position themselves relative to data and funding opportunities 
projected to arise out of the program, and at the end of the day, receive benefit if NASA 
builds hardware and makes consistent decisions to accomplish its stated science goals. 
This creditor relationship means that the architecture really doesn’t have the opportunity 
to respond to scientist stakeholder feedback, unless the goals can be readily changed, or a 
unless a second generation program is planned. In this sense, multi-generational systems, 
like many Earth observation satellite programs, see much better stakeholder engagement 
and involvement in the architecture.  
 
The other relevant dimension here is the duration over which benefit is delivered. 
Is benefit delivered incrementally through the project’s implementation and operation, or 
is it delivered in a burst, only once the entire system is complete? For example, we can 
assume that political benefit deriving from spending in a given district will accrue over 
the life of the project, whereas science benefit only occurs when data is actually returned 
from the lunar surface. For incremental value delivery, we can imagine that there would 
be earlier stakeholder feedback. If there is a desire to include feedback in the design, then 
we have to ensure that the architecture has flexible goals. For a more concrete example, if 
a manned mission campaign is to be preceded by a robotic campaign, then we require that 
the manned mission architecture can switch science objective to respond to data gathered 
from robots. For point benefit delivery, we have no opportunities to test which aspects of 
the architecture affect benefit prior to system completion, which increases the need for 
interim reviews.  
 
When Does Benefit Require Simultaneous Actions? 
 
 I think it is clear to the reader that many types of benefit require several things to 
fall in line at once. For example, new science data is not necessarily valuable without the 
funding to analyze it. The model as I have defined it searches only for paths through the 
network, assuming that a given input can be used to influence a given output. 
 
 For a first level analysis in only the benefit space, one could simply flag all stocks 
where multiple inputs are needed to modulate the output. One would then have to 
perform a search function back to the starting node to capture paths leading to the 
required additional flow(s). One criteria for selecting parallel paths might be 
commonality in the NASA output. Under this regime, one would have to represent trees 
with the root at the NASA input, and the leaves at the NASA outputs, as shown in the 
figure below. 
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Figure 66 Value Loop Representation With Couples 
 More detailed analysis of this phenomena cannot rely on manual pairings of 
inputs. This likely requires definition of a ‘physical’ model, where the stock fill rate is 
actually defined by the flow rates on inputs.  
5.3.3. On Outputs 
 
There are two divergent contexts in which we can examine the outputs of this 
methodology. First, we can examine them in the context of modeling-assisted decision 
making process, and  second, in the context of a traditional requirements engineering 
decision process.  
 
Model-Assisted Decision Making 
 
 This section examines the possible concerns on the utility of stakeholder analysis 
in an environment where the architecture is being chosen with assistance from a large 
architecture model.  
 
 From a computational perspective, given a large architecture space which is 
computationally intractable as a whole, one would want to:  
 
1. Run a stakeholder analysis to define what processes have to be included in the 
architecture space 
2. Create a rough model of the architecture, match this to rough metrics for 
stakeholders, and throw out architectures that deliver little benefit 
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3. Create a more detailed model of the architecture, sorting for technical feasibility 
and technical metrics.  
4. Use stakeholder analysis to define detailed metrics by which architecture should 
be evaluated, including soft ‘observable’ comparisons, then rate architectures 
across stakeholders, eliminating Pareto inefficient architectures.  
5. Use detailed affordability, risk, policy robustness and value comparisons across 
architectures to select the winner.  
 
 Notice that model-assisted methods rely much more strongly on metrics. These 
methods also require different types of information. Specifically, they require that the 
architect input explicit tradeoffs when different metrics are used to evaluate benefit (as 
opposed when metrics are used to enforce constraints). Additionally, model-assisted 
methods force a distinction between hard (measurable) metrics and soft (observable) 
metrics. These soft metrics must be evaluated by the architect through comparisons 
within the architecture space.  Goals play a smaller role in model-assisted methods, 
because there is no uncertainty as to the final design value.  
 
 Goals play a larger role where there is uncertainty in the final product – as such, 
encoding stakeholder needs as goals helps bracket the value of the final design. Goals and 
metrics are not opposing, in the sense that a model-assisted approach can be used first to 
define which goals are reasonable, and then further, to define the Metrics and Target 
Values by which the eventual design should be evaluated. This is very much in the spirit 
of the DoDAF metrics described above.  
 
Requirements Engineering 
 
 For the sake of argument, I abstract the traditional requirements engineering 
process as follows :  
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Figure 67 Traditional Requirements Engineering Process 
(Adopted From Crawley ESD.34 Fall Lecture 3) 
I have already shown how we can prioritize needs according to important 
stakeholders, and we can derive metrics that are representative of stakeholder value. 
However, we have not yet addressed how these conceptions might fare when pitted 
against typical organizational pressure on legacy, cost, schedule, performance shortfalls, 
within the requirements engineering process?  
 
Many of these pressures are stakeholder-driven or overseen. Cost oversight is one 
the Congress’ main roles – although some would argue the real responsibility is internal 
if the evaluating body doesn’t have the technical expertise to understand cost trends. Use 
of legacy hardware is sometimes advanced by contractors looking to extend current 
contracts and the implementation of interfaces with legacy is primarily the contractor’s 
responsibility. Past performance shortfalls linger in stakeholder consultations, influencing 
stakeholder strategies on setting their minimum requirements.  
 
The essential tension that exists in this problem is a battle between building 
internal capabilities vs. delivering external benefit. For example, cutting requirements to 
meet a schedule deadline may help accomplish land people on the moon sooner, but 
conceivably with fewer science capabilities. We could re-express this tension as a 
competition between responding to stakeholders and achieving technical feasibility.  
 
The easiest mental model to fit this problem is to consider stakeholder satisfaction 
as part of the performance space of the architecture. According to conventional system 
engineering wisdom, one can control a maximum of 2 of : Cost, Schedule and 
Performance.  
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One solution is therefore to assign internal owners to particular benefit delivery 
programs, particularly where value propositions are not easily encoded as  technical 
requirements. If stakeholder satisfaction results from emergent behavior defined from a 
number of architectural values, then it is only logical that the concerns have to be 
managed across the breadth of the project, rather than locally. On the process side, this 
means that requirements trades have to be carefully scoped in order to capture the 
relevant benefit space and benefit-owners. I have already shown a method for 
determining the benefit sensitivity of a particular architecture variable – obviously if a 
requirements trade has no benefit implications it should not considered in the trade.  
 
I postulate that one of most common failure points of benefit analysis is 
overscoping the architecture. Imagine if stakeholders are allowed to express possible 
objectives with widely different architecture scopes. Over time, the architecting process 
narrows the architecture space, in response to cost constraints, schedule deadlines, etc. 
The natural response is to eliminate those objectives that don’t fit into the new space, 
despite the fact that the stakeholder’s needs remain. Moreover, throwing out those 
objectives  suggests that all stakeholder needs are malleable and possibly infirm. This 
problem does not arise because stakeholders are inherently unreasonable, but rather 
because the questions asked of them are typically open-ended. Working with stakeholder 
to narrow these objectives as the architecture space narrows is essential if the architect is 
going to attempt to track benefit as a performance metric. 
 
 
 
Figure 68 Shrinking Architecture Space 
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 The key contribution from this thesis to requirements engineering is that value 
mapping allows the architect to scope out all of the stakeholder considerations relevant to 
the problem, so that when it comes to validating the design, one understand the 
dimensions along which the design needs to be evaluated. Given that not all stakeholder 
needs can be encoded as requirements, but that they are observable from an architecture, 
this means that we need checks built into design reviews that examine these soft 
consideration across a comparison set of architectures.  
 
 In a model-assisted decision frame, this is easily done. However, as can be seen 
from the NASA design review model, where benefit considerations are almost non-
existent, this is more difficult. I don’t believe that it makes sense to ask the reviewers 
(and stakeholders) to determine whether a given architecture meets these needs, because 
the tendency will be to “check the box”. Therefore, I believe that where alternative 
architectures are brought forth or considered at a design review, particularly for trades, 
the benefit should be captured as a dimension of evaluation.  
 
I postulate that stakeholders whose stake in the organization depends more on 
implementation than operation will be more likely to care about singular architectural 
variables. If given the opportunity for broad input on the architecture, these actors will 
use couplings in the design to argue indirectly for the architecture that favors them. For 
example, a company focused on robotics and in-space assembly will favor an architecture 
that involves EOR and LOR over a direct mission. The point is that stakeholders whose 
benefit derives from single architectural variables will nevertheless attempt to extend 
their influence to include more architectural variables, in particular because it can be 
more difficult to discern vested interest. Therefore, it could prove desirable, though not 
necessarily feasible, to limit consultations with stakeholders to those aspects directly 
related to their benefit, leaving decisions about design couplings to the architect.  
 
With respect to stakeholders who derive benefit from the operation of the system, 
there may be cases where stakeholders are only concerned with a subset of the 
architecture. For example, those scientist concerned with lunar soil may only be 
concerned with surface operations, given that they have access to (assumed) 
homogeneous samples wherever the activities are located on the surface. 
 
What use is this information? I have made reference several times to segregating 
stakeholder involvement as a function of their interests. At the consultation stage, this 
shouldn’t be a significant concern, in the sense that consultations are typically structured 
to capture as much input as possible. However, at the evaluation stage, we should only 
evaluate stakeholder benefit for the aspects of the architecture that directly concern that 
stakeholder, rather than attempting to evaluate a stakeholder’s opinions on all aspects of 
the architecture.  
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 This is necessarily a soft consideration, given the variation in benefit and design 
processes. More important than capturing benefit in the design process, it is important to 
align people in the organization to benefit, as highlighted above. 
 
What are the possible organizational alignment principles vis-à-vis managing for 
stakeholder value?  
 
 I’ve already touched on some of the organizational principles informed by this 
work, but I have collected them and expanded on the below.  
 
1. The organization should be aligned with the value outputs it produces, particularly 
at the architecture decision level. Valued outputs should be clearly traceable to 
responsibilities, processes, and incentives within the organization. This means 
have individuals to represent and analyze the needs of stakeholders who benefit 
from the architecture, in proportion to the organization’s stakeholder priorities.  
 
2. Identifying value loops helps an organization understand who contributes to the 
provision of the inputs the organization requires. 
 
3. Organizational representatives for benefit streams should be proportionately 
represented at design reviews, but only for those stakeholders which are 
architecture discriminators. Stakeholder who receive benefit that is invariant 
within the architecture space should not be consulted at the architecture definition 
stage. 
 
4. Where architectural choices settle conflicts between stakeholders, these decision 
should be expressed to the relevant stakeholders, to build buy-in and 
communicate how their needs are being met.  
 
5. Given the length of value loops, and the supposition that a given player only has 
visibility to 2 flows in front and behind, then it may be difficult to identify the 
root provider of value. There are opportunities with stakeholders to improve the 
branding and the gain of these loops for those stakeholders who don’t have 
visibility back to NASA. Furthermore, reducing the number stakeholders and 
value flows between the organization and the end beneficiary will almost 
universally improve traceability. 
 
6. Building common understanding among stakeholders can help reinforce key 
messages in a distributed fashion. For example, reinforcing a message that NASA 
provides health benefits to the population, and strengthening communications 
opportunities among relevant stakeholders, may eventually lead to a conventional 
wisdom that “NASA does life science research”, at which stage stakeholders will 
form a distributed communications network for NASA. Likewise, the value of 
reinforcing aspects of NASA’s work that are already in the conventional wisdom 
may not prove to be high-leverage activities. 
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6.  Future Work and Conclusions 
 
In this thesis, I have explored the feasibility of making architectural decisions 
based on stakeholder analysis and externally-delivered value. I have shown that using 
stakeholder networks can help represent the complexity of indirect benefit delivery. I 
have also advanced a numerical methodology for encoding stakeholder preferences, 
which can be used to determine the relative prioritization of the outputs of the 
organization. Furthermore, I have created and tested a framework for linking benefit 
models to architecture models, in order to confirm that benefit models can indeed be used 
to differentiate between architectures.  
 
For reference I have collated the principles derived in this thesis below:  
 
1. Internal assets restrict the input-output connectivity of a stakeholder model 
 
2. Network diagrams can help represent and book keep complex value flows 
characterized by indirect value delivery 
 
3. Indirect benefit delivery forces consideration of value loops over simpler 
transaction models.  
 
4. Computation on value flows can discover discrepancies between how different 
groups perceive the mission of the organization 
 
5. Weighted outputs provide an indication of how the organization should align its 
products to create strong feedback loops to inputs of importance 
 
6. Stakeholder inputs should be traceable to metrics and criteria at the architecture 
evaluation phase 
 
7. Not all benefit flows will differentiate between architectures – some types of 
benefit will be produced regardless of which architecture is chosen 
 
8. The outputs of the organization in a value network model define the space of 
proximate metrics required for architecture evaluation.  
 
9. The human ability to conceptualize the level of detail in the model is an important 
component of success when attributes of the benefit are observable but not 
decomposable.  
 
10. Covariance of needs in a coupled architecture-stakeholder model will identify 
conflicting, synergistic and orthogonal needs  
 
There are a numbers directions of future work on this topic, given that it 
quantitative methods for ‘soft’ engineering and management considerations are becoming 
tractable with new analytical techniques.  
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Stakeholder Models 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, there are three big question to address on 
stakeholder models: 
 
1. When does benefit require simultaneous inputs? How can these constraints 
be effectively represented within the current framework? 
 
2. How does the network representation of stakeholders enable the architect 
to identify opportunities for new benefit flows or connectivity between 
stakeholders? This could be framed either in terms of maximizing inputs 
or in terms of providing alternative paths to enable policy flexibility.  
 
3. How do value loops function when stakeholders form coalitions? This 
would require understanding the terms on which stakeholders create 
coalitions, and the action they would take.  
 
In terms of the baseline modeling structure created, there are also several areas 
that would be interesting to investigate. Namely, it would be interesting to build a second 
level of depth into a stakeholder network model, to investigate whether the 
decomposition of needs provides more or less accountability for decisions. Additionally, 
it would be worthwhile investigating the calibration of a limited subset of loops, but with 
the understanding that traceability of impact makes this an enormous challenge. This 
work would be particularly useful in studying conversions of flow types, and its impact 
on traceability to the root provider of value.  
 
 It would also be interesting to interface the current network model to an internal 
model of NASA, to better understand how inputs translate into outputs on a more 
operational level than the current long term architecting approach taken in this thesis.  
 
 Finally, it would be interesting to expand on the competition aspect of stakeholder 
power. One could relatively quickly expand the current competition framework to include 
multiple layers of competition within a value chain. A more in-depth study of 
competition would have to define the benefit of competition explicitly in terms of 
margins (or the non-monetary equivalents of margins), in order to correlate levels of 
competition with transaction costs or availability of resources. 
 
Proximate Metrics and Architectures 
 
 First and foremost, the development of a complete set of proximate metrics with 
respect to an actual architecture space is needed. While science metrics for other 
applications have been well developed in the literature, there is a definite hole in the 
literature on exploration and planetary surface science metrics.  
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  The next step would be to create a coupled model of stakeholders and 
architectures, which would necessarily include constraints. In particular, cost constraints 
would be the most interesting to include, to enable a value equals benefit at cost 
argument. This exercise would have to wrestle with a number of concerns highlighted in 
Section 5.3.3, namely whether functions or forms must be specified to compute benefit, 
and what to do if the benefit to different stakeholders occurs at different phases of the life 
of the architecture.  
 
 I think there is also significant work to be done on the representation of benefit 
for different architecture. Some sketches were provided in this thesis, but the problem of 
illustrating an architecture space with physical, cost, and stakeholder constraints, and 
different functions for benefit and cost within the feasible space remains. I continue to 
believe that the use of visual media will be essential if this methodology is to be 
effective. 
 
Organizational Studies 
 
 As the reader has most certainly noticed, much of this thesis is concerned with 
phenomena created by large engineering organizations. The incentives and structure 
within organizations like NASA have rise to the incomplete benefit space exploration that 
motivated this thesis. Any successful methodology with the same scope of this thesis has 
to make very clear how it will integrate within current organizations.  
 
 There is still significant work to be done on the motivation for this research: 
Expressing and demonstrating with historical examples why it is so difficult to capture 
non-technical requirements. While some organizational studies certainly exist with 
respect to engineering failures, the literature would really benefit for a clear set of case 
studies on the structures that lead to an incomplete consideration of the benefit space, 
particularly in the aerospace industry.  
 
 I think future work in this area would also have to include how decision-support 
tools interface in actuality with organizational processes, particularly for decisions on 
stakeholder benefit, which have historically been made on very rough heuristics.   
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7. Appendix 1 : Individual Value Flows 
  
 The table below provides a description for each type of link in the model, listed 
alphabetically. 
 
Benefit Flow Description 
Access to highly visible 
events 
Capabilities that enable greater depth of (non-NASA) 
media coverage. Video cameras on spacecraft, live 
interview time with astronauts, etc.  
Commercial launch Commercial launch services purchased by economic 
players, NASA, and security. Ex. Delta 4 flight to orbit 
a satellite.  
Corporate taxes Taxes paid by firms in the economy.  
Economy opinions and 
policy support 
The view of NASA as a whole and with respect to 
specific programs that is espoused by contractors to 
the US Congress as well as the media. Ex. lobbying 
the congress by Boeing, or contractor interviews on 
their bids for the CEV in Popular Mechanics.  
Educator opinions and 
policy support 
The feedback from K-12 teachers and university 
professors to the media and to the US Congress on 
the provision of educational material by NASA. This 
does not cover research opinions, which are lumped 
under Science.  
Exploration systems The hardware and software systems provided in return 
for NASA contracts. Ex. Shuttle SRBs.  
Funding The annual budget and budget outlooks provided by 
the Congress to NASA, which represents the only 
source of income for NASA in this model.  
Goods and services, inc. 
health, derived from 
space technology 
This represents the technology transfer of space 
technology and space-derived science knowledge to 
products for the American people. Ex. molecular 
biology experiments onboard ISS that aid in the 
development of a commercial drug, or more directly 
from NASA technology, velcro.  
Human Exploration First 
Events 
Humans in new places, not necessarily on a planetary 
surface. Landing in new locations on the same planet 
would count as a new event. Ex. Landing at the lunar 
pole.  
Humans in Space Events Projected events that show humans in space but not 
exploring a planetary body. This would include test 
flights leading up to a new exploration event. Ex. A 
crew exchange on the ISS.  
Informative and 
entertaining media 
content 
Covers all media coverage of NASA, from spacecraft 
launches to new images returned from planetary 
missions. Separated into entertaining and informative, 
which are not mutually exclusive, in recognition that 
event-centric coverage (launch) has a different 
audience from science-results coverage.  
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International Agreements Agreements or treaties signed between nations for 
cooperation in space. Would include collaborative 
projects (ISS), exchanges (modules for astronaut 
flights) or NASA supplied hardware for international 
flights. Agreements are nec. but not suf. for actual 
hardware exchange. Actual hardware exchange are 
modelled separately.  
International launch 
services 
Launch of NASA cargo or people, typically government 
controlled launch faclities (Soyuz), but also including 
commercial launch services purchased internationally 
(Ariane, DNEPR) which require some political 
mediation.  
Internationally provided 
space systems 
Modules, instruments, or capabilities provided under 
international agreement. Does not distinguish between 
systems provided for an international project and 
systems provided for a NASA mission. 
Mission and Event Content The web, video and audio content that NASA makes 
available for direct consumption by stakeholders . 
Examples include the Mars pathfinder website and 
NASA TV broadcasts from the ISS. This does not 
include technical data, or the frequency or interest of 
the events, just the extent to which NASA publishes 
content.  
NASA Contract funding Contracts to industry for exploration hardware, and 
the associated analysis. Ex. Canadarm2 acquisition 
NASA educational content Content (video, written, or exhibits or speeches) 
specifically designed to be used by teachers (K12 or at 
the university level), created by NASA.  
NASA Instruments and 
Modules 
NASA instruments provided to international partners 
on national missions. This is the converse of 
'internationally provided space systems'. 
NASA Launch and Space 
Services 
Use of NASA infrastructure (Deep Space Network, 
TDRSS) or launch services (Shuttle) by security or 
international partners. 
NASA Market funding Funding for systems or services that are partially or 
wholly motivated by a desire to create a new market, 
typically to achieve cost reduction or improve 
performance. For example, ISS resupply contracts.  
NASA Science Events Presentation of science knowledge on a NASA mission, 
or the launch of a primarily-science mission. Ex. 
Release of new Hubble photos.  
NASA Science Funding Contracts for analysis of science data or acquisition of 
hardware from scientist in universities or research 
institutions. This includes exploration and technology 
relevant analysis (ex. engine flow solvers), not just 
'pure' science.  
NASA Space Technology Two main categories - technology relevant to future 
space applications, and technology relevant to earth 
applications (spin-offs). Ex. automated rendezvous 
and docking and velcro, respectively. 
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NASA Space Technology 
Demonstration Events 
Events that are primarily tech demonstrations, may be 
manned or unmanned. Ex. Spacecraft testing an 
autonomous rendezvous and docking procedure.  
Participation in 
international exploration 
missions 
The benefits derived in exchange for supplying 
instruments and modules to an international mission, 
including foreign political capital, mission and event 
content, and sharing of cost.  
Participation in NASA-led 
exploration mission 
Benefits of participating in NASA-led exploration 
missions, including transportation to destination, 
spacecraft bus, as well as PR content at home. 
Received in exchange for internationally provided 
space systems. 
Personal Taxes Taxes paid to the government on income. Given that 
there is no federal goods and services tax, this is most 
strongly influenced by employment.  
Plans and Progress 
Reports 
The architecture's ability to provide regular reports, to 
show progress in a sequential, measured fashion. This 
flow is only provided to the stakeholders who might 
have a role in the planning. Whether or not the 
architect is providing plans the stakeholder agrees or 
disagrees with is captured by the projected value 
flows, not here.  
Policy direction This captures a number of elements. 1) Congressional 
feedback on plans and progress reports, including 
directives that carry possible funding implications in 
the future 2) Throughput of international agreements 
from international partners to NASA 3) Executive 
direction on the types of missions, as well as 
characteristics of those missions (ex. near term 
demonstrations of progress) 
Political support (votes) This is a special subset of Public Opinion, that deals 
with the election of Congress and the Executive. It is 
intended to capture the extent to which a given 
administration is associated with NASA's actions, 
postive and negative.  
Protection against claims 
of sovereignty on 
planetary bodies 
Primarily presence in space and on planets, but also 
imaging that could be used to document abuses of the 
Outer Space Treaty. As this is not a strong justification 
currently, it is binary - presence or no presence on a 
planet. This is provided to the Congress, rather than 
the people, because it is not a tangible benefit, and 
because the Congress is specifically chartered with the 
stewardship of safety.  
Public opinions and policy 
support 
Specific feedback provided to Congress, as well as 
'concensus' opinions given in the media, on all aspects 
of NASA performance, but primarily those relevant to 
the US people, such as inspiration, space-derived 
goods and services, etc. For example, popular support 
for the Mars exploration rovers, as evidenced by 
increased media coverage, including interviews of 
students and people on the street.  
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Science and engineering 
inspired students 
Students are provided by the US People to the 
Educators, to the extent that they have been inspired 
by NASA to pursue technical careers.  
Science data Observations and measurements captured by NASA, 
both in space and on planetary surfaces. Ex. radar 
altimetry of the moon, radiation levels in LEO.  
Science knowledge The knowledge gained from NASA exploration 
activities, as processed and created by scientists from 
science data. Ex. gravity model of the moon, presence 
of water at the lunar pole.  
Science opinions and 
policy support 
This captures both science opinions on NASA provided 
to the media (ex. 'NASA is cutting lifescience 
funding!') and science feedback to NASA  directly on 
what areas merit attention - such as the relative worth 
of going to the lunar pole vs in an equatorial site.  
Security benefits The protection from harm and invasion, a feeling of 
security. This is recognized in the model as another 
mechanism by which activities in space contribute to 
quality of life.  
Security Funding The money allocated to defense activities. This 
quantitiy is present to show that there are competing 
agents for the government's budget, and to provide 
the source for security's contract funding in the model.  
Security opinions and 
policy support 
The support or lack thereof of NASA expressed by 
various security organizations, particularly with 
respect to joint programs (Space Shuttle) and shared 
industrial base. Ex. US air force largely pulling out of 
Space Shuttle as a launch vehicle, and creation of 
another EELV program, after the loss of Challenger.   
Skilled workforce The result of training students in a specific discipline. 
Educators are the source of skilled workforce. The 
assumption made is that each stakeholder has a stock 
of human capital, which increases the skills of their 
workforce, but these workers are not transfered 
between stakeholders, in order to simplify the model. 
Ex. MIT training aerospace engineers, who go to work 
at Lockheed.  
Space Acquired Data Measurements relevant to security and commercial 
interests in space - knowledge that is not particularly 
scientifically interesting, but which is valuable for 
building and operating space technology. Ex. fine 
measurements of the micrometeroid frequency in 
GEO.   
Space resource 
knowledge 
Knowledge relevant to commercial interests for 
mining, such as the prevalence of hydrogen at the 
lunar poles. This captures a very specific form of 
science data  
Space tourism services The market created within the economy for space 
tourism opportunities, which may or may not be 
derived directly from NASA, but nevertheless 
represent one of the most tangible offshoots of the 
space program to the US People. Ex. suborbital flights 
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on SpaceShipOne, or soyuz flights to the ISS.  
Stable and rewarding 
employment 
The extent to which an architecture provides 
employment to NASA employees, and the relative 
certainty that the project will not be terminated or 
create layoffs. For example, a selection of NASA as 
prime contractor woud increase employment by NASA, 
and decrease that of contractors. Competiting forms of 
stable employment are listed in the model, originating 
from other stakeholders.  
Unmanned Exploration 
First Events 
New exploration events that represent a significant 
first. This is differentiated from Science events if the 
'First' is more compelling or interesting than the 
'Science'. The presentation of the science data 
gathered from an exploration event might merit a 
secondary NASA Science Event. Ex. NASA's Deep 
Impact : Flying a spacecraft through a comet tail 
 
 
 The table below indicates the values that I chose for the model. Kano Must Haves 
are shown as ‘5’, One Dimensionals as ‘3’ and Exciters as ‘1’, to match the 
implementation in OPN. Likewise, for the importance scale, ‘5’ is high and ‘1’ is low.  
 
To NASA From Kano Importance Value 
Funding Exec & 
Cong 
5 5 1.00 
Policy Direction Exec & 
Cong 
5 4 0.78 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 3 4 0.26 
Skilled and motivated workforce Educators 5 4 0.78 
Commercial launch services Economy 5 5 1.00 
Exploration systems Economy 5 5 1.00 
Science knowledge Science 1 3 0.06 
Science systems  Science 5 3 0.55 
Science opinions and policy 
support 
Science 5 2 0.33 
International launch services Int Part 5 3 0.55 
Internationally provided space 
systems 
Int Part 1 3 0.06 
Participation in international 
exploration mission 
Int Part 1 2 0.04 
To Executive and Congress From Kano Importance Value 
Protection against claims of 
sovereignty in space 
NASA 5 1 0.10 
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Plans and Progress Reports NASA 5 3 0.55 
NASA Mission and Event Content NASA 1 2 0.04 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 3 4 0.26 
Educator opinions and policy 
support 
Educators 1 1 0.01 
Economy opinions and policy 
support 
Economy 1 2 0.04 
Corporate Taxes Economy 5 1 0.10 
Science opinions and policy 
support 
Science 1 1 0.01 
International agreements Int Part 3 4 0.26 
Security opinions and Policy 
Support 
Security 3 3 0.19 
Protection against claims of 
sovereignty in space 
Security 5 2 0.33 
Political Support (Votes) US People 5 5 1.00 
Taxes (should this be marginal 
taxes?) 
US People 3 2 0.11 
Public opinion and policy support US People 3 4 0.26 
To Media From Kano Importance Value 
Plans and Progress Reports NASA 1 2 0.04 
Access to highly visible events NASA 1 3 0.06 
NASA Mission and Event Content NASA 1 2 0.04 
Humans in Space Events NASA 5 3 0.55 
Human Exploration First Events NASA 5 5 1.00 
Unmanned Exploration First 
Events 
NASA 5 4 0.78 
NASA Science Events NASA 3 4 0.26 
NASA Space technology 
demontration Events 
NASA 3 3 0.18 
Educator opinions and policy 
support 
Educators 1 3 0.06 
Economy opinions and policy 
support 
Economy 1 1 0.01 
Science knowledge Science 1 2 0.04 
Science opinions and policy 
support 
Science 1 2 0.04 
Public opinion and policy support US People 1 2 0.04 
To Educators From Kano Importance Value 
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NASA Mission and Event Content NASA 1 2 0.04 
NASA education material NASA 1 3 0.06 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 1 3 
0.06 
Science knowledge Science 3 4 0.26 
Science and Eng Inspired Students US People 5 5 1.00 
To Economy From Kano Importance Value 
NASA Market funding NASA 3 3 0.19 
NASA contract funding NASA 3 4 0.26 
Space resource knowledge NASA 3 3 0.19 
NASA launch and space services NASA 1 2 0.04 
NASA space technology NASA 3 3 0.19 
Space acquired data NASA 3 3 0.19 
Plans and progress reports NASA 3 5 0.34 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 3 3 0.19 
Skilled and motivated workforce Educators 5 5 1.00 
Science knowledge Science 1 2 0.04 
Security Contract Funding Security 5 5 1.00 
To Science From Kano Importance Value 
NASA science funding NASA 5 5 1.00 
NASA space technology NASA 3 3 0.19 
Science data NASA 5 5 1.00 
Space acquired data NASA 3 4 0.26 
Plans and progress reports NASA 3 4 0.26 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 
1 3 
0.06 
Skilled and motivated workforce Educators 
5 5 
1.00 
To International Partners From Kano Importance Value 
NASA launch and space services NASA 
1 4 
0.09 
Plans and progress reports NASA 5 4 0.78 
NASA instruments and modules NASA 
1 2 
0.04 
Participation in NASA Exploration 
Missions 
NASA 
3 5 
0.33 
International agreements Exec & 
Cong 3 4 
0.26 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 
1 3 
0.06 
To Security From Kano Importance Value 
NASA space technology NASA 1 2 0.04 
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NASA launch and space services NASA 
1 3 
0.06 
Space acquired data NASA 3 4 0.26 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 
1 3 
0.06 
Skilled and motivated workforce Educators 
5 5 
1.00 
Commercial launch services Economy 5 5 1.00 
Science knowledge Science 1 3 0.06 
To US People From Kano Importance Value 
Stable and rewarding employment NASA 
5 4 
0.78 
NASA Mission and Event Content NASA 
1 3 
0.06 
Media Entertainment and 
Information 
Media 
3 4 
0.26 
Stable and rewarding employment Educators 
5 2 
0.33 
Stable and rewarding employment Economy 
5 5 
1.00 
Space tourism services Economy 1 3 0.06 
Goods and services, including 
health technology, derived from 
space technology 
Economy 
1 2 
0.04 
Stable and rewarding employment Science 
5 3 
0.55 
Stable and rewarding employment Security 
5 4 
0.78 
Security benefits Security 5 5 1.00 
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8. Appendix 2 : Building a Benefit Network Model in OPN 
 
Key Attributes of OPN Model 
 
1) Each flow modifies value, using the statement: v = v*k1*i1*c1 where the 
numbers are indices for the Kano, Importance, and Competition. All of these 
values have to be initialized.  
 
2) The path through the system is traced based on flows. One variable, ‘path’ , is a 
concatenated string containing the names of all the flows. The statement is:  
 
            path=path+ “Security Opinions” 
 
It is important that all similar flows have the exact same spelling, because some of 
the post-processing in Excel is case-sensitive. 
  
3) The model checks to make sure each stakeholder is only visited once. There is a 
variable for visits, initialized to zero. This variable is then incremented by any 
process that is going towards the node (ex. people = people+1). All links that 
connect to a node therefore have to have a logical check, people = =1 , to ensure 
that node has not yet been visited. Alternatively, if you wanted to allow loops, 
you could set this relative to a variable, ex people <= max, max=2.  
 
4) I have a counter to determine the length of a loop. Every process increments 
length = length +1 
 
5) In order to get the model to run in a finite length of time, I put a cap on the value 
of v. This is encoded on the links that exit a node and go to the outgoing process, 
and is written v<a, where a in my model works as low as 0.001. There is an 
additional logical constraints, see #1 below (stop stakeholders).  
 
6) Each stakeholder in my model is composed of a series of objects, the internal 
assets. Together, these internal assets form the stakeholder node. The internal 
assets provide connectivity between inputs and outputs, to prevent any input from 
being paired with any output (which might result in an illogical pairing).  
 
7) All inputs to NASA are collected at a centralized ‘Report Node’.  
 
Getting the Model Stop at Stakeholders 
 
1) I have an outgoing process linked to each node. The link is conditional on a flag, 
ex. STOPPeople. The idea is open this path up to tokens, and prevents tokens 
from taking any other outgoing path . Therefore, all the other outgoing links from 
the node need a STOPPeople==0 condition (in addition to the v>a condition).  
 
2) The results have to be collected from a separate ReportStakeholder node.  
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Getting the Model Stop at Stakeholders 
 
1) I have a process that leaves from the initializing node. It has a conditional link, 
only for STARTPeople == 1. This process only has code to set the starting node’s 
visited flag to one (people = people + 1). This process has to be linked to all 
internal assets in the node, which will necessarily create duplicates. Duplicates 
can be handled in the post-processing.  
 
Post Processing 
 
1) Process for duplicates (have an algorithm).  
2) Rank by v value 
3) Determine stakeholder incidence in high-value loops 
4) Determine NASA output incidence in high value loops 
5) Determine NASA inputs incidence in high value loops 
6) Collect START and STOP data pairs for each stakeholder at a variety of levels. 
 
Couple of Flaws I’ve Found in OPN: 
  
1) It is very difficult to query the token’s location in the model. As such, any path-
related algorithms have to be decentralized, in the sense that the code has to be 
embedded at its origin, not at its destination.  
2) I couldn’t figure out how to assign variables to a matrix (without using a string) of 
uncertain size – therefore, all nodes (stakeholders) are referenced using separated 
variables.  
3)  You can’t modify a variable in a process, then reference it.  
 
For example: 
klo = 0.5 
khi = 1.0 
k=klo 
k=khi 
a=k 
 
Comes out a = 0.5 instead of a=1.0 
 
3) If viewing report tokens, need to click on another object in list, then back to the 
report, in order to fully refresh list of tokens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 161 - 
9. Appendix 3 : Code for Metrics 
9.1. Science Data and Space Resource Knowledge Metrics 
 
Total Crew Science Hours 
#Fixed and Made Up Variables 
numMissions=10 
MaxCrewObservationDays=6*30 
UnmannedObservationDays=360 
numScienceInstruments=10 
UnmannedDiscount=1/4 
EVAhours = 6 
ScienceTimeFraction = 0.4 
 
#Calculations 
 
CrewObserveDays=crew*duration 
CrewScienceHours = CrewObserveDays*EVAhours*ScienceTimeFraction 
TotalCrewScienceHours = CrewScienceHours*numMissions 
 
#Amount of Data Collected Value Table 
DataAmountZeroPC = 0 
DataAmountTenPC = 0.5*numScienceInstruments  
DataAmountNinetyPC = 10*numScienceInstruments 
DataAmountOneHPC = 40*numScienceInstruments 
 
Amount of Data Collected Calculation 
DataAmount = TotalCrewScienceHours 
DataAmountValue = Interpolator(DataAmount, DataAmountZeroPC, 
DataAmountTenPC, DataAmountNinetyPC, DataAmountOneHPC) 
 
Mass Per Instrument 
MassPerInstrument = sciencemass/numScienceInstruments 
 
MPIZeroPC = 0 
MPITenPC = 1 
MPINinetyPC = 100 
MPIOneHPC = 1000 
 
MPIValue = Interpolator(MassPerInstrument, 
MPIZeroPC,MPITenPC,MPINinetyPC,MPIOneHPC) 
 
Roving Area  
RovingArea = 3.14*roverrange*roverrange 
 
# Roving Area Value Table 
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RovingAreaZeroPC = 0 
RovingAreaTenPC = 3.14*0.1*0.1 
RovingAreaNinetyPC = 3.14*30*30 
RovingAreaOneHPC = 3.14*100*100 
 
# Roving Area Value 
RovingAreaValue = 
Interpolator(RovingArea,RovingAreaZeroPC,RovingAreaTenPC,RovingAreaNinetyPC,
RovingAreaOneHPC) 
 
Data Quality 
#Because rover speed is not traded, set its value to 1 
RoverSpeed = 30 
RoverSpeedValue = 1 
 
DataQuality = MPIValue*access*RovingAreaValue*RoverSpeedValue 
 
Science Data 
ScienceData = DataAmountValue*DataQualityValue 
 
Space Resource Knowledge 
SpaceResourceKnowledge = Science Data 
 
9.2. NASA Space and Launch Services Metric 
 
Heavy Lift Value  
HeavyLiftZeroPC = 23 
HeavyLiftTenPC = 25 
HeavyLiftNinetyPC = 60 
HeavyLiftOneHPC = 130 
 
HeavyLiftValue = Interpolator(HeavyLift,HeavyLiftZeroPC,HeavyLiftTenPC, 
HeavyLiftNinetyPC, HeavyLiftOneHPC) 
 
NASA Launch Services 
NASALaunchServices = HeavyLiftValue 
 
9.3. Science Funding Metric 
 
# Here we mean money for science instruments that go to the moon 
# not science funding that helps design exploration hardware 
 
FundingPerKilo = 100000 
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SciFund = FundingPerKilo*ScienceMass 
 
# Science Funding Table 
SciFundZeroPC = 0 
SciFundTenPC = 10000000 
ScieFundNinetyPC = 100000000 
SciFundOneHPC = 1000000000 
 
Science Funding Value 
SciFundValue = Interpolator(SciFund,SciFundZeroPC,SciFundTenPC, 
ScieFundNinetyPC, SciFundOneHPC) 
 
9.4. Humans In Space Events Metric 
 
# Crew Inspiration Value Table 
CrewInspireZeroPC = 0  
CrewInspireTenPC = 0.5 
CrewInspireNinetyPC = 3 
CrewInspireOneHPC = 10 
 
Crew Inspiration Value 
CrewInspireValue = Interpolator(Crew,CrewInspireZeroPC, CrewInspireTenPC, 
CrewInspireNinetyPC, CrewInspireOneHPC) 
 
# Duration Inspiration Table 
DuraZeroPC = 0 
DuraTenPC = 1 
DuraNinetyPC = 7 
DuraOneHPC = 90 
 
Duration Value 
DuraInspValue = 
Interpolator(duration,DuraZeroPC,DuraTenPC,DuraNinetyPC,DuraOneHPC) 
 
FlightsPerYear = 2 
 
# Flights Per Year Table 
 
FlightsZeroPC = 0  
FlightsTenPC = 0  
FlightsNinetyPC = 3 
FlightsOneHPC = 6 
 
Flight Value 
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FlightsValue = Interpolator(FlightsPerYear, FlightsZeroPC, 
FlightsTenPC,FlightsNinetyPC,FlightsOneHPC) 
 
# Assumed Values 
 
#Assume EVAs are proportional to duration 
EVAValue = DuraInspValue 
VehicleTransferEventsValue = 1 
TotalTimeinSpaceValue = 1 
 
Humans in Space Value 
HumansInSpaceEventsValue = 
CrewInspireValue*DuraInspValue*EVAValue*VehicleTransferEventsValue*TotalTimei
nSpaceValue*FlightsValue 
 
9.5. Human Exploration Firsts Events Metric 
 
Global Access Human Exploration Firsts Locations 
SouthPole = 1 
NorthPole = 1 
LunarFarside = 1  
SouthHighLat = 1  
NorthHighLat = 1 
ModernEquatorial = 1 
 
Equatorial Access Human Exploration Firsts Locations 
ModernEquatorial = 1 
 
LunarNightStay = 1 
 
# Assumptions 
# No habitats, basing, power production, or resource collection in this phase. 
 
RevisitsPerSite = 0 
 
Rate of New Events 
PotentialRateofNewVisits = FlightsPerYear/(RevisitsPerSite+1) 
 
#This could use some work 
#New Visit Rate Table 
NewVisitZeroPC=0 
NewVisitTenPC=0.3 
NewVisitNinetyPC=2 
NewVisitOneHPC=3 
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NewVisitRateValue = 
Interpolator(PotentialRateofNewVisits,NewVisitsZeroPC,NewVisitsTenPC,NewVisitsNi
netyPC,NewVisitsOneHPC) 
  
Total New Events 
TotalExpEvents = 
SouthPole+NorthPole+LunarFarside+LunarNightStay+NorthHighLat+SouthHighLat+M
odernEquatorial 
 
TotalExpEventsZeroPC = 0 
TotalExpEventsTenPC = 0.5 
TotalExpEventsNinetyPC = 3 
TotalExpEventsOneHPC = 25 
 
TotalExpValue = 
Interpolator(TotalExpEvents,TotalExpEventsZeroPC,TotalExpEventsTenPC,TotalExpEv
entsNinetyPC,TotalExpEventsOneHPC) 
 
Human Exploration Firsts 
ExpFirsts = TotalExpValue*NewVisitRateValue 
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